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SUMMARY 
The present study is divided into five ciiapters. In the 
first chapter after definition of justice in general we have 
explained historical background of justice in Greek philosophy 
and in Christianity. Because Muslim philosophers had beeft 
influenced with them. The Greeks looked upon justice as 
virtue. The Greek conception of justice was the virtue of the 
soul and injustice its vice. To both Plato and Aristotle, justice 
meant goodness as well as willingness to obey laws. It 
connoted correspondence of rights and duties. Justice to 
Greeks, was not a mere function of the judicial tribunals. I t 
was the spirit which animated men in the proper discharge of 
their duties. The promotion of balance and harmony in 
thought and action was pre-eminently social in character. 
Justice was the ideal of perfection in human relationships. 
The second chapter deals with tat first the meaning of 
justice in Islam and its various synonyms and it has also 
explained justice in early Muslim philosophy. Such as Khawrij, 
the third party in Islam, who curse both the majority sunnis 
and the shia partisans of Ali They believe that committing a 
grave sin makes him a Kafir (infidel). In fact, they defy 
mercy, an important attribute of God. And also Murjia theory 
of justice who hold that the sinners, are still believers and 
that action is not part of the fai th, to the extent that no sins 
would harm anyone who is a believer and not good deed 
would benefit an infidel. We have also discussed Jabriyah 
theory of justice in early kalam. The school that affirmed man 
is absolutely determined in his deeds. He has neither power 
nor will nor choice. This group emphasized the Divine power 
to the extent that God creates man's actions. In this chapter 
we have also explained the Qadariyah view on justice. Who 
were the opposite of jabriyah, and held that man has power 
over his actions. And they affirmed the delegation of action 
and responsibility to man, without divine assistance. 
The third chapter explains justice in later Muslim 
philosophy. At first we have described Mutazilah theory of 
justice. The school which is known as rationalist. They also is 
called as ahl al tawhid wal-adl. Because they emphasized on 
the unity of God and justice. The Mutazilah held that God is 
ever just and can never be unjust. In the field of free will 
they believed that Divine justice necessitates that man should 
be the author of his own acts, otherwise he cannot be 
responsible for his actions. So all the Mutazilah agree that 
man is maker of his volitional acts. They accepted totally the 
theory of indeterminism and became true successors of 
Qadariyah they argue since man is the creator of his own 
acts, it is necessary for God to reward him for his good acts 
and punish him for his bad acts. They maintained that it is 
only reason which leads us to differentiate between good and 
bad actions. And good and evil are innate in the essence of 
things themselves. 
We have also included al-Farabi as the representative of 
rationalist thinkers. Who in political science preferred to 
follow plato's Republic and laws, as understood by middle 
Platonic thinkers, convinced that plato's theoretical 
philosophy had been superseded by Aristotle and the 
Neoplatonistic, but his analysis of the imperfect state and his 
solution of the problems of politics remained valid and 
compatible with the changed political conditions. Farabi's 
theory of city state is based on his concept of political justice. 
He has emphasized mutual help and co-operation for men in 
the society. He speaks of happiness both of this world and the 
hereafter. Man has been created to achieve the highest 
happiness (Saadah). There are four kinds of virtues that when 
form the qualities of a nation or city, their worldly happiness 
in this world and eternal happiness in the next insured. To 
him, theoretical perfection is the ultimate happiness. Man, 
understand it only through the speculative ration faculty. 
Farabi believes the Imam or the chief of the ideal state 
should possess basic conditions. The state of Farabi is 
international in character. Thus, general concept of justice 
concerns the exercise of virtue in relation to one's fellow 
men, whatever this virtue might be. This concept is 
reminiscent of the platonic definition of justice as a harmony 
of functions in the soul and of classes in the state. 
We have also discussed orthodox Ashariyah 
determinism. Who held an intermediate position between the 
two schools of thought in position in Islam, that is the 
rationalist and the extreme orthodox. In contrast to the 
emphasis of the Mutazilah on the reality of choice in human 
action, Ashariyah insisted on God's omnipotence; every thing 
good and evil , is willed by God. They confirmed that the 
power of choice in human being is created by God, and that 
man has been given the power of acquiring the actions. They 
made a distinction between creation (Khalq) and acquisition 
(Kasb) of an action. God according to them, is the creator of 
human actions and man is the acquisitor. On the question of 
reason, they don't believe in the absolutism of reason as the 
Mutazilah do. They hold that revelation is more fundamental 
than reason. And revelation is the real criterion of good and 
evil. Actions in themselves are neither good nor bad, but 
Dvine law makes them good or bad. They affirmed that God 
can reward whom He will and punish whom He wil l , there is 
nothing binding on God, what He does is just . 
This chapter also deals with Shiah idea of justice. In 
their doctrine, the justice of God constitutes one of the five 
principles of religion (Usui al-din), on the question of justice, 
although they supported the Mutazilah view, but they have 
also given their particular view. The shiah held a mid way 
between the two positions, 'al-amr bayn al-amrayn'. As Imam 
Jafar Sadiq said, " I t is neither predestination nor delegation, 
but a position between the two positions". The Shiah like the 
Mutazilah maintained that reason, is the criterion of goodness 
and badness of an action. They argued that justice is a reality 
in itself and that since God is bound to be just and wise, 
carries out acts in accordance with standard of justice. The 
shia philosophers emphasized that people are the agents of 
all actions emanating from them in a real sense, not 
metaphorically. Nevertheless, their actions are also actions of 
God without any deficiency. 
In the fourth chapter we have dealt with justice in 
modern Muslim Philosophy such as: Qutb, Mutahhari, and 
Shariati. Qutb's theory of justice is on the basis of Laws of 
sharia in Islam. He holds that Islam has one universal theory 
which covers the universe, and life and humanity. So the best 
method of studying Islam is to start by understanding its 
universal theory before going on to study its views on politics 
or economics, etc. to him any society that is not Muslim is 
jahil iyya (ignorant). He has mentioned three principles as 
foundations of social justice in Islam: 1. Freedom of 
conscience 2. Human equality 3. Mutual responsibility in 
society. On these three foundations, social justice is built up, 
and human justice is ensured. He has discussed political and 
economic theory in Islam on the basis of Quranic verses. He 
has mentioned that Islamic political system is based on two 
fundamental conceptions, one is the idea of equality of 
mankind in class, in nature, and in origin; the other is the 
belief that Islam represents the eternal system for the world 
throughout the future of the human race. 
This chapter also deals with Mutahhari's view on justice. 
At first he has defined the concept of justice in four senses, 
such as: balance, equality, etc. To him, justice means to keep 
every thing in its own place, and also means giving every 
possessor of right his due. Mutahhari like plato and Aristotle 
advocated the establishment of the best government in the 
political philosophy. On the problem of evil and objections on 
the Divine justice he has given his philosophical methods to 
solve that problem In which evil Is either relative or non-
existential. 
Besides the Qutb and Mutahhari we have also described 
Shariati's view on justice who believes that Islam has a 
unique culture which is neither totally spiritual, nor totally 
mystical, nor completely philosophical, and nor entirely 
materialistic and technological. But it is a mixture of fai th, 
idealism and spirituality and yet full of life and energy with a 
dominant spirit of equality and justice. He believes Shiism is 
based on two principles: (1) justice (2) Imamate. To him 
justice means social equality and equality of human rights, 
and economic equality. He believes that the system is based 
on unity of God and universal justice. He emphasized on 
equality before law, economic equality, racial equality and 
liberty in the society. He agreed with Marxist concept of 
radical just ice, wiges, available to all. 
In the conclusion we have explained our point of view. 
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I I 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice is one of the essential features of Islam. It has 
about considerably different responses in various comnnunities. 
We have discussed some of these responses and their 
theoretical foundations. The present study is divided into five 
chapters. The first chapter deals with the definition of justice in 
general. In view of the fact that Muslim philosophers had been 
influenced with Greek Philosophy, we have therefore delineated 
the concept of justice in Greek Philosophy. We have also 
discussed the meaning and significance of justice in 
Christianity. It has been done to clearly bring out the inverse 
relation between the two. Having retained the reformative, 
Islam has also propounded a different theory of justice which 
takes into account the reformative and the retributive both. 
The second chapter deals with the definition of justice in 
Islam and also describes the views on justice of the various 
Ill 
schools of the early Islam. We have focused herein on the 
Khawarij, Murjia, Jabriya and Qadariyah. 
The third chapter deals with the justice explained in the 
later schools of Islamic Philosophy. We have deliberated here 
on the rationalistic point of view of indeterminism. Besides the 
Mutazilah we have also included Farabi as the representative of 
rationalist thinkers. It has been concluded on the discussion of 
orthodox Ashariyah determinism. With its representative 
thinkers, like, Baqilani, Al-Ghazzali, Abdu, etc. We have also 
discussed Shiah interpretation of justice which is an 
intermediary between the Mutazilah and the Ashariyah. 
The subsequent chapter discusses the modern Islamic 
philosophers who have deliberated on justice: such as, Shariati, 
Mutahhari and Qutb, etc. 
In the conclusion we have explained our point of view. 
The Purpose of the study is to bring out various point of 
views of important schools of Muslim Philosophy together and 
to make the assessment as to which of them has represented 
the basic idea of justice. The schools of Muslim Philosophy have 
worked either the influence of Greek philosophy or orthodox 
Islam. The Modern philosophers like Mutahhari and Shariati 
have emphasized the social significance of justice, and they 
have given their ideal method. 
CHAPTER - I 
JUSTICE A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
DEFINIT ION 
Justice has been a vital problem in the realm of 
philosophy. Since the time of Plato to the modern age. 
Justice had been defined by several philosophers in their 
own way. 
Although "Justice is sometimes used as synonym for 
law or lawfulness, it has a broader sense, closer to 
fairness".-^ " In the beginnings of recorded ethical and legal 
thought the term justice was used as equivalent to 
righteousness in general. Justice comprised the whole of 
virtue and complete conformity with the approved pattern of 
moral conduct".^ 
Justice each getting what he or she is due. I t has been 
classified in various kinds such as retributive justice, 
corrective just ice, distributive just ice, commutative justice, 
formal just ice, and substantive justice. 
Retributive justice concerns when and why punishment 
is justif ied and whether punishment is just i f ied as retribution 
for past wrong doing or because it deter future wrongdoing. 
Some, those who emphasize retribution as the justif ication 
for punishment usually believe human beings have 
libertarian free wi l l , while some usually accept determinism.^ 
Distributive justice concerns the fairness of the 
distribution of resources. I t applies to the distribution of 
honor, wealth, and other social goods and should be 
proportionate to civic merit. The standard of distributive 
justice is that treating equals equally and un-equals 
according to their relevant inequalities. Distribution may be 
organized on any of three principles of just ice: arithmetical 
equality, merit, or need."^ 
Corrective justice "concerns the fairness of demands 
for civil damages. Commutative justice concerns the fairness 
of wages, prices, and exchanges".^ Corrective or 
commutative just ice, is confided peculiarly to the judiciary. 
whose duty is to restore a middle point of equality whenever 
it is lacking between the parties. "Formal justice is the 
impartial and consistent application of pri- impartial and 
consistent application of principles, whether or not the 
principles themselves are just. Substantive justice is 
associated with rights, that is, with what individuals can 
legitimately demand of one another or what they can 
legitimately demand of their government",^ 
For aims of rational analysis the classic philosophers, 
following Aristotle, restricted the term's reference to a 
particular vir tue, distinguishing, e.g., between justice and 
equity or between justice and charity. 
Plato's Justice is a proper coordination in different 
sections of society. Plato's just state is that in which "every 
man does the job to which he is best f i t ted, under the 
direction of the wisest."^ 
I t is said that since Aristotle, justice has been 
identified both with obeying law and with treating every one 
with fairness. Aristotle's Justice is treating equals equally 
and un-equals unequally but in proportion to their relevant 
differences. 
Aristotle treated justice as a particular vir tue, but in 
spite of this he recognized the prevalence of general justice 
in popular usage. And he held a role for it in his taxonomy of 
legal justice above the familiar categories of (a) 
"distr ibut ive" and (b) "corrective" (or remedial or 
commutative) justice.^ 
Kant and his disciples have explained the concept of 
justice only tangentially. After giving a baldly positivistic 
definition of just and unjust in the metaphysic of morals, 
kant devoted his Philosophy of law to analyzing right or law, 
not just ice. His practical observations on legal and political 
rules and institutions were generally unimpressive.^ 
Questions of justice, "according to Hume, Mill, and 
others, presuppose conflicts of interest; there would be no 
point in talking about justice, according to Hume, but for the 
limitations of human benevolence and the competition for 
scarce goods. Justice presupposes people pressing claims 
and justi fying them by rules or standards. This distinguishes 
it from charity, benevolence, or generosity. No one can claim 
alms or gifts as a right".•^° Justice, Mill said, "is a name for 
certain classes of moral rules, which concern the essentials 
of human well-being nnore clearly, and any other rules for 
the guidance of life".^^ 
In modern philosophy, some (e.g. Marx) allowed no 
place for justice in their analysis of economic relations. They 
ridiculed the term, regarding it as a mere mask for capitalist 
exploitation and hypocrisy. 
Some modern philosophers, like Marx have held 
distributing resources in accordance with needs. Others have 
maintained their distribution in whatever way maximizes 
util ity in the long run. Others have held that the fair 
distribution is one that, in some sense, is to everyone's 
advantage. Some have maintained that a just distribution is 
whatever results from the free market. Some theorists 
combine these and other approaches.•^^ 
JUSTICE I N GREEK PHILOSOPHY 
The Greeks looked upon justice as 'v ir tue in action' and 
therefore a virtue. The Greek conception of justice was the 
virtue of the soul and injustice its vice.^-^ To both Plato and 
Aristotle, justice meant goodness as well as willingness to 
obey laws. I t connoted correspondence of rights and duties. 
Justice was the ideal of perfection in human relationships. To 
Plato, "justice was one of the highest of virtues". "^^  Justice 
to the Greeks, was the spirit which animated men in the 
proper discharge of their duties. The promotion of balance 
and harmony in thought and action was pre-eminently social 
in character. 
"The Greeks were devoted to their laws partly because 
of the belief in their superhuman origin and partly because 
the general principles embodying the law were believed to 
be perfect and permanent, not subject to change at the will 
of the people. Nature was the source of law and the duty of 
the state was ordinarily considered to be the application 
rather than the creation of the law. Law, to the Greeks, was 
moral because It was natural and, therefore, It constituted 
the cement of the city-state. Law was the same for all and, 
therefore, in a way, it meant freedom. Obedience to laws 
was an essential element in the Hellenic conception of 
liberty".^^ To the Greeks, "the city-state was both a charch 
as well as a political institution, and its end was to promote 
among its citizens goodness, and just ice, the latter 
representing an ideal perfection in human relationships."^^ 
This part deals with the theories of Plato, Aristotle, and 
stoicism as follows: 
Plato 
Plato of Athens was born of a noble family, about 427, 
a pupil of Socrates, is the oldest Greek Philosopher. The 
chief source of inspiration for Plato was Socrates. 
One of the most important questions of Socrates, was 
about the nature of justice. After Socrates, "Plato, also 
regarded justice as the true principle of social life."^^ And he 
has named his most important work. Republic, as a 
discussion on justice. Dr. Barker, therefore has pointed out 
that "Justice is the hinge of his thought".^^ In his 
contemporary world Plato saw states everywhere cities so 
divided that their citizens stood "in the state and posture of 
gladiators" against one another. He saw unrighteousness 
rampant and injustice enthroned.^^ He saw ignorance 
supreme and parading up and down in the guise of 
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knowledge.^° Thinking mainly of the Athenian democracy in 
which he lived and at the hands of which Socrates had been 
kil led, he found the contemporary politics of his day 
dominated by two things. One was the ignorance and the 
other was a political selfishness which divided every city into 
two hostile cities. "To create efficiency in the place of 
amateur incompetence to replace selfishness and civil 
discord by harmony these are therefore his aims, and 
specialization and unification are, therefore, his watchwords. 
To these two aims the political teaching of the Republic is 
addressed".^^ The far-seeing eyes of the philosopher could 
foresee that any plan for perfecting the city-state will not be 
complete unless it meets incompetence and factionalism, 
which were the two fundamental political evils of the day.^^ 
Plato found in justice the remedy for curing these evils. 
The main argument of the Republic is a sustained 
search after the location and nature of just ice. Plato follows 
this search with the help of the method of elimination. He 
discovers and locates justice with the help of his ideal state. 
He reviews the various theories of justice representing 
various stages in the development of conceptions of justice 
and morality, and finally gives his own.^'' 
According to Plato, justice is that in individual life, 
different parts of soul are placed in their proper place, and 
in social l i fe, each individual and each class is placed in its 
proper place. Plato believed that the human nature is made 
from, wisdom, courage, and appetite. And each class 
according to prevalence of one of this capacities, places in 
the social and moral hierarchy. Plato's justice does not state 
a conception of rights but of duties through it is identical 
with true liberty. Justice is a quality - an indispensable 
quality of moral life. I t is condition of the individual and of 
the state and the ideal state is the visible embodiment of 
justice. The state is the reality of which justice is the idea. 
To Plate, "Justice, like the ideal state, therefore, 
demands division of society into three classes representing 
the elements of reason, spirit and appetite, one man, one 
work, on the basis of functional specialization, a state-
regulated scheme of education, the rule of philosopher-
rulers and their emancipation from domestic and economic 
worries by a system of communism, and emancipation of 
women and their equality with men. Plato's concept of 
justice is based on the submergence of the individual in the 
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society. I t refers to the whole duty of man and not merely 
his legal duties".^^ 
Plato in his theory of state mentions that there are five 
types of political organizations: aristocracy, the rule of the 
best; t imocracy, in which the rulers are motivated by 
honour; oligarchy, in which the rulers seek wealth; 
democracy, the rule of the masses; tyranny, the rule of one 
man advancing solely his own selfish interests. 
In the Republic Plato gives an outline of what he 
regards as the Ideal state. I t is a form of intellectual 
aristocracy. The state is the individual writ large. On the 
analogy of the tr ipart i te division of the soul, society is 
stratified into three classes, the rulers, the auxil iary, and the 
artisans, each class having its own specific v ir tue: the rulers 
wisdom, the auxiliary valour, and the artisans self-restraint 
and willing obedience. To keep people contented in their 
respectie classes the state would have to propagate "a royal 
l ie" that God has created human beings of three kinds: the 
best are made of gold, the second are made of silver, and 
the common herd of brass or iron, the first fit to be 
guardians, the second warriors, and the rest manual 
workers.^^ "These three classes, working in proper 
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correlation, will insure the maximum of well-being 
throughout the state. Every member of the community must 
be assigned to the class for which he proves himself best 
f i t ted. Thus a perfect harmony and unity will characterize 
both the state and every person in it".^^ Plato says in this 
f ield: 
"Well than, tell me, I said, whether I 
am right or not, you remember the 
original principle which we were 
always laying down at the foundation 
of the state, that one man should 
practice one thing only, the thing to 
which his nature was best adapted; 
now justice is this principle or a part of 
it. Yes, we often said that one man 
should do one thing only."^'' 
In his theory of Ethics, Plato held that the soul is in 
essence rational and immortal. The world of true beings, the 
world of ideas, is the source of all its goodness. The body is 
material and is the ground of all-evil. I t is only a temporary 
prison house. Release from the body and contemplation of 
the beautiful ream of ideas, is the ultimate goal of life. The 
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embodied soul is wise if reason rules all its impulses. I t is 
brave if its spirited part aids and obeys the rational part, 
temperate, if both spirit and appetite obey the dictates of 
reason, and just . If all the three parts perform their 
respective functions in unison. The idea of this life is 
achieved when a man is wise, brave, temperate, and just.^^ 
The highest good of life is the harmony of the soul which is 
attained by the exercise of all the four virtues, wisdom, 
courage, temperance, and justice, under guidance of reason. 
The greatest happiness attends the life that achieves the 
highest good and contemplates the highest ideas.^^ 
For Plato, justice is the fundamental v ir tue, mother of 
the virtues belonging to each of the three souls. For the 
intelligence it consists in the correctness of thought; for the 
wi l l , in courage for the sensibility, in temperance. Wisdom is 
the justice of the mind; courage, the justice of the heart; 
temperance, the justice of the senses. Piety is justice in our 
relation with the Deity; it is synonymous with justice in 
general.^° 
Man must be educated In order to reach justice and 
through it to become like God. Justice is realized only in the 
collective man or in the state. In order that the collective 
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man or the state may form a real unity or an individual on 
the large scale, particular interests must be merged in the 
general interest, the family must be absorbed in the state, 
the individual must cease to be a proprietor. Henceforth the 
children belong to the state only, which forms one large 
family. The state is the father of the children; the state also 
educates them.-^^ 
Justice, to Plato, has a moral rather than legal content. 
I t has its individual and social aspects. Justice is a principle 
of non-interference, which keeps within proper bounds the 
various classes of society, various individuals of each class 
and various elements in an individual's soul. I t is a principle 
of functional specialization, which moves every one to make 
a specialized contribution to society. Specialization leads to 
efficiency. Justice is architectonic and keeps other virtues in 
harmonious relationship with each other. I t permeates and 
integrates the other virtues of wisdom, courage and self-
control and keeps them within proper bounds. As such, 
justice is the bond that holds the society together.^^ 
ARISTOTLE 
Aristotle was born at Stagira in Thrace in 384 B.C. and 
he died in 322. He was the greatest of Plato's disciples and 
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he took his inspiration on many things from his celebrated 
teacher. 
Aristotle believed, like his master, Plato, that justice is 
the very essence of the state, and that no polity can endure 
for a long time unless it is founded on a right scheme of 
justice. I t is with this consideration in view that Aristotle 
proceeds to set forth his theory of just ice. The theory, 
however, was not developed by him in isolation. The 
Republic of Plato serves as a great guide. 
Generally, Aristotle believes that every things have 
especial aim and man's especial aim is to reach to the real 
happiness. He sat the concept of human happiness basis of 
his discussion, and explains the concept of justice on the 
basis of individual life- He says in this f ield: 
Justice is relative to persons, and a 
justice distribution is one in which the 
relative values of the things given 
correspond to those of the persons 
receiving.^^ 
According to Aristotle, justice in individual is the 
harmony in the human soul, and in the society is equality 
and proportion in the enjoyment of values. 
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In the Aristotle's political philosophy, essential criterion 
of justice is treating equals equally and un-equals unequally 
but in proportion to their relevant differences. He says in his 
politics: 
" In all sciences and arts the end is a 
good, and especially and above all in 
the highest of all - this is the political 
science of which the good is just ice, in 
other words, the common Interest. All 
men think justice to be a sort of 
equality; and to a certain extent they 
agree in the philosophical distinctions 
which have been laid down by us 
about Ethics. For they admit that 
justice is a thing having relation to 
persons, and that equals ought to have 
equality. But there still remains a 
question - equality or inequality of 
what? Here is a difficulty which the 
political philosopher has to resolve".^"* 
Justice, to Aristotle as to Plato, is virtue in action. 
Justice means that every member of a community should 
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fulfil his moral obligation towards the fellow-members of his 
community. 
Justice in the political sense, has two division (1) 
distr ibutive, and (2) corrective justice. Corrective justice is 
concerned with voluntary commercial transactions like sale, 
hire furnishing of security, etc., and other things like 
aggression on property and life, honour and freedom."^^ 
Distributive justice consist in proper allocation to each 
person according to his worth or deserts. This type of justice 
relates primarily but not exclusively to political privileges. 
From this point of view, each type of political organization 
has its own standard of worth and, therefore, of distributive 
justice. In a democracy, the standard of worth is free bir th; 
in an oligarchy it is riches, in aristocracy of birth it is 
descent while in true aristocracy it is vir tue. "Distributive 
justice assigns to every man his due according to his 
contributions to the society. I t minimizes strife and 
confusion by countering inequality of the equals or the 
equality of the un-equals. Aristotelian distributive justice is, 
thus, the other name of proportionate equality i.e., a man's 
rights, duties and rewards should correspond to his merit 
and social contribution."-^^ 
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In the politics of Aristotle, the first natural community 
for him is the family, which, when complete, consists of 
father, wife, children, and slaves. 
The family is based on two relations, the relation 
between man and woman and that between master and 
slave, both of which are considered to be natural. To all 
members of the family the father is an absolute ruler, but he 
should rule the slaves with mildness, the wife as a free 
member of the community, and children by right of affection 
and seniority.•''' The most comprehensive human society is 
the state. The aim of the state is to produce good citizens, 
individuals living a virtuous and happy life. As the highest 
virtues are intellectual, it is the duty of the state not to 
create warriors, but men capable of making the right use of 
peace, which is conducive to intellectual activity. The state 
should be strong enough to protect itself. The state should 
be wage no wars except in self-defence or to subjugate 
natural slaves, i.e., inferior people. The Greeks combine 
courage with culture and are therefore, superior people; and 
the superior people are alone justif ied in extending their rule 
over those who are inferior.^^ 
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The treatment given to citizen sliould be determined by 
the differences of capability, property, bir th, and freedom. 
Equals should be treated as equals and unequals as 
unequals. Although the individual citizen is prior to the state 
in point of t ime, the state is prior to the individual in 
significance, for the whole is prior to its parts. As man is a 
social animal, the natural aim of the individual is to live in 
society. The rational aim of society is the happiness of man. 
So in a rational society the interest of the individual and the 
state are harmonized. 
To Aristotle, the worth of the individual citizens 
depends on the kinds of government under which they are 
brought up. A government is good when it aims at the good 
of the whole community, bad when it cares only for itself, 
"there are three forms of good government (monarchy, 
aristocracy, and poli ty), and three forms of bad government 
(tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy), according as the rule is 
of one man, of a few, or of many. The best form of 
government is a monarchy in which the ruler is a man of 
intellectual eminence and moral worth. Next best is 
aristocracy in which there are a few persons possessed of 
such qualities".^^ 
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There is therefore a difference between the rule of the 
best (aristocracy) and of the richest (ol igarchy), since the 
best are likely to have only moderate fortunes. There is also 
a difference between democracy and polity, in addition to 
the ethical difference in the government, for what Aristotle 
calls polity retains some oligarchic elements. But between 
monarchy and tyranny the only difference is ethical. 
Aristotle believes that monarchy Is better than polity. 
But the corruption of the best is worst; therefore tyranny is 
worse than oligarchy, and oligarchy than democracy. In this 
way Aristotle arrives at a qualified defence of democracy; for 
most actual governments are bad, and therefore, among 
actual government, democracies tend to be best.''^ 
Democracy, Aristotle says, arises from the belief that 
men who are equally free should be equal in all respects; 
oligarchy, from the fact that men who are superior in some 
respect claim too much. Both have a kind of just ice, but not 
the best kind."*^ 
In the theory of mortality Aristotle raises the question 
of the good for man''^ - the good which is the end of all 
human ends. 
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According to Aristotle, tl ie ultimate end of man is 
happiness which is an activity of the soul. Aristotle says that 
Plato was right in dividing the soul into two parts, one 
rational, and the other irrational. The irrational part itself he 
divides into the vegetative and the appetitive.'*-' From this 
definition of happiness it follows that it is not the same thing 
as pleasure. Pleasure is only beauty is the accompaniment of 
the perfect physical development of youth."*"* The highest 
pleasure attends the highest happiness. While in all its 
degrees is good, pleasure may be good or bad according as 
it accompanies good or bad activities. 
The ethical goal of happiness cannot be attained 
without some non-ethical prerequisites, such as the proper 
discharge of mental and bodily functions and the satisfaction 
of economic needs. 
Human happiness manifests itself in two ways: first in 
the habitual subordination of the animal side of man's 
nature, his appetites, desires, and passions, to rational rule; 
secondly, in the exercise of reason in the search for 
knowledge and contemplation of t ru th . In the former case, 
happiness expresses itself in moral virtues (courage, 
temperance, liberality, magnanimity, love of honour, 
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mildness, truthfulness, friendship, and the highest of them 
all, just ice). In the latter case, it manifests itself in 
intellectual virtues which are of two types: (1) those of 
theoretical reason which we use in our inquiry in the nature 
of what is necessary and in the intuitive apprehension of 
truth (science and reason), and (2) those of practical reason 
by which we exercise deliberation in such matters as are 
possible for us to change (art and practical wisdom)."*^ 
Aristotle is a pronounced supporter of the freedom of 
wil l . He criticized Socrates because the latter's theory of 
virtue practically amounts to a denial of freedom. According 
to Socrates, whoever thinks right must necessarily do right. 
But this is equivalent to denying a man's power to choose 
evil. And if he cannot choose evil, he cannot choose good. 
Aristotle believed, on the contrary, that, "man has the 
choice of good and evil. The doctrine of Socrates makes all 
actions involuntary. But in Aristotle's idea only actions 
performed under forcible compulsion are involuntary. 
Aristotle did not, however, consider the special difficulties in 
the theory of free will which in modern times have made it 
one of the most theory of all philosophical problems".'*^ 
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Aristotle's and Plato's just ice, in fact, both are 
complementary to each other, but they differ in many 
fundamental respects from each other. For example, 
Aristotelian justice lays emphasis on a system of rights, 
while Platonic justice attaches more importance to duties. 
The Aristotelian justice is based, as it were, on the principle 
"every one should have his own". The Platonic justice, on 
the contrary, is based on the principle "every one should do 
his own". The former, therefore, is a system of rights but 
the latter is a system of duties. Also Aristotelian justice 
establishes equality between different members of the state, 
while the Platonic justice establishes a hierarchy of classes. 
According to this justice, citizens are divided into three 
classes, each of which performs a particular set of functions. 
Every citizen is bound to do his duties for which he is called 
as an organ of the state. On the other hand, the Aristotelian 
justice is based on a classification of complete and particular 
just ice. Plato does not attempt any such classification. His 
justice rests on three different elements of the human soul-
reason, spirit and appetite. 
But in spite of this difference, there is ground of 
common agreement also. The aim of both the philosophers is 
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to find out a principle of capacity througli whicli unity, 
harmony, virtue and liappiness can be established in the 
society. The purpose of both is to give every citizen his due 
in accordance with his capacity or nature. Thus, justice in 
the case of both can be regarded as distributive in character. 
In both cases, justice is ultimately functional and 
teleological, and is not merely a legal, but also a moral 
principle. 
STOICISM 
Stoicism was founded by Zeno (336-264) in Athens 
about 314 B.C. Some say that Zeno, in reaction to Epicurus, 
set up a school defending virtue as the only good and the 
law of nature or the logos as the dominating force in the 
universe. Zeno was a materialist, whose doctrines were, in 
the main, a combination of cynicism and Heraclitus; but 
gradually, through an admixture of Platonism, the stoics 
abandoned materialism, unti l , in the end, little trace of it 
remained. I t is true that most of them regarded their ethical 
doctrine as of the chief importance."*^ 
The stoic ethical teaching is based upon two principles: 
First, that the universe is governed by absolute law, which 
admits of no exceptions; and second, that the essential 
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nature of man is reason. Both are summed up in the famous 
stoic maxim, "Live according to nature".'*^ In their ethics, the 
stoics mention three things, namely Nature, virtue and duty. 
By nature, the stoics mean that it is working according to 
laws and all the processes within it are fully determined. 
Hence, nature means 'necessity'. Secondly, this nature is the 
logos of the world and is fully rational. Man is a part of 
world-reason to which he is bound by necessity to obey the 
natural laws. Man is said to be rational, when he submits 
himself to his own rational nature.''^ 
Virtue, then, is the life according to reason. Morality is 
simply rational action. I t is the universal reason which is to 
govern our lives, not the caprice and self-will of the 
individual. The wise man consciously subordinates his life to 
the life of the whole universe, and recognizes himself as 
merely a cog in the great machine. Now the definition of 
morality as the life according to reason is not a principle 
peculiar to the Stoics.^° The Stoics look upon the passions as 
essentially irrational, and demanded their complete 
extirpation. They envisaged life as a battle against the 
passions, in which the latter had to be completely 
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annihilated. Hence their ethical views end in a rigorous and 
unbalanced asceticism. 
The Stoics asserted that virtue alone is good, vice 
alone evil , and that all else is absolutely indifferent. Virtue is 
the only happiness. Since virtue alone is good, vice alone 
evil, there followed the further paradox that all virtues are 
equally good, and all vice equally evi l , there are no 
degrees.^^ By habitual exercise of will with the help of 
reason alone man becomes a part of the rational Nature of 
world-reason. Hence, a wise man alone is virtuous and all 
others are fools. Therefore, there is "absolute chasm 
between wise men and fools. And there is no intermediate 
class between the wise and the f o o l . " 
However, in the modified it later on the rigour of 
morality was softened. 'Duty' really means the same thing 
as virtue. However, it means moral act in accordance with 
rational, all-embracing Nature in which the rational man 
lives in full harmony with nature. Here in his performance of 
duty a wise man is not only in his own rational nature and in 
his full command by annihilating his impulses, but he feels 
that in his moral ought, he is experiencing a command and 
an imperative from his higher self called God. Thus, the 
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Stoics in t l ieir ethics emphasis on duty contained the 
essential of Kantian r igor ism. " 
As the society is divinely established, so as stoic has 
not only to preserve himself, but preserve the whole human 
species. So he has to carry out his family life, and, help his 
fellowmen. As a rational being a man will perform his duties 
in the society, but this duty should not be prompted and 
vitiated by any desire or impulses. A rational man who has 
become aware of the higher principle following from God, 
will perform his duties towards society, but without any 
sense of patriotism.^"* 
So the highest good, according to Stoicism, is to 
practise virtue for its own sake, to do your duty because it is 
your duty; every thing else, health, fortune, honors, 
pleasures, are indifferent, and even bad, when they are the 
sole objects of your strivings. Virtue alone makes us happy, 
provided we seek it in a disinterested manner. It is one and 
the common source of what we call the virtues, i.e. wisdom, 
courage, temperance, and justice. A man is good in all 
things or bad in all. 
So in the stoics view justice means: 
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a. A balance between the three ethical principles, 
nature, virtue, and duty. 
b. Justice means living as a rational life. 
c. Justice also means to maintain a harmony between 
the law and reason. 
d. Justice means to create a gap between the two 
classes (i) wise man and (2) fool. 
e. Justice also means to promote virtue in the society 
and to augment the sense of duty. 
f. Justice means to live in full harmony with nature. 
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JUSTICE I N CHRISTIANITY 
ST. AUGUSTINE 
Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, in North Africa (354-430), 
Christian theologian, was one of the greatest of the early 
fathers of the Latin church. The influences on Augustine 
were Manicheism, Skepticisnn, Neoplatonism and 
Christianity. His thought represents a fusion of Platonism. 
Stoicism and Christianity. 
Augustine in his conception of justice was very much 
influenced by Plato. But to Plato's concept of social just ice, 
Augustine gives a religious turn. According to him, justice 
and peace are the cardinal virtues of the city of God. 
To Augustine, "Justice is that virtue which gives to 
each his own",^^ and it cannot be predicated of the 
community which takes man himself away from God and 
gives him to demons. This is not giving but denying to God 
his own. Justice can exist only in a people who worship the 
true God. He emphatically declares that it is justice alone, 
which holds a society, ethically together, whether there is no 
just ice, there is no peace. According to him, justice is 
another name of the 'r ight relation of man and God'. Where 
there is no justice there can be no law. In his 'Decivitate 
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Dei' he mentions ti ian without justice there is nothing to 
distinguish a state from a band of brigands.^^ Justice to 
Augustine is conformity to order and respect for duties 
arising from this order. He believes lil<e Plato, that an 
individual is just if he fulfils these duties. But there is a 
difference, in the case of Plato, individuals duties were under 
authority of the state and they were required to conform to 
the order of the state. But in the case of Augustine, the 
duties, which are assigned to men are essentially religious 
duties and the order to which they are required to conform 
is the order of the church which helps men in coming nearer 
to God. He asks, What justice of man is it which takes man 
himself away from the true God and makes him subject to 
unclean demons? This moral and religious conception of 
justice is behind the central thought of Augustine. According 
to him the concept of justice, is not bound, like Plato, by 
Space and t ime. I t represents a more absolute conception. 
To Augustine, the state is not the final society. There is the 
universal society with its universal order and justice which, 
to Augustine was a Christian commonwealth. 
Augustine in his city of God articulated the Christian 
case against those who charged that by undermining the 
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traditional values of Roman religion the church had been 
responsible for the decline and fall of the roman empire. On 
the contrary, he said, Christianity was the support of just 
rulers and legitimate governments, and by its faith in the 
God of history, as well as by its moral teachings about work 
and the family, it promoted the welfare of society; the city 
of Earth would function best if it acknowledged the 
transcendent reality of the city of God, which was beyond 
history but which had made its presence known within this 
particular history.^^ 
Augustine defends, "a Christian moral understanding 
against the dualism and pessimism of Manichaeans on the 
one hand and the optimism of Pelagians on the other. 
Augustine devoted a number of works to specific moral 
questions, such as lying, continence, marriage, 
concupiscence."^^ He stresses the centrality of the grace of 
God, which delivers sinners from evil and makes the 
Christian life possible. 
For Augustine, God is omnipotent and good and yet 
moral evil has to be admitted and satisfactorily, explained. 
Secondly, the supreme end of moral life is happiness which 
can be found only in God. But it is a fact that men do evil. 
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run for the worldly good. Got has revealed His way through 
Jesus Christ and has established a Church to establish God's 
Kingdom on earth. Man by his own nature is utterly corrupt 
and by himself cannot be saved. He can only be damned for 
the eternal hell-fire. 
In his epistemology, St. Augustine maintains the 
theory of free wil l , but in his theological doctrine of Original 
sin, he denies free will to a sinful man. St. Augustine holds 
that the first man called Adam alone had free wil l. After his 
disobedience in eating the forbidden frui t , he became a 
fallen man. His descendents too have become fallen men, 
and no fallen men can have free wil l . Only by the grace of 
God can a fallen sinner be restored to have free will.^^ 
A sinner cannot do real good, for real good means free 
act. Free will means free choice or decision for assent to a 
definite course of action. In his early work De libero arbitrio, 
Augustine explained that evil, was the result of Adam's free 
wil l. "God would not permit man to be completely free 
without giving him the potentiality of doing wrong or right. 
From Adam's sin all later humanity inherited the inclination 
toward evi l , thus, all humans since Adam have been sinners. 
Only God's grace could overcome that propensity. No 
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number of good works chosen freely by latter-day men and 
women could atone for so grievous a faH".^° Augustine 
insisted that grace alone enables fallen humanity to achieve 
anything worthy. Freedom is linked with Gods grace, not 
humanity's nature. He affirmed that God is not in any sense 
responsible for sin, nor does obedience to God's will nullify 
human freedom. 
In his theory of state, St. Augustine attributes the 
origin of the state to the gregarious instinct of man. In this 
he is essentially an Aristotelian. At another place he also 
explains that the state has originated from the human sin 
resulting from the original sin. This is essentially a Christian 
view of the origin of the state. To him the state was due to 
sin and, hence, it represents a divine remedy for sins. I t was 
derived from God Himself, and hence it was a divine 
institution. He regarded the state as a necessary agency. 
The church for its maintenance wanted both property and 
buildings and the rights to these could be granted only by 
the state. The orders of the state should be obeyed because 
they are meant for the establishment of peace and a good 
social life. But he emphasizes that if the laws of the state 
are in conflict with the laws of religion and morality, they 
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should not be obeyed. According to Augustine, The life of the 
wise man must be social and that there is no man who does 
not wish to have peace. He repeats the Creco-Roman ideas 
when he says that the state is in its own kind, better than all 
other human good. For it desires earthly peace for the sake 
of enjoying earthly goods. According to Prof. Ebenstein, the 
peace that the state provides is not an end in itself, but only 
a means, a condition that makes the service to God possible. 
The peace of the state is the temporary tranquil l i ty that 
enables man to work for the heavenly city, which is "peace 
never ending". What he actually wants to say is that, " the 
state must be a Christian state, serving a community, which 
is one by virtue of a common Christian fai th, ministering to a 
life in which spiritual interests admittedly stand above all 
other interests and contributing to human salvation by 
preserving the purity of the faith".^^ 
Augustine believed that virtue and not happiness 
constitutes the highest goal of free activity. Against the 
indeterminism of Tertullian he raises the objection that the 
moral law does not depend on any one, but that it is itself 
the absolute. Absolute goodness, absolute beauty, and 
absolute true constitute the will of God. The moral law is not 
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good because God commands it; God commands it because 
It is good. A thing is not bad because God forbids i t ; God 
forbids it because it is b a d . " 
Augustine is perfectly aware of the insoluble 
difficulties, which the problem of human freedom considered 
in its relations to divine prescience, and the question of the 
origin of evi l , present. If God foresees our actions, these 
lose their fortuitous character and become necessary. So 
how can we explain free wil l , responsibility, and s i n ? " 
The philosophical reasons inclining St. Augustine 
towards determinism are supplemented by religious reasons. 
He feels that he is a sinner and incapable of being saved 
through his own efforts. "The natural man is the slave of 
evil, and divine grace alone can make him free. Now, divine 
grace cannot be brought about by man; it is entirely 
dependent on God's freedom. God saves man because he 
desires i t , but he does not save all men. He chooses among 
them, and destines a certain number for salvation. This 
election is an eternal act on his part, antecedent to the 
creation of man. That is, some men are predestined for 
salvation, others are not. Augustine ignores the question of 
predestination for damnation, as far as he can, but it is 
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logically impossible for him to escape this necessary 
consequence of his premise".^"* 
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 
Aquinas (1227-74 AD) was the only figure of real 
philosophical significance in the Middle Ages. He was born in 
Sicily in a noble family. 
Aquinas' theory of law and justice constitutes the most 
important part of his political philosophy. 
Christian Philosophers, especially Thomas Aquinas, 
reduced the natural law to the divine law and put the basis 
of just ice, the divine law and inspiration. Aquinas' theory of 
law and justice "Is the Channel through which the doctrines 
of Aristotle, the Stoics, Cicero, the Roman Imperial Jurist 
and Augustine, blended into a round whole, where 
transmitted to modern times".^^ 
Following the traditions of the Roman Jurist, Thomas 
defines justice "as the fixed and perpetual will to give to 
every one his own rights"^^ This definition of Thomas is in 
close conformity with the Aristotelian Principle of distributive 
justice. Here also as elsewhere he makes Aristotle as his 
guide when he accepts equality as the very basis of justice. 
The establishment of equality in society depends upon the 
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enjoyment of two kind of right, namely, (1) natural and (2) 
positive. Natural justice is established when one gives so 
much that he may receive back precisely the same. Positive 
justice is established when popular custom or an order of 
the king require that two things shall be regarded as equal. 
I t is this that makes distinction between natural and 
positive rights. Written human laws are thus fully recognized 
as a source of rights and justice. But Thomas insists that 
they derive their force, not from being wr i t ten, but from 
nature itself. Accordingly, written law Is vit iated and loses 
binding force whenever and so far as it deviates from natural 
justice. I t is here that Thomas "bring into harmony the 
Aristotelian, the Roman stoic and the Christian conceptions 
as to the basis of social order."^^ 
In his 'summa Theologica' he defined law as an 
ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by 
him who has the care of a community. A critical 
examination of this definition is found to imply three things. 
Firstly, the law is the product of reason. Secondly, the law is 
the command of the sovereign. Thirdly, the common good is 
the basis of law. Seen in this light, his definition marks a 
new stage of development in the conception of law. To St. 
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Thomas, the law is at once a conclusion of reason and an 
expression of wil l . I t connbines both the practical and the 
philosophical elements together. 
Aquinas distinguished between four kinds of law, viz., 
(a) eternal law (b) natural law (c) human law and (d) 
divine law. Among these four kinds of law, the first and the 
last are only the concern of theologicians. But in reviving 
and repolishing the Roman doctrine of natural law, and in 
stressing the rational and volitional elements in human law, 
Thomas made a far-reaching contribution to political 
thought. His conception of natural law does not presuppose 
the existence of universal and immutable canons of right 
reason, but rather of a body of rational precepts which may 
change and grow as human reason and human conditions 
undergo change and development. Human law-the ordinary 
law, which governs men in society, should be a rational 
growth of natural law, but this does not mean that any 
irresponsible person's cogitations can give birth to law. The 
reason which furnishes the sanction for human law must 
have its origin in the thought and will of society as a whole, 
or in some person authorized to speak and act for society as 
a whole.^^ 
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In this theory of freedom of wi l l , St. Thomas, grants 
that human beings are free in their moral choice. However, 
it is the intellect which decides what is good for a man, and 
the man has to choose the good freely. But at times by the 
violence of appetites and passions, a man may be 
overpowered, and his intellect may be befogged. In such 
conditions he might fall into vice.^^ 
St. Thomas follows Aristotle in his philosophy of 
morality. A moral act is a self-determined act. In every self-
determined or voluntary act, it is the will which gives it 
assent. But before doing so, the will has to be presented 
with the alternatives of what is good and what is not. This 
determination of the good is done by intellect. But the will is 
not coerced to do what is good, as ascertained by the 
intellect. There is no intellectual necessity. Thus, intellect by 
determining the good which will has to follow, is superior to 
wil l , as a general rule. 
In his theory of nature and purpose of political 
authority, Aquinas following Aristotle closely, attr ibuted the 
origin of the state to the social nature of man. Man is 
naturally a social being and so in the state of innocence he 
would have led a social life. But for the organization of social 
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life and for looking after the common good, there must be 
some institution of social life. And secondly, if some man 
surpasses others in knowledge and justice it would be wrong 
and unjust to ignore that superiority for the benefit of all. 
St. Thomas thus, bases the need for government on man's 
social nature, and the organization of government on the 
superior wisdom and morality of the ruler for the benefit of 
the ruled. In both views, his kinship to Aristotle is evident, 
and it constitutes a sharp break with the typical conceptions 
of state as had been prevalent until Aristotle's politics 
became known again in the thirteenth century".^° 
The common good is what defines and determines the 
rights and duties of both. Human society, viewed in this 
l ight, is a sort of hierarchy consisting of different classes 
having functions arranged in such a manner that each may 
contribute to the realization of the common good. The 
common good, however, requires that such a system should 
have a ruling authority, just as the soul rules, the body or 
any highest nature rules the lower. The founding and ruling 
of states, the planning of cities, the building of castles, the 
establishment of markets, and the fostering of education, all 
have been compared by Thomas to the providence whereby 
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God creates and rules the world. The authority of the ruler 
over his subjects Is not arbitrary but exist only In so far as It 
promotes the good of the community as a whole. The office 
of the ruler should, therefore be regarded as a trust for the 
whole community.^^ 
Aquinas followed Aristotle in his classification of 
governments Into monarchy, aristocracy, polity, tyranny, 
oligarchy and democracy. He, hating medieval disorder, 
preferred monarchy to a democracy, for, did not one God 
rule the universe and one soul the body? A monarchical form 
of government would ensure stability and unity of the state, 
an impossible ideal for a democracy. The best government 
was a monarchy because it gave to the state important 
advantages of unity, regularity, experience and an analogy 
with Divine Rule. Monarchy may degenerate into tyranny but 
tyranny more often results from the rule of many than from 
the rule of one. Tyranny must be avoided as the worst form 
of government. The degeneration of a monarchy into a 
tyranny could be prevented if the monarchy were tempered 
but Aquinas does not explain how this was to be done.^^ 
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CALVIN 
John Calvin (1509-1564), primary protestant reformer, 
biblical scholar, church organizer, and theologian. Also a 
humanist and linguist. He was the first reformer who created 
a comprehensive system of doctrines for the Reformed 
Church which was as logical as that of the Roman Catholic 
Church. I t was really Calvin who gave form and coherence to 
the Lutheran doctrines. "While Luther was the theologian, 
Melanchthon the philosopher and Zwingli the politician, 
Calvin was distinctly the law giver of the reformation".^^ In 
his institutes of the Christian Religion, Calvin tried to give a 
complete guidance as to what was necessary to do in order 
to live a good Christian life according to the injunctions of 
the Bible. His interpretation of the Scripture was based on 
the sound principles of order and authority. 
Among the Reformation Movement, Calvin is doubtless 
the most important from the point of view of political 
philosophy. Book IV of his institutes contains the substance 
of his political thought. 
To Calvin, the concept of state is based on two 
fundamental ideas. Sovereignty of God and the fall of Man, 
To him, men are evil, nine out of ten being damned. Man is 
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wicked, deceitful and liypocritical.^'* Secular government is, 
therefore, necessary to preserve order. I t is as necessary as 
the Church or other necessities of life. Calvin held that "the 
authority of a magistrate is the most sacred and honourable 
of all things pertaining to mere mortal life."^^ The civil 
government had two chief functions to perform, (1) the 
preservation of order, property and liberty, and (2) 
especially the exclusion of idolatry, blasphemy and 
calumnies against truth from among the people. Every 
Christian had a moral duty to help the state in these 
fountains. Calvin thinks that there is little to choose as 
between monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. All are good 
at their own times but then, too. Calvin gave his preference 
to the rule of the aristocracy. 
Calvin believed in the separate existence of the church 
and the state with their own organization and spheres of 
action. The main duty of secular ruler is the care of religion 
because religion represents the soul of the state. The state 
should help the church in organizing worship of God and 
maintaining the purity of Christian doctrines. After paying 
consideration to the church a ruler must provide peace and 
order to the state, a task in which every Christian must help 
43 
the state. Calvin, like Luther recognized the duty of a 
subject to show passive obedience to the ruler in general. He 
believed that even a bad ruler must ordinarily be given 
obedience and honour, but Calvin recognized that there 
were cases in which resistance to tyranny was just i f ied. 
Thought, in general, Calvin supported order against 
rebellion, but he left an opening for opposition. He held that 
an individual had the right of opposing the ruler if the ruler 
broke the command of God.^^ 
Calvin also believed in a law of nature. The moral law 
represented human knowledge of the natural law. There was 
natural right conforming to the natural law. The natural 
rights created natural duties too. The natural right which are 
inalienable are right to law, right to liberty and right to 
freedom of worship.^^ 
In all essentials "Calvin's state was a theocratic 
dictatorship. Yet, as in the case of Luther, Calvin's 
movement, led to a greater independence of the individual. 
I t contributed, intentionally and unintentionally, to personal, 
economic, and political individualism".^^ 
Calvin set up a system of education which had more to 
offer to the ordinary person than had earlier system. " In his 
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school all children had equal educational opportunities, 
regardless of birth or wea l th" /^ 
In Geneva, "Calvin rejected both religious and political 
individualism, i.e., the freedom of the individual to make his 
own choice in these matters. Geneva was a Calvinist 
theocracy no deviation was tolerated. I t was in this spirit 
that Calvin, at his university, trained men, such as John 
Knox and the English reformers, who returned to their own 
countries and tried to introduce the Calvinist reform".^° 
In the light of the above discussion we can conclude 
that Calvinian justice means a balance between good and 
evil. Man by nature, as he believes, is evi l , wicked. 
Justice means to impose the rule of authority to curb 
the natural wickedness of man. 
Calvinian justice is an equilibrium between different 
class of society. To him justice means stern execution of 
commands of God. Although Calvin stands for state church 
separation yet he justifies the authority of church. 
Justice means to maintain a balance between two 
authorit ies, the church and the state. In his theory, justice is 
a balance between the rights and the duties. The ruler can 
be opposed, in case he defies the commands of God. Justice 
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means the maintenance of law which originates from the 
bible. 
Justice also means a balance between the natural law 
and the moral law, the natural rights and the moral rights 
and the duties accordingly. 
46 
Notes: 
1. Edwards, Paul, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New York 
and London, Macnnillan Company and Free Press, 1967, 
Vol. 4, p. 298. 
2. ToLang, Humo, International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences, New York, Macnnillan and Free Press, 1968, 
Vol. 7, p. 341. 
3. Audi, Robert, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 
General Editor, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 
395. 
4. Ib id ; International Encyclopedia of the Social Science, 
Humo. Tolang, New York, Macmillan and Free Press, 
Vol. 7, p. 344. 
5. Audi, Robert, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 
General Editor, Cambridge University Press, p. 395. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1967, Vol. 4, p. 301. 
8. International Encyclopedia of Social Science, Vol. 7, p. 
344. 
9. Ib id. , p. 345. 
10. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1967, Vol. 4, p. 298. 
11. International Encyclopedia of the Social Science, Vol. 
7, p. 346. 
12. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1996, p. 395. 
47 
13. Bhandari, D.R., Reprint History of European Political 
Philosophy, Bangalore, Bappco, the Bangalore Press, 
2002, p. 5. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
16. Ibid., p. 2. 
17. Barker, E., Greek Political Theory- Plato and His 
Predecessors, London, 4"^ edit ion, 1952, p. 153. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Wayper, C.L., Political Thought, England, V^ edition, 
1954, p. 16. 
20. Ibid., p. 16. 
21. E. Barker, op.cit., p. 149. 
22. Sabin, G.H. A History of Political Theory. 3''' edit ion, 
1949, p. 52. 
23. Dr. Bhandari, History of European Political Philosophy, 
2002, p. 19. 
24. Ibid., p. 21 . 
25. Sharif, M.M., History of Muslim Philosophy, Delhi, 
Adam Publishers, 2001, Vol. 1, p. 98. 
26. Dunning, W.A., Political Theories-Ancient and IMedieval, 
Allahabad, Copyright, 1966, Vol. 1 , pp. 28-29. 
27. Plato's Republic, Jowett's Translation, The Modern 
Library, New York, pp. 147-148. 
48 
28. M.M. Sharif, A History of Muslim Philosopliy, Vol. I, p. 
97. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Weber, Alferd, History of Philosophy, Indian, 
Translated by Frank. Thilly, India, Surjeet Publication, 
2"^ Reprint, 2000, p. 73. 
31. Ib id. , pp. 73-74 
32. D.R. Bhandari, History of European Political Philosophy, 
pp. 21-22. 
33. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Translated by 
Commentaries and Glossary by Hippocrats G. Apostle, 
D. Redial Publishing, London, 1980; Book E, 5. 
34. Aristotle's Politics, Translated by Jowett, London, 
Reprinted Oxford At the Clarendon Press. 1953, P. 125. 
35. Dr. Bhandari, History of European Political Philosophy, 
p. 54. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Aristotle's Politics, 1953, London, p. 26. 
38. M.M., Sharif, A. History of Muslim Philosophy, p. 105. 
39. Russell, Bertrand, History of Western Philosophy, 1961, 
pp. 200-201. 
40. Ib id. , pp. 200-201. 
41 . Ibid. 
49 
42. Aristotle Nicomachean 1,2, Quoted by M.M. Sharif in A 
History of Muslim Philosophy, p. 104. 
43. Bertrand Russel, History of Western Philosophy, p. 185. 
44. Nicomachean Ethics X.4. Quoted by M.l^. Sharif, in 
History of Muslim Philosophy, p. 104. 
45. M.M. Sharif, A. History of Muslim Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 
104; Bertrand, Russel, op.clt., p. 185. 
46. Stace, W.T., A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, 
London, Macmlllan, 1962, p. 320. 
47. Russel, Bertrand, History of Western Philosophy, 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961, p. 260. 
48. Stace, W.T., A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, 
London, Macmlllan, 1962, p. 349. 
49. Masih, Y, A Critical History of Western Philosophy, 
Delhi Reprint, Motllal Banarsidass Publishers Private 
Limited, 2002, pp. 122-123. 
50. W.T. Stace, A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, p. 
350. 
51. Ib id. , pp. 350-351. 
52. Y, Masih, A Critical History of Western Philosophy, 
Delhi Reprint, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private 
Limited, 2002, p. 123. 
53. Ib id. , p. 124. 
54. Ib id. , p. 125. 
50 
55. W.A. Dunning, Political Theories Ancient and Medieval, 
1966, Vol. 1, p. 158. 
56. Ibid. 
57. Encyclopedia of Religion, Mircea Etiade, Editor in Chief, 
Macmillan, New York, 1983, Vol. I. P. 349. 
58. Encyclopedia of Religion, Vol. I, p. 342. 
59. Y. Masih, A Critical History of Western Philosophy, 
Delhi Reprint, Motllai Banarsidass Publishers Private 
Limited, 2002, pp. 181-182. 
60. Encyclopedia of Religion, Vol. 3, 523. 
61. G.H. Sabin, A History of Political Theory, p. 171. 
62. Weber, Alferd, History of Philosophy, Indian, 
Translated by Frank, Thilly, India, Surjeet Publication, 
2"^ Reprint, 2000, p. 152. 
63. Ibid. 
64. Ib id. , 153. 
65. Dunning, W.A. Political Theories - Ancient and 
Medieval, Allahabad, Copyright, 1966, Vol. 1, p. 192. 
66. Ib id. , p. 196. 
67. Ibid. 
68. C.C. Maxey, Political Philosophies, New York, 
Macnnillan, 1949, p. 118. 
69. Y. Masih, A Critical History of Western Philosophy, 
Delhi, Reprint, 2002, p. 185. 
51 
70. W. Ebenstein, Introduction to Political Philosophy, p. 
73. 
71. Ib id, pp. 73-74 
72. Bhandari, D.R., History of European Political 
Philosophy, p. 127. 
73. W.A. Dunning, Political Theories - Ancient and 
Medieval, Vol. 2, p. 36. 
74. Bhandari, D.R., History of European Political 
Philosophy, p. 190. 
75. Dunning, W.A., Political Theories - Ancient and 
Medieval, Vol. 2, p. 27. 
76. Bhandari, D.R. History of European Political Philosophy, 
pp. 190-191. 
77. Ib id. 
78. Bronowski, J. and Mazlish, Bruce, The Western 
Intellectual Tradition, From Leonardo To Hegel, New 
York and Evanston. Harper Torch Books, Harper and 
Row, 1962, pp. 95-96. 
79. Ib id. , p. 96. 
80. Ib id. , p. 98 
CHAPTER - I I 
JUSTICE I N EARLY MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY 
DEFINITION OF JUSTICE I N ISLAM: 
As it said earlier, justice had been defined by ancient and 
modern pliilosopliers in tl ieir own way. The problem of justice 
has also been important in Islam. 
Justice has been an important issue in the history of 
Muslim intellectual thought, and it has given rise to important 
works in different periods of Islamic thought in areas like 
theology, law, and Islamic politics. 
The Arabic word for justice is 'adi ' . Etymologically, the 
term is found both as substantive and as adjective, but with 
meaning that do not exactly correspond. 'AdI, the substantive, 
means just ice, as an adjective, it means rectilinear, just well 
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balanced; it thus applies both to beings and to things. In its 
two forms, the word is current in the vocabulary of religion, 
theology, philosophy, and law. In the Mu'tazilite doctrin, adi, 
the justice of God constitutes one of the five fundamental 
dogmas (Usui) of the system.^ 
In his dictionary Lughat al-Quran, Abd ul-Rasheed has 
described its various meanings. The word adI has been used to 
mean balance, equity proportion, semetry and compensation 
etc.^ 
In al-Mawardi's definit ion, 'adala, the quality of 'adI, is 
described as a state of moral and religious perfection.-' 
Maudoodi,in his Tafhim, understands adI to mean balance 
in the rights of men towards each other and rights of God 
towards man besides, it is a balance between right and wrong 
that means it has an ethical connotation as well. He also warn 
that adI is not used to mean equality in the strict sense. I t , 
however, does mean to give one his due.'^ But agreement has 
never been reached on a definition of the term, as the Malikit 
jur ist Ibn Rushd observes. Furthermore, the various definitions 
that have been formulated are too comprehensive and 
imprecise. In the latest stage of Muslim law, as it appears in 
the codification undertaken in the ottoman empire about the 
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middle of the 19*^ ^ century, the following definition is given: 
"The 'adi person is one in whom good impulses prevail over 
bad". In short, one can translate 'adI by "person of good 
morals", with the essentially religious sense that this has in 
Islam. Whether this quality must be a natural inclination, 
innate or acquired, or whether it is sufficient for it to be 
achieved by an effort of wil l. Is however a theoretically 
disputed point. The antonym of 'ad I in this meaning is fasiq.^. 
Justice, in Islam, means balance, the meaning of this 
word is that which in every collection, the different parts 
should be used for a necessary amount so that, the collection 
can play its role in order to reach the purpose. The Holy quran 
says in this f ield: "He raised the sky and set up the balance". 
(55:7) 
Justice, in Islam, means equality, but the observance of 
equality and justice is necessary, when all have the equal 
rights, but where that there is no rights, there can be no 
discussion of equality and justice, and discrimination between 
two individuals cannot be called injustice.^ 
Justice, in Islam, means the observance of individuals 
rights and a balance between rights and duties. God 
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commands people to be just towards one another and, in 
judging between man and man, to judge just ly. 
Justice, in Islam, means obedience to law and God who is 
that has sent law and in the make of laws has observanced 
justice. In the Great Quran is cleared that the purpose of 
prophets has been creation of justice. And says in this f ield, 
"surely, we sent our messengers with clear reasons and we 
also revealed with them the book and the balance, so that man 
kind may maintain just ice".(57:25) The Quran says about 
Islamic law order, "Say my God has ordered to just ice".(7:29) 
The Quran has used the words qist, and mizan as 
synonyms of adi ' justice'.^ ^'Al-Mizan (balance), is the nomen 
instrumenti from wazana "to weigh", which means to weigh in 
the ordinary sense and also to test the level of something like 
the Latin library. The common balance is called mizan, but in 
the kur'un we also find qistas, which according to al-Tha'labi, 
is a loanword".^ 
Justice in Islam is that, "every body's rights should be 
respected that no distinction should be made between people 
for no reason. But the observance of equality and justice is 
necessary when all have the equal rights".^ 
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Thus, those who find difficulty in understanding the 
creation of things, and asl< why God has not created all people 
equal and without distinction, and why he does not behave 
towards every one with equal measure, and imagine that God's 
justice has been proved to non-existent and completely 
imaginary have not understood the real meaning of justice. For 
the beings of the world have no right to claim of God that his 
distinguishing constitutes injustice.^° 
In the world of existence, to discover that diversity here 
is neither pointless nor without reason. Without doubt, the 
beauty and complexity of this world is due to the variety of its 
parts, and we cannot call this diversity meaningless or unjust. 
So injustice exists where all have the same right to use 
something equally, but distinction is made between some and 
others. 
God demands from every one according to his ability and 
responsibility, and no one is asked to do more than his bodily 
and mental powers enable him. This is justice itself. The Quran 
says clearly that creation order is created on justice and 
balance and rights and abilities. 
Therefore, if all existent things are regarded from the 
same point of view, and their responsibilities were all the 
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same, to make a distinction as regards their creation would be 
an injustice. But we l<now tl iat responsibilities are proportional 
to the individual's capabilities, and thus there is no injustice. 
Moreover, we believe that God is wise and knowing, and 
he does nothing for no reason or for no good purpose, and we 
believe that the world has a special design. 
Justice demands that people should be true in word and 
deed, faithfully observe the contracts which they have made 
and fulfil all obligations. When Muslims enter into treaties with 
people of other faiths, they must fulfil their engagements to 
the end and be true to them, for that is the demand of 
righteousness.^^ 
In fact, the real origin of the theoretical and practical 
discussions of the issue of Divine justice in the Islamic world 
must, f irst, be sought for in the Qura'n. Because it has 
discussed justice and injustice in their various forms: 
ontological just ice, legislative justice, moral just ice, and social 
justice. 
The Quran clearly states that the existential and created 
order is based on justice and balance-on rights and potential. 
a) "He has raised the sky and has set up the 
balance".(55:7) 
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b) "Say, My Lord has enjoined just ice". (7:29) 
c) "That is more just with God". (2:282) 
d) "IMy pledge does not extend to the unjust". (2:124) 
e) "As judged by two just men among you". (5:95) 
f) "And tal<e the witness of two just men from among 
yourselves". (65:2) 
The various schools of Philosophical and Theological in 
Islam have felt the importance of the problem, and each one of 
them has presented Its own theory of just ice, that it will be 
dealt with in the next sections. 
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JUSTICE I N EARLY MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY: 
Differences among Muslims had sprung up during the last 
years of Uthman's reign, leading to his murder, but they had 
not yet assumed theological or philosophical shape. When after 
his death in the reign of Ali these differences raged more 
furiously than ever and led to a civil war resulting in 
bloodshed, as in the battle of the Camel (36/656), the battle 
of Siffin (37/657), the arbitration (38/659), and the battle of 
Nahrawan (38/659), questions like "who is in the right in these 
battles, and how?, "who is in the wrong and why"? If some 
regard both sides as wrong, what is their ground for holding 
this?, naturally cropped up and demanded to be answered. 
These questions led to the framing of certain opinions and 
justif ications that were essentially political in the beginning, 
but as each group sought to strengthen its position by calling 
theological support in aid of its particular stand, these political 
factions gradually changed into religious groups. Then, the 
bloodshed which accompanied these factional hostilities in the 
beginning and continued during the rules of the Umayyads and 
the Abbasids, did not allow these differences to remain only 
theological; they went on growing ever more acute and 
menacing ti l l they threatened the national unity of the 
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Muslims.^^ This chapter will deal with four groups of this period 
as follows 
THE KHAWARIJ: 
The Khawarij are the third party in Is lam, who curse both 
the majority Sunnis and the Shia Partisans of All , their origins 
lie in the agreement between the fourth caliph, All , and his 
challenger, Muawiyah, Kinsman and avenger of the murdered 
third caliph, Uthman, to submit their quarrel to arbitration, 
following the Battle of Siffin (AH 37/657 CE). A group of All's 
followers, at first mostly from the Arab tribe of Tamim, held 
that All had, by agreeing to treat with rebels, committed a 
great sin and could no longer be considered a Muslim. They 
made an exodus (Khuruj) from his camp and collected at 
Harura near All's capital of Kufa in I raq: hence Kharijis (those 
who went out) are sometimes referred to as Haruriyah, From 
the beginning they insisted on the equality of all Muslims 
regardless of race or tr ibe, even if he be a black slave, and 
they found an important following among the non-Arab 
converse.^^ 
Shahrastani says, "whoever rebelled against the 
legitimate Imam accepted by the people is called a Kharij ite, 
whether this rebellion took place at the time of the companions 
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against the rightfully guided Imams, or against their worthy 
successors, or against the Imams of any time."^"^ 
"The emergence of the Khawarij gave rise to an early 
major issue of Kalam, namely the status and fate of murtakib 
al-kabirah: whether committing a grave sin makes a person a 
kafir ( inf idel, to be condemned to Hell fire for ever) or not. 
Here we find that the Kharijites take the extreme view of 
considering such a person as an infidel, interpreting in their 
own way Quranic verses that do not agree with this stand."^^ 
The most important groups among them are the 
Muhakkima, the Azariqa, the Baihasiya, the Ajarida, the 
Ibadiya, and the Sufariya.^^ 
The Khawarij "continued to oppose all the Umayyad 
Khalifs but never succeeded in the attempt to overthrow them, 
as the IMuslims in general were not inclined to support their 
views. The movement, which originated with a political 
aspiration, developed into a religious body with the following 
as its guiding principles: 
1. the Khalif must be elected and be responsible to 
Muslims. He need not be of the Quraish descent. Any 
Muslim even a slave, can be elected and remain 
Khalifa, so long as the people were satisfied with his 
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rule; if not, he might be deposed or even killed. Some 
extremists among them did not like to have any 
common head and were content with a dictator 
whenever they needed. 
2. A Muslim who does not perform regularly his prayers 
and observe the fasts and other rituals is no better 
than a Kafir (infidel). 
3. A Muslim, if he has committed a sin and dies without 
repentance, deserves eternal punishment in Hell. 
4. All those Muslims who do not agree with Kharijites 
ought to be considered as infidels, whom the Kharijites 
must fight and destroy."^'' 
5. They acknowledged Abu Bakr and Umar as Rightful 
Caliphs but Uthman, in their opinion, had, towards the 
end of his reign, erred from the Path of justice and 
right conduct and hence deserved to be deposed or 
kil led. AM also committed, according to them, a major 
sin when he accepted the arbitration of "one besides 
God". The two arbiters (Amr ibn As and abu Musa al 
Ashari), their choosers (AM and Muawiyah), and all 
those who agreed to arbitration were sinners. All those 
who participated in the battle of the Camel including 
63 
Talhah, Zubair, and Aishah, the Prophet's wife, had 
been guilty of grievous sin. 
6. The Quran was recognized as the authoritative source 
of Law but their views on Hadith (the Prphet's 
Tradition) and ijma (the agreement of Muslims in 
respect of a rule of law) were different from those of 
the majority. 
A large group of them, al-IMajdiyyah, did not believe in 
the very need of a State. They held that the Muslims, should of 
themselves abide by the right. However, if they needed a 
Caliph to guide their problems, there was no harm in choosing 
one.^« 
The Azariqah (their major section), believed that all 
Muslims, excepting themselves, are polytheists. To them, the 
Khawarij, could not go for prayer in response to any but a 
Kharijite's call. They considered war on all other Muslims to be 
a religious duty and sanctioned the killing of their women and 
children and the looting of their property. They declared those 
of their own sect as infidels if they shirked this duty.^^ 
The most tolerant of them were the Ibadiyyah who 
refrained from declaring the other Muslims as polytheists 
although they put them outside the pale of Islam and 
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described them as unbelievers. Tlieir evidence, the Ibdiyyah 
said, was to be accepted, marriages with them and inheritance 
to and from them allowed. Their terr i tory too was not to be 
called dar al-kufr (the land of the infidels) or dar al-harb (the 
land of the people at war) but dar al-tawhid (the land of the 
people of one God) although they excepted the centers of their 
governnient from it. They disallowed secret assaults on other 
Muslims, although open warfare with them was not 
repugnant.^° 
On the basis of the above it may be concluded that the 
theory of justice is retributive in nature they defy mercy, a 
significant attr ibute of God. 
THE MURJIA 
Murjia, is the name of a politico-religious movement in 
early Islam and, in later t imes, refers to all those who 
identified faith (Iman) with belief, or confession of belief, to 
the exclusion of acts. The names Murjia and irja are derived 
from Quranic usage of the verb arja in the meaning of "to 
defer judgement", especially in Sura IX, 106, the related 
meaning of " to give hope" (raja from an early date, was not 
implied."^^ Regarding justice the Murjia hold that the "sinners 
(murtakib al-kabirah), are still believers and that action is not 
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part of the fai th, to the extent that no sins would harm anyone 
who is a believer and not good deed would benefit an infidel. 
They based their view on Quranic verses that pronnise a good 
future for the believers and interpreted other verses that 
contain warning and threats to suit this stand. Scholars of the 
sahabah and tabiun stood up to both the sects basing their 
views on combining the two sets of Quranic verses, showing 
that a sinning believer remains a Muslim, and that his or her 
destiny is left to God. Who may pardon him or her or give the 
deserved punishment, but not eternally in Hell.^^ 
According to Shahrastani, "one of the meaning of al-irja 
is deferring the case of one who commits a grave sin to the 
day of judgement; in this world, therefore, no judgement is 
made as to whether he belongs to the people of Paradise or 
the people of Hell. If the word is understood in this way the 
Murjia and the Waidiya are two opposing sec ts " . " The Murjia 
consist of four groups: the Kharijite Murjia, the Qadarite 
Murjia, the Jabrite Murjia and the pure Murjia.^"^ 
The principal articles of faith of the Murjia sect may be 
stated briefly to be: 
1. Muslims must worship and serve God alone and must 
not associate any being with him; 
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2. All Muslims are members of Is lam; 
3. All non-Muslims are equal in their wrong beliefs; 
4. Doubtful questions such as disagreement between the 
early companions, and the claims of several men for 
the office of Khilafat, etc., must be left to Divine 
judgement. Those companions, whome the Muslim 
public consider sinners, my be forgiven by God or in 
t ruth may not be guilty, though misunderstood by 
other; 
5. A Muslim must not fight against a Muslim, execept in 
self-defense; 
6. Good intention, though followed by wrong action, will 
have its own reward; 
7. God's will is above human wi l l ; 
8. The first four Khalifs were all-good. (This statement is 
against the Kharijite idea, who denied the third and 
the fourth Khalifas); 
9. Man must be judged by God alone for punishment or 
reward; 
10. The apparent submission to the laws of Islam with no 
faith in Islam, is of no use; 
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11. If there is fai th, sins may be forgiven, except shirk 
( in f ide l i t y ) . " " 
According to Abdul Qahir of Baghdad, the Murjia were 
divided into: 
1. Believers in faith and free will such as Ghailan of 
Damascus, Abu-Shamvi and Muhammad, son of Abu-
Shabib of Basra; 
2. Believers in faith and Jabr (compulsion), i.e., those 
who hold that man has no freedom of wi l l ; 
3. Believers in fai th, who hold faith as most essential and 
above action, i.e., faith is pre-eminent to action. 
Imam Abu Hanifa was inclined towards this last school. 
He rejects eternal punishment and holds that faith 
consists in expressing with the tongue and believing in 
the heart.^^ 
Sharastani says, some of the Murjiah, (Ubadiya) taking a 
step further, affirmed that except polytheism all sins, even the 
worst, would be certainly forgiven.^^ A few, taking a further 
leap in that direction, asserted that if a man cherished faith in 
his heart but worshipped idols or adopted Jewish or Christian 
doctrines and spoke heresy in the Islamic state where he lived 
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under no fear, he would yet be quite fast grounded in fai t l i , 
remain a friend of God, and deserve to go to paradise.^^ 
Anotlier view closely comparable with the one mentioned 
above was that if one's duty to uphold the right and stem the 
wrong (Amr bi al-maruf and nahi an al-munkar) required one 
to bear arms, it was a " t r ia l " to be avoided. I t was quite right 
to check others on wrong conduct, but to speak loud against 
the tyranny of government was not allowed. Al-Jassas was 
very bitter on these things and asserted that they strengthen 
the hands of tyrants and greatly demoralized the Muslims' 
power of resistance against the forces of evil and wickedness.^^ 
THE JABRIYA 
During the early years of Islam, theological discussions 
revolved around of number of separate issues. As the 
discussion of the question of qadar appeared at the time of the 
prophet. The question of qadar gave rise to much discussion as 
to whether people have free will or are under compulsion.^° 
The two schools of early kalam, Jabriya and Qadariya 
contemplated over this problem and based their doctrines of 
Jabr and Qadr by drawing substance from the Quran itself. 
Jabr is a doctrine that denies that a deed is in reality to 
be attr ibuted to man, and ascribes it to God. 
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Shahristani has divided "Jabriya" into two groups: 
1. "the pure Jabriya who do not allow any deed at all to 
man, not even the power to act; 
2. the moderate Jabriya who admit that man has power, 
but maintain that it is a power which is no way 
effective".^^ 
If, however, one maintained that this created power in 
man has some effect on the act and calls it an acquisition, 
(Kasb), such a one cannot be called a Jabriya. The Najjariya 
and Dirariya is regarded as jabriya, and the others as sifatiya. 
(Kullabiya, Ashariya).-'^ 
The three groups of Jabriyah are as follows: 
1. The Jahmiya: 
The Jahmiya were the followers of Jahm b. Safwan (d. 
128, 745), and adherents of pure determinism, who declared 
that "a man does not have power over anything, nor can he be 
said have capacity (to act). Man is absolutely determined in his 
deeds. He has neither power, nor will nor choice. God creates 
deeds in man just as he produces actions in all inanimate 
objects, and it is only in a metaphorical sense that, as with 
inanimate objects, deeds can be ascribed to man."^-' 
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This group affirmed tlie divine power and held that man 
is under compulsion to the extent that God creates his actions, 
good or bad. Man is entirely helpless, working as a machine 
does; and man is not responsible for his deeds. "Some argued 
that the Umayyads encouraged the Jabriyah for their own 
political reasons, but such conjecture is not born out by the 
fact that Jahm, as well as Mabad, the leader of the Qadariya, 
rebelled against the umayyads and were killed by them.^'* 
2. The najjariya: 
The Najjariya were the followers of Husain b. Muhammad 
al-Najjar, whose views were adopted by most of the Mutazilah 
in the district of al-Rayy. The Najjariya maintained that God is 
the creator of all man's actions, good and bad, right and 
wrong, man on his part acquires these deeds. They also 
maintained that the created power has a certain effect on 
these deeds; this they called acquisition (kasb), as Ashari did. 
They agreed, too, with Ashari that capacity exists with the 
act.3= 
3. Dirariya: 
This groups are the followers of Dirar b. Amr and Hafs al-
Fard. 
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They held that man's deeds are in reality created by God 
and man in reality acquires them. Thus it is possible for an act 
to be produced by two agents.^^ 
The Jabriya based their theory on those verses of the 
Quran which affirm the absolutism of Divine wi l l , such as: 
1. "He is powerful over every th ing". (48:21). 
2. "He does whatever He intends". (22:14) . 
3. "God has all things at command". (16:77) 
4. "God creates what He wills". (24:45) 
5. "He pardons whome He wills and punishes whome He 
wills, in as such as God is a supreme Sovereign". 
(2:284). 
6. "Verily, I created everything with a fixed decree". 
(54.49). 
THE QADARIYA: 
At the opposite extreme of Jabriya school there were the 
Qadariya, who held that "people have qudrah (power) over 
their actions. Some went to the extent of denying the pre-
existent knowledge of God in order to remove any compulsion, 
saying that people perform all their actiosn without divine 
assistance. These are the early Qadariya, who should not be 
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confused with the mutazilah who recognized the pre-existent 
divine knowledge, even though they affirmed people's freedom 
and responsibility for their actions".^^ 
The school of Qadr was started by Mabad al-Juhani (d. 
80/699) before the end of the first century of Islam. Who 
affirmed the tafwid (delegation of action and responsibility to 
man). The Qadarlya held that man has power in the choice of 
right and wrong. 
Mabad al-Juhaini, "who charged the Omayyads with 
misgovernment and foul deeds and held them responsible for 
the rupture and disunion in the Muslim commonwealth, had to 
pay a heavy penalty for the new school he started. In the year 
80 A.H. he was put to death by Haj jaj , the iron-handed 
governor of I raq, under the instigation of the Caliph 'Abdul 
Malik' son of Marwan. The school after his death received the 
support of Ghilan of Damascus who, not remaining confined to 
the theory of free will only, enlarged the scope of his 
predecessor's mission by the addition that it is essential for 
every believer to try to enforce what is advisable and to 
eradicate what is undesirable".^^ 
The man who soon came to be recognized as the leader 
of the Qadariya was Hasan al-Basri (d.A.D. 728), whom should 
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be regarded as having made a valuable contribution to the 
Muslim enthical consciousness, for he was inspired with the 
conviction that man's moral action requires at least some 
degree of freedom.^^ 
While the Umayyads were in authority they had 
welcomed the doctrine of fatalism. After the devastating war 
that had occurred over the question of the succession in the 
Caliphate, the Umayyads were the first dynasty of rulers, and 
their poets praised them as those "whose rule was 
foreshadowed by the eternal decree of God". " In the light of 
fate, whose acts no one should criticize". And when this 
principle was challenged by the Qadariya, Caliph Abd al-Malik 
and al-Haj jaj , wrote to Hasan al-Basri to call him to account 
for his idea about men having a degree of freedom of will in 
their actions. 
Hasan al-Basri argued that, "in the Quran qadar is 
postulated as complete and absolute determinism, not only 
physical but ethical and spiritual as well. I t deprives man of 
any init iat ive, any choice, any voluntary share in his conduct. 
Man's destiny can only be what God knew that, by His all-
embracing qadar, it would be. Any endeavour on man's own 
behalf is doomed to fai l , his fate having been determined 
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beforehand by God's knowledge and vol i t ion. From the very 
womb of his mother man has been decreed to be blessed or 
affected without any merit acquired, or any iniquity 
committed, his breast is made wide and easy or strait and 
narrow. He is created for hell-fire or paradise, just as he is 
formed tall or short, black or white. Accordingly he is rewarded 
for deeds he could not help performing and mad to answer for 
others he had no way of preventing; as when the adulterer is 
punished for having begotten a child whose birth was, in t ru th , 
decreed by the will of God. Man triumphs or suffers for works 
done, not by him, but in him, through despite of him"."*" 
But Hasan al-Basri insisted that man is nevertheless 
capable of doing what is wrong in the eyes of Allah shows that 
here, in the sphere of man's moral conduct, God's decree, His 
wi l l . His knowledge, do not mean the same as in the sphere of 
man's physical existence. In teaching man to do what is good, 
in commanding man to refrain from what is evi l , Allah reveals 
that here, in the field of good and evil , predestination consists 
in the guidance of His teaching, that qadar here is defined by 
His command. God does not forbid man to be tall or punish 
him for being black."^^ 
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This conviction that "what Allah forbids is not from Him" 
is an idea that Hasan al-Basri frequently stressed. Bold in his 
accusations against the governors and their officials who 
sought to justi fy their acts of tyranny by pointing to the 
doctrine of absolute determinism, Hasan exclaimed: Violence 
and tyranny are not of Allah! He does not order abominations! 
Guidance comes from Allah, but error is of man's own do ing/^ 
The followers of the school "Qadr" ( i .e. , free will) were 
subjected to all sorts of persecutions at the hands of the 
irresponsible officers appointed by the irreligious Omayyad 
monarchs. They also succeeded in holding their own for a 
considerable t ime. Afterwards they continued to flourish under 
the wellknown tit le of "Mutazilah" for a number of centuries. 
The Qadariya, to be known afterwards as Mutazilah (Muslim 
Rationalist) will be dealt with in the next section in detail. 
The Qadariya school based their theory of free will on 
those Quranic verses which affirm the human freedom and 
responsibility, such as: 
1. "Whoever acts virtuously does so for himself, and 
whoever acts viciously does for himself".(41:46) 
2. "And whoever gets to himself a sin, gets solely on his 
responsibilities". (4:40) 
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3. "When they (sinful) commit a deed of shame, they 
say: we have found that our fathers did so, and God 
obliges us to do it, say surely, God does not enjoin 
shameful doing." (7.28) 
4. "Verily, God does not change the condition of a people 
until they change their own condition". (13:11) 
5. "So whoever follows the right path does so far his own 
good, and whoever goes astray, bears on himself the 
responsibility (of going astray)". (10:108) 
77 
Notes: 
I . Encyclopedia of Islam, Edited by Gibb, H.A.R. and others, 
New Edition, Leiden E.J. Brill, 1979, Vol. I, p. 209. 
2 . Lughat al Quran, Numani, Abd al Rasheed, Delhi, Vol. 4, 
pp, 247-249. 
3. Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. I , p. 209. 
4. Maudoodi, Talkhees Tafheem ul quran,p. 442. SX2. 
5. Encyclopedia of Islam, 1979, Vol. I , p. 209. 
6. The Roots of Religion, Dar Rah-Haq, Educational Institute 
and Publisher, Qum, Iran, 1995, p. 62. 
7. Q. 55: 7-9. ; 4: 135; 57: 25. 
8. Encyclopedia of Islam, Edited by C.E. Bosworth, New 
Edition, New York, Leiden, E.J. Bril l, 1993, vol. V I I , p. 
195. 
9. The Roots of Religion, p. 62. 
10. Ibid. 
I I . Q. 3:17, 2:177, 5 :1 , 9:4-7. 
78 
12. Sharif, M.M., A History of l^luslim Philosopiiy, Delhi-6, 
India, Adam Publislier, 2001, Vol. I, p. 665. 
13. Encyclopedia of Religion, Mircea Eliade, New York, 
Macmillan, Publishing, 1987, Vol. 8, p. 288. 
14. Shahrastani, Muhammad b. Abd al-Karim, Muslim sects 
and Divisions, Translated by A.K. Kazi and J.G. Flynn, 
London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley, 1984, p.98. 
15. Nasr, Hossein and Leaman, Oliver, History of Islamic 
Philosophy, London, Routledge, 1996, Vol. I, p. 79. 
16. Shahrastani, op.cit., p. 99. 
17. Shushtery, A.M.A., Outlines of Islamic Culture 
Philosophical and Theological Aspects, Printed at the 
Bangalore Press, Bangalore City, 1938, Vol. I I , p. 551. 
18. Sharif, op.cit., p. 668. 
19. Shahrastani, op.cit., pp. 102-103. 
20. Ib id. , p. 115; M.M. Sharif, pp. 668-669. 
21. Encyclopedia of Islam, Bosworth, C.E., Leiden-New York, 
E.J. Bril l , 1993, vol. V I I , p. 605. 
22. Nasr, Hossein and Leaman, Oliver, History of Islamic 
Philosophy, London, routledge, 1996, Vol. I , p. 79. 
79 
23. Shahrastani, op.cit., p. 119. 
24. Ibid. 
25. Sushtery, A.M.A., Outlines of Islamic Culture 
Philosophical and Theological Aspects, 1938, vol. I I ,p . 
552. 
26. Ib id. 
27. Shahrastani, op.cit., p. 120. 
28. Ib id. , pp. 122-123. 
29. M.M. Sharif, op.cit., p. 670. 
30. Nasr, Hossein and Leaman, Oliver, History of Islamic 
Philosophy, London, routledge, 1996, Vol. I , pp. 78-79. 
31. Shahrastani, Op.cit., p. 72. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Ib id. , p. 73. Mashkur, Muhammad Javad, Haftad V- seh 
Mella, Tehran, Matbuat-e-Ataii, p. 17. 
34. Nasr, Hossein and Leaman, Oliver, Op.cit. p. 80. 
35. Shahrastani, Opo.cit., p. 75. 
36. Ibid.,p. 76. 
37. Nasr, Hossein, Op.cit., p. 79; Mashkur, Op.cit., p. 18. 
80 
38. Nadvi, Muzaffar-ud-Din, Muslim Thought and Its Source, 
Delhi, Reprint, Idarah-I Adabiyat-I , 1983, pp. 8-9. 
39. Donaldson, Dwight M., Studies in Muslim Ethics, London, 
S.P.C.K., 1953, p. 98. 
40. Ib id. , p. 99. 
41 . Ib id . , pp. 99-100. 
42. Ib id. , p. 100. 
CHAPTER - I I I 
JUSTICE I N LATER MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY 
THE MUTAZILAH: 
Mutazilah is the name of one of the theological groups in 
Islam, a religious movement founded at Basra, in the first half 
of the 2"^ /8 '^ century by Wasil b. 'Ata ' (d. 131/748). 
Subsequent to the times of the companions of the Prophet of 
Islam, the Mutazilah creed made its appearance. I t had its 
inception nearly two centuries after the migration (Hijrah) of 
the Holy Prophet to Madinah. The Mutazilah is known as 
rationalist. They held that the arbiter of whatever is revealed 
has to be theoretical reason. Afterwards becoming one of the 
most important theological schools of Islam. "The Mutazilah 
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were the first thinkers of Islam, and they gave the science of 
kalam a systematic form."^ 
Some of the great Mu'tazilah In Basra are (abu al-
Hudhayl al-Allaf, d. 849; al-Nazzam, d. 846; al-Jahiz, d872) 
and in Baghdad (Bishribn al-Mutamir, d 825; Abu Musa al-
l^irdar, d 8 4 1 ; Thumamah ibn al-Ashras, d. 828). 
The origin of this term-which has the sense of "those who 
separate themselves, who stand aside" - remains enigmatic. 
According to a traditional explanation, "the word would have 
been applied to Wasil- or to his lieutenant, Amr b. Ubayd-
because on the question relating to the definition practicable 
to the Muslim sinful of a serious sin, the former (or the 
second) "would have separated himself" from al-Hasan al-
Basri."^ Ibn al-Rawandi has explained that, on the same 
question of the name to be given to the sinful Muslim-who 
should, according to Wasil, be described by the definition of 
fasiq, an "intermediate rank" between that of mumin and that 
of kafir.3 
The story goes that one day while Imam al-Hasan al-
Basri was asked by his students in a mosque, about his opinion 
on the question as to whether those who committed great sins 
(Kabair) should be regarded as believer or unbeliever. The 
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Imam al-Hasan al-Basri was on the point of giving his reply, 
when one of his students Wasil Ibn Ata got up and said: "The 
perpetrator of grave sins neither unbeliever nor believer; he 
has an intermediate state (manzilah bain al-manzilatain)". 
Afterwards Wasil seceded from his teacher and began to 
explain his own views to others. The Imam al-Hasan al-Basri 
then exclaimed, "Itazal anna", ( i .e., he seceded from us). Thus 
Wasil and his followers were called al-Mutazilah, and his school 
was called "Mutazil ism" (secession)."* 
In his book, (al-Farq bain al-Firaq), Baghdad!, has 
described that The Mutazilah separated (itazala) themselves 
from all of Muslim, and said, the sinful Muslim is between 
unbelief and fai th, an intermediate rank (manzilah bain al-
manzilatain). 
Five Principles: (al-Usul al-Khamsa) 
Five principles of Mutazilah are as follows: 1. the unity of 
God (al- tawhid); 2. Justice of God (al-adi); 3. the promise and 
the threat (al-wad wal-waid); 4. the theory of an "intermediate 
state" (al-manzilah baynal-manzilatain); 5. finally the 
"commanding of good and forbidding of evi l " (al-amr bi-al-
maruf wa-al-nahy an al-munkar). 
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The Mu'tazilah founded their school on two important 
principles, Divine unity and Divine Justice. For this, they are 
called the people of unity and justice (Ahl-al tawhid-wa-al-
Adl). 
The Unity of God (Tawhid): 
By unity they innply the denial of the divine attributes. 
They believed that God is one and He has no attributes 
separate from His Essence. God is knowing, powerful, and 
seeing, but these attributes are identical with His essence, 
otherwise it will be unbelief (kufr).^ The Mutazilah adopted a 
different way from other theological schools. Agaisnt the 
"people of hadith" and the 'Alids, the Mutazilah could affirm 
their agnosticism on the matter of the nature of God. Without 
going as far as the Jahmiyah, who completely denied the 
attributes of God, they affirmed that all these attributes are 
identical with God's essence and that they have no real 
existence.^ 
The Justice of God: 
The Principle of the necessary justice of God is not only 
one of the characteristic dogmas of Mu'tazilah, it may be said 
without exaggeration to be their fundamental dogma. Even 
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more then ahl-'al-adi wa l-tawhid, they are and they call 
themselves, in brief, ahl al- 'adl. ' ' 
Islamic theologians were two groups in the field of the 
justice, 1. The mu'tazilah and the shiah that were supporter of 
just ice; 2. The Ashariyah that were the opposite of them. 
The issue of divine justice refers to the free wi l l , good 
and evil and reward and punishment. 
By Divine Justice they imply that God is ever just and can 
never be unjust. And it is incumbent on God to reward the 
obedients for their good acts and punish the sinners for their 
misdeeds.^ 
The mutazilah believe that man has free will and liberty 
of action. Man can make his fortune because he has power and 
responsibility for all his actions. 
Justice is one of the Attributes of God and one of His 
sublime Names. The holy Quran says: 
1. "Surely God does not do injustice to men". (10:44). 
2. And Your Lord does not deal unjustly with anyone". 
(18:49). 
3. "Surely God does not do injustice to the weight of an 
atom". (4:40.) . 
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Predestination and Freewill: 
God Almighty's justice necessitates that man should be 
the author of his own acts; then alone can he be said to be 
free and responsible for his deeds. The same was claimed by 
the Qadarites. The mu'tazilites accepted totally the theory of 
indeterminism and became true successors of the Qadarites. If 
man is not the author of his own acts, he cannot be supposed 
to have any responsibility for his actions and deserve reward 
for his good actions and punishement for his sins. Therefore, 
all the Mu'tazilites agree that man is maker of his volitional 
acts.^ 
Since man is the creator of his own acts, it is necessary 
for God to reward him for his good acts and this can be justly 
claimed by him. As al-Shahrastani explains it: "The Mutazilah 
maintain, that man has power over his good and bad deeds 
and is also their creator. Man, therefore, deserves reward or 
punishment in the next life for what he does in this one. One 
cannot ascribe to God evil and injustice or an act of unbelief 
and sin, because if he created injustice he would be unjust; 
likewise, if he created justice he would be just."^° 
The Mutazilah believe that man creates some acts by way 
of mubasharah and some by way of taul id. By the term taulid 
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is implied tine necessary occurrence of an oti ier act from an act 
of the doer. Man creates guidance or misguidance for himself 
by way of mubasharah and his success or failure resulting from 
this is created by way of taulid. God is not in the least 
concerned in creating it, nor has God's will anything to do with 
it. In other words, if a man is regarded as the author of his 
own acts, it would mean that it is in his power either to accept 
Islam and be obedient to God, or become an unbeliever and 
commit sins, and that God's will has nothing to do with these 
acts of his. God, on the other hand, wills that all created 
beings of His should embrace Islam and be obedient to Him. 
He orders the same to take place and prohibits people from 
committ ing sins. 
I t is the creed of most of the Mutazilites that one 
possesses "abi l i ty" before the accomplishment of the act, but 
some Mu'tazilites (e.g., Muhammad b. 'Isa and abu 'Isa 
Warraq) like the Sunnites are of the view that one has ability 
to act besides the act.-^^ 
The Mu'tazilah draw support for their belief in freewill 
and freedom from the Holy Quran. The Quran says, 
a. "Every soul is held in pledge for what it earns". (74:38). 
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b. "Indeed God does not change the condition of a people, 
unless they change their own condition". (13:11) 
c. "Surely we have shown him the way, he nnay be thankful 
or unthankful". (76:3) 
d. "So whoever does an atom's weight of good shall see it, 
and whoever does an atom's weight of evil shall see it". 
(99:7-8) . 
e. "Whoever does good, it is for his own soul, and whoever 
does evil , it is against it; and your Lord is not in the least 
unjust to the servants".(41:46) 
f. "Whatever benefit comes to you (O man!) , it is from 
God, and whatever, misfortune befalls you, it is from 
yourself". (4:79) 
g. "And whoever does good deeds whether male or female 
and he (or she) is a believer-these shall enter the 
garden, and they shall not be dealt with a jot 
unjust ly".(4:124) 
The Motive and End of Divine Acts: 
As an intelligent and wise being, God must necessarily 
act according to a purpose, with a view to a determined plan. 
There is chosen, objective order in the universe, and thus 
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intermediary purposes, themselves related to an ultimate 
purpose. God is obliged always to do the best, (al-aslah).^^ 
The justice of God "makes it necessary upon Him not to 
do anything contrary to justice and equity. God's wisdom 
always keeps in view what is salutary for His servants; 
therefore. He cannot be cruel to them. He cannot bring into 
effect evil deeds. He cannot ask His servants to do that which 
is impossible".^^ Any form of obligation to the impossible (taklif 
mala yutaq) would be contrary to His justice. The Quran says 
that the Lord of the Universe is Just, wise and Merciful. 
Therefore, He cannot issue impossible commands. The Quran 
says, "God does not impose any duty on the soul but to the 
extent of its capacity"(2:286). Such verses clearly show that 
He cannot oblige His creations. The Quran says, "He is wise 
and Omniscient".(15:25) 
The Mu'tazilites believe that God cannot do anything 
which does not serve any useful purpose. They have received 
their inspiration on the question from those verses of the 
Quran, which invite the attention of the men to the variety of 
creatures and to the purpose which they serve. For example. 
The Quran says, " In the creation of the heaven and earth in 
the alternation of night and day, in the ships which sail in the 
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sea to benefit the people, in the rain-water which God sendeth 
quickening again the dead earth, and in the change of the 
winds and clouds, balanced between heaven and earth are 
signs for the people who understand". (2:164) 
The Mu'tazilah naturally became the proponents of God's 
creation having an end and a motive. "They saw God's 
wisdom-something that the Quran clearly emphasizes over and 
over again to lie in that fact that He has specific motives and 
purposes for His acts and that He, with perfect knowledge 
carries out these acts by choosing the best and most expedient 
means. 
In this f ield, Wasil adopted the creed of Ma'bad al-Juhani 
and Ghailan al-Dimashqi and said that since God is wise and 
just, evil and injustice cannot be attributed to him. But good 
and evil , belief and unbelief, obedience and sin are the acts of 
His servant himself, i.e., the servant alone is creator of his 
acts and is to be rewarded or punished for his deeds.^^ 
The Mu'tazilah believe that "God does not want evil. He 
does not order it since his wish (iradah) and his commandment 
(amr) are identical. Evil is created by humans, as is good for 
that matter, since people create all their actions, good or evil. 
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They have in effect received from God a "Power" (qudrah), 
that allows them to act freely."^^ 
While "God does not create the voluntary human act, He 
does at least in the man the power (qudrha)corresponding to 
this act. For the Mu'tazila, the notion of power is linked to that 
of free choice ( ikht iyar), itself implied, once again, by the 
principle of divine justice".^^ 
I t is the duty of God to create in us the powers necessary 
for the fulf i lment of acts which His law impose upon us. The 
powers in question are specifically among those "graces" which 
He is required to grant to all those subject to the Law. 
Essential Good and Evil: 
According to the l^u'tazilites, Good and evil are innate in 
the essence of things themselves. This very good or evil of 
things is the cause of the commands and inhibition of the Law. 
The human intellect is capable of perceiving the good and evil 
of a few things and no laws are required to express their good 
and evil.^^ 
The Mu'tazilites, maintain, that it is only Reason which 
leads us to differentiate between good and bad actions. 
Revelation only confirms what Reason dictates. 
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In this debate, the Mu'tazilties affirmed "the existence of 
the good essentially, innately, and rationally and put forward 
the argument of "rationally derived realities". They said: We 
obviously perceive that acts are, in their essence, different 
from one another. We also obviously know that our intellects 
become aware of these realities without needing to be guided 
by revelation from the outside, so to speak."^^ 
They argued that justice is a reality in itself and that 
God, because He is bound to be just and wise, carries out acts 
in accordance with this standard of justice. To explain, when 
we look at the very essence of acts, regardless of whether or 
not the particular act is associated with God's creative act or 
His commandments, we see that some of them are different 
from others. Some of these acts, in their essence, are just , 
such as rewarding the doers of good deeds; while other acts 
are in themselves oppression and unjust, such as punishing 
those who do good deeds. Now because these acts are 
different on the level of essence and because God is good and 
absolute in His perfection, wisdom and just ice. He choose acts 
that are in accordance with the standard of justice. Al-
Shahrastani says in the field of rationalism of the l^u'tazilites: 
"The adherents of justice say: All objects of knowledge fall 
under the supervision of reason and receive their obligatory 
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power from rational insight. Consequently, obligatory gratitude 
for divine bounty precedes the orders given by (divine) Law; 
and beauty and ugliness are qualities belonging intrinsically to 
what is beautiful and ugly".^° 
The Mu'tazilites, therefore, maintain, that it is through 
reason that we understand the worth of Revelation and 
necessity of believing in God's existence and His command. 
The verses of the Quran emphatically prove that over reason 
itself is the best guide and sole judge in respect of what is 
good and what is bad. The Holy Book very often appeals to 
reason, reflection and understanding, when it says; "There are 
signs in this for a people who understand, who reflect, who 
listen, who ponder, who are righteous and so on. The Quran 
directs us to give up blind adherence to ancestral beliefs and 
adopt the right course dictated by reason. Now, if reason does 
not help us in shaping our judgement, the Quranic appeal to 
human intellect becomes meaningless. 
Promise of Reward and Threat of Punishment: 
The Mu'tazilites held that God is bound to fulfil His 
promise of reward and punishment. This concerns the fate of 
the believer, the sinner, and the unbeliever in the hereafter. 
The names and the statutes is also used, referring to the 
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juridical statutes that determine the fate of each group. The 
basic problem is that of faith and disbelief. For the Mutazilah, 
to have faith is not merely to assent in the heart and to make 
the verbal profession (shahadah) but also to avoid the major 
sins (Kabair). The unbelievers and the unrepentant Muslim 
sinners are condemned to hell.^^ 
The Mu'tazilites believe that every action must take its 
natural course, God must reward the virtuous and punish the 
wicked. I t is impossible for Him to reward the evil doers or 
punish the righteous.^^ 
In the next world, God must of necessity reward those 
who have merited His reward, and punish those who have 
merited His punishment. There is no doubt that He has the 
ability to Pardon; the Quran states that He "Pardons whom he 
wills and punishes whom He wil ls".(2:284) In fact there is no 
possibility that He will pardon any one who has not merited His 
Pardon; Pardon is only conceivable where there has previously 
been repentance on the part of the unbeliever or the sinner. 
Similarly, only sinners who have already repented will be able, 
on the day of judgement, to benefit from the intercession of 
the prophet. Conversely, God is required to Pardon the man 
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who repents; "accepting repentance" so long as it is sincere, is 
for Him an obligation.^-^ 
The Mutazilites maintain: "Threats shall definitely be 
carried out. The transgressor will be punished. No one will be 
exempt; that is in compliance with the reports from the 
creator. For when the source of reports is Allah, and especially 
when they are of a general nature such as, " And most surely 
the wicked are in burning fire. (82:14), So he who has done an 
atom's weight of good shall see it. And he who has done an 
atom's weight of evil shall see it (7:99). I t is inconceivable not 
to treat such reports as applicable to all who fall within such a 
category".^'* 
The Quran also says, "Never think that God will violate 
the promises he made to is Prophets verily God is Powerful and 
able to requite".(14:47) 
"Verily God does not break His promise". (13:31.) 
Some groups of Mutazilah are as follows: 
1 . The Wasil iya: 
These are the followers of wasil b. Ata. The Mutazilah 
school is known as the wasiliya. 
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In the matter of justice and free wil l , they held that God 
is wise and just ; evil and injustice cannot be attr ibuted to him. 
God cannot will of his creatures the contrary of what he 
commands them. Man is the author of good and evil, belief and 
unbelief, obedience and sin, and is to be reward or punished 
for his deeds.^^ 
2. The Hudhailiya: 
These are the followers of Abu al Hudhail Allaf. "Their 
view on qadar are the same as those of other Mutazilah, 
except that Allaf is a Qadarite with regard to this life, but a 
Jabrite with regard to the next. According to them, man in the 
next life has no power over his actions, but all are created by 
God. If any of these acts were men's own acquisition, they 
would have to be responsible for them".^^ 
3. The Nazzamiya: 
These are the followers of Ibrahim b.S. ayyar, called al-
Nazzam. 
With regard to qadar, al-Nazzam held that God has no 
power at all over sin and evil. Other Mutazilah do not deny the 
power of God over evil, but deny the act of His creating evil. 
Namely, God has power over evil, but He does not use it for 
the creation of evil. But al-Nazzam,in opposition to them, syas 
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that when evil is the essence of a th ing, then the possibility of 
the occurrence of evil or the power to create it will itself be 
evil. Therefore, it cannot be attributed to God who is the doer 
of justice and good.^'' 
4. The Bishriya: 
These are the followers of Bishr b. al-Mutamir, one of the 
greatest scholars of the Mutazilah. It was he who introduced 
the doctrine of secondary effects, tawallud, in which he went 
to extremes. They admit that "man is the author of his 
voluntary actions. Some actions arise by way of mubasharah, 
i.e., they are created directly by man, but some actions arise 
by way of taul id, i.e, they necessarily result from the acts done 
by way of mubasharah."•^^ 
Commanding Right and Forbidding wrong 
Commanding right and forbidding wrong is the basic 
subject of religion. It is such a necessity for which all the 
prophets were sent to the world. It appears from the Quranic 
verses and saying of the Holy Prophet that commanding right 
and forbidding wrong is compulsory. 
In Quran God says: "There shall be a party from you who 
will call towards good and prohibit evil and they shall be 
successful".(3:105) 
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Forbidding wrong is one of tine celebrated 'five principles' 
(al-usul al-khamsa) of Mutazilism. Howeve,there is no 
agreement among modern scholars as to the antiquity of this 
pentad,•^^ 
In contrast to those who saw internal criticisms as 
sufficient, the Mutazilah favoured direct action. Order must be 
reestablished " by the sword". If there is a hope of defeating 
adversaries one must overthrow the guilty leaders, even kill 
them if necessary, and force them, on pain of death, to accept 
the true doctrine.•^° 
In the course of a call for unity among the believers, God 
addresses them as follows: "Let there be one community of 
you, calling to good, and commanding right and forbidding 
wrong; those are prosperers". (3:104) This conjunction of 
'commanding right ' and 'forbidding wrong' is found in seven 
further Quranic verses. (3:110), (3:114) , (7 :157) , (9:71) , 
(9:112) , (22:41) , (31:17). 
In his Taliq, Mankdim, says: Commanding (amr) is telling 
someone below one in rank to do something, while forbidding 
(nahy) is telling them not to; right (maruf is any action of 
which the agent knows or infers the goodness (husn), and 
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worng (munkar) any action of which he knows or infers the 
badness (qubh).-^^ 
There are three classical Mutazilite authorities whose 
views on forbidding wrong are known to us in some detail. 
Those of Mankdim (d. 425/1034) and al-Hakim al-Jishumi 
(d.494/1101) are directly accessible in their own works. Those 
of Abu 1-Husayn al-Basri (d. 436/1044) are known fronn the 
works of a number of later scholars. All three are member of 
the school of Abd al-Jabbar.^^ 
According to Mankdim, a classical Mutazilite, there are 
some stages of commanding right and forbidding wrong as 
follows: 
1. Obligation: 
Mankdim explains that "there is no disagreement that 
commanding right and forbidding wrong are obligatory. The 
only point at issue is whether the obligation is known to be 
such by reason, or by revelation alone. On this he reports 
disagreement between the Mtuazilites. One view is that the 
obligation is known from both reason and revelation, the other 
that it is known only from revelation. The forms of revelation 
that establish the duty are Quran, tradit ion (sunna) and 
consensus ( i jma). From the Quran he mentions: You were the 
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best community brought forth to men, commanding right and 
forbidding wrong'; God would not have praised us so had 
commanding right and forbidding wrong not been obligatory. 
(3:110). From the tradit ion, he quotes a saying of the 
prophet: No eye which sees God disobeyed should blink before 
righting the wrong or departing the scene".^"^ 
2. Conditions: 
Mankdim gives a schema of five conditions which must be 
satisfied for commanding right and forbidding wrong to be 
obligatory. These conditions are as follows: 
1 . Knowledge of Law: One must know that what one 
commands is right and what one forbids is wrong. 
Otherwise, one is in danger of commanding what is 
wrong and forbidding what is right. 
2. Knowledge of fact. One must know the wrong to be in 
the making (hadir). With regard to this condition, it 
suffices to have good reason to believe. 
3. Absence of Worse Side-Effects: One should know that 
taking action will not lead to a greater evil. Without this, 
one is in danger of greater wrong. So, there is no 
obligation to proceed, nor is it good to do so. 
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4 . Efficacy: One must know or have good reason to believe 
that speaking out will have an effect. 
5. Absence of Danger to Oneself: One must know or have 
good reason to believe that one's action will not bring 
harm to one's person or property. There is a question that 
whether it is still good to proceed, even for someone who 
is not obligated to do so. In this case the answer is that it 
depends: if the man's suffering would be for the greater 
glory of the faith, then it is good that a man should act, 
but if not, not. This is how we should understand the case 
of Husayn Ibn Ali, who persisted in commanding right and 
forbidding wrong till he was killed.^"* 
3. Obligation and Supererogation: 
There is a question that If right can be either obligatory or 
non-obligatory, what is the status of the act of commanding such 
right? The answer is that it is obligatory to command the obligatory, 
but supererogatory to command the supererogatory. Wrong, 
however, cannot be divided in this manner. It is thus obligatory to 
forbid any wrong without distinction, a minor wrong or a major 
wrong. 
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4. Role of the ruler: 
At this point, l^ankdim takes up tlie role of the ruler in 
earnest. There are two kinds of the duty: What only rulers can carry 
out, and what people at large can undertake. Examples of the 
former are such tasks as inficting the set punishments (hudud), 
defending the Muslim heartland and frontiers,dispatching armies, 
and appointing judges and governors. Examples of the latter are 
taking action against wine-drinking, theft, adultery and the like; if, 
however, there is a legitimate ruler, then even in such cases it is 
better to have recourse to him. In fact most of what falls under the 
duty can only be performed by rulers. This emphasis on forbidding 
wrong as the business of the state is in part contextual: the 
passage forms part of Mankdim's opening statement in his 
discussion of the imamate, and justifies considering this institution 
under the rubric forbidding wrong.^^ 
5. Collective Obligation: 
The purpose of the duty is to prevent right from being 
thwarted and wrong from occurring; so if this is achieved by 
one person, it ceases to obligate others. In other words. If 
some people do it, other Muslims Will be absolved from it. 
Accordingly the duty is a collective obligation, (furud al-
kifayat). as opposed to the individual ones. 
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There are some differences between nnankdim's accounts 
and rival doctrines. There is, however, a substantial identity of 
basic doctrines, as might be expected given that both tradtions 
stem from Abdal-Jabbar. There are, of course, matters covered 
exclusively by Mankdim. Equally there are others that appear 
only in the treatments of the duty under consideration here. 
Thus we find in several of these accounts a taxonomy of 
potential wrongs that contains significant elements to which 
Mankdim offers no parallel. According to this classification, one 
category consists of things that are invariably worng, such as 
injustice; we could call these intrinsic wrong. The other 
category consists of things that may or my not be wrong; we 
could call these contingent wrongs. 
More centrally, these accounts fill a major gap in 
Mankdim's treatment of the duty by addressing two obvious 
questions: Who is obligated to forbid wrong, and to whom? The 
answer to the first question is every Muslim who is able to 
perform the duty and satisfies the conditions. However, the 
imam and his deputies are better placed to undertake the duty 
where it involves fighting (qi tal) ." The answer to the second 
question is every legally competent person (mukallaf) who 
satisfies the conditions. 
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The most striking differences, liowever, relate to the 
conditions. One aspect of this is the way in which they are set 
out. Where IMankdim has one set of five conditions for 
obligation, the accounts driving from Abul-Husyn have one set 
of five for it to be good to proceed, and a further set of three 
(or two) for it to be obligatory.^^ 
AL-FARABI, ABU NASR (870-950) 
Al-Farabi was known to the Arabs as the second teacher 
(after Aristotle), for he was one of the world's great 
philosophers and much more original than many of his Islamic 
successors. A philosopher, logician and muscian, he was also a 
major political scientist.-^^ 
" In political science he preferred to follow plato's 
Republic and laws, as understood by middle platonic thinkers, 
convinced that plato's theoretical philosophy had been 
superseded by Aristotle and the Neoplatonistis, but that his 
analysis of the imperfect states and his solution of the 
problems of politics remained valid and compatible with the 
changed political conditions.-^^ 
In the Encyclopedia of Religion has been mentioned that 
al-farabi claimed that religion is merely an imaginative 
imitation of true philosophy, which must therefore be perior to 
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it both logically and chronologically. True philosophy is the one 
handed down by Plato and Aristotle, who remain in 
fundamental agreement because they were both pursuing the 
same aim. 
The philosophical method is demonstration, which 
restricts philosophy to an intellectual elite. Religion, in this 
view, is a popular philosophy that translates philosophical 
concepts and truths into symbols and symbolic statements; its 
method is imaginative persuasion. As symbols are, culturally 
determined, Al-Farabi envisioned a plurality of religions using 
different symbols for different cultures, and he believed that 
the value of a religion can be measured by the accuracy of its 
translation of the true philosophy into symbolic language and 
by the degree of cultural fitness of such a language. 
Within al-Farabi's framework, both philosophic i l lumin-
ation and its translation into symbols, which are forms of 
revelation, emanate from the Active intellect, the tenth 
separate intelligence, which is symbolized in Islamic terms by 
the angel Gabriel, who communicated revelation to 
Muhammad. In this way, al-Farabi vests Plato's philosopher 
king and lawgiver with the garb of a prophet. 
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Al-Farabi's belief in the priority of philosophy over 
religion may have been influenced in part by the fact that 
Christians were usually not permitted to study Aristotle's Logic 
beyond the prior analytics, where as al-Farabi and other Arab 
philosophers did."^^ 
Farabi's Political thought: 
M.M. Sharif has mentioned that "whi le, recasting the 
philosophical views of Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek 
thinkers Al-Farabi always keeps in view the Islamic tenets 
which have formed the inner links of his writ ings. In his 
political philosophy, he has followed the same line. Under the 
influence of Plato and Aristotle he evolves his own system 
which markedly differs from the system of the Greeks, the 
Iranians as well as the Indians."'*° 
Regarding the city-state, al-Farabi believes that the city-
state (Madinah) and the family state (manzil) are places that 
contain inhabitants, no matter whether their dwelling are 
constructed of wood, mud, wool or hair. 
"The house or family is limited to only four relationships: 
husband and wife, master and slave, father and son, and 
property and proprietor. He who makes them unit in co-
operation and aims at providing for them an abode with best 
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facilities and maintenance is called the master of the family. 
He is in the house what the administrator of the city is in the 
city."^^ 
In the field of necessity of society, al-Farabi says, "Men 
are naturally so constituted that they need many things for 
their best achievements. Hence, they need mutual help and 
co-operation, everyone doing his best for obtaining a particular 
kind of object. Thus, by uniting their individual efforts for 
different objects they organize different societies."''^ 
He has divided human societies into perfect and 
imperfect. The perfect society includes great, middling, or 
small. The great human society is the one consisting of several 
nations uniting themselves in one unit and helping one 
another. The middling one is the society of one national part of 
the world, and the small is the society of the people of a city.'*-^ 
The imperfect society is that of the people of a village, a 
locality, a lane, or a house, the last being the smallest. 
Now, the highest good and perfection are primarily 
achieved through volition and wil l. Similarly, evil finds its 
scope by volition and wil l. The city-state can, therefore, 
develop by mutual help and efforts to attain some evil purpose 
or to attain happiness. The city in which the members of the 
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society co-operate to attain happiness is in reality ti ie ideal 
city-state (al-madinat al-fadilah), the society, the ideal 
society, and the nation, the ideal na t ion / ' ' 
Happiness: 
Al-Farabi speaks of happiness both of this world and the 
hereafter. He says that there are four kinds of virtues that 
when form the qualities of a nation or of the people of a city, 
their worldly happiness in this world and eternal happiness in 
the next are insured. Such as: Speculative virtue (al-fadail al-
nazariyyah), theoretical virtues (fadail al- f ikr iyyah), the nnoral 
virtues (fadail al-khulqiyyah) and the practical arts (al-sanaat 
al-amaliyyah). 
Speculative virtues represent those sciences which aim at 
the highest object, knowledge of existing things including all 
their requirements. These sciences are either natural in man, 
or they are achieved by effort and learning."*^ 
According to al-Farabi, theoretical perfection is the 
ultimate happiness and theoretical knowledge is the only good 
in itself. From this doctrine it clearly follows that all other 
things which are good can be good only as means to 
theoretical perfection, they cannot be good in themselves."*^ 
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He has divided souls into tinree degree: souls of celestial 
bodies, souls of the rational animals, and souls of the irrational 
animals. The souls of the rational animals are the rational 
faculty. The rational faculty equips man with sciences and arts, 
and enables him to distinguish good from evil manners and 
actions. Through this faculty man inclines to do good and avoid 
evil and realizes the useful, the harmful, the pleasant, and the 
unpleasant.'^'' 
Man, understands and realizes happiness only through 
the speculative ration faculty. The imaginative and the 
sensitive faculties help the rational faculty in moving man 
towards those actions which lead to happiness. The good is 
characterized as voluntary. But if the rational faculty feels 
happiness only by making an effort to perceive it, while other 
faculties do not perceive it, then sometimes man considers the 
pleasant and the useful to be the ultimate ends of life. 
Similarly, he produces only evil who attains to happiness 
which he does not recognize as his aim, does not desire it, or 
desires it with a faint desire, and depots something other than 
happiness as his end, and exerts all his faculties to achieve 
that end.^^ 
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According to him, virtue, Is that state of the soul which 
gives rise to actions that lead to theoretical perfection. He also 
In another place says, the virtue of any thing is that which 
produces excellence and perfection in Its being and action.'*^ 
"The definition of virtue as the excellence of the faculties 
of the soul elevates the status of virtue fronn the position of an 
Instrunnental good. Another thing which further elevates the 
status of virtue is the emphasis that al-Farabi lays upon the 
purity of motive in the pursuit of virtue. He who seeks justice 
or temperance or any other virtue in a commercial spirit, or 
pursues them for any external advantage, infact gets nothing 
except vice and base qualities. For, he does not acquire justice 
or temperance as good in themselves, nor does he leave what 
he leaves of Ill-doing and vice for Itself, because it is ugly and 
he hates it."^° 
The recognition of virtue as a good in itself, as something 
desirable for its own sake, requires that virtue should be 
considered as an integral part of the ultimate happiness of 
man along with the theoretical perfection. But this will 
virtueally mean a revision of al-Farabi's whole conception of 
happiness.^^ 
I l l 
The knowledge of happiness, "al-Farabi explains includes 
the knowledge of the First Beings, the Intelligences and the 
Active intelligence, the spheres, natural bodies and their 
various grades, man and the faculties of his soul and his 
relation to the Active Intelligence, the supreme ruler of the 
state and those who replace him when he is not available, the 
virtuous polity and the kinds of happiness which the people of 
the virtuous polity achieve, and the spurious goods which is 
the lot of the people of the vicious and ignorant polities. 
The true knowledge of all this is either attained by a true 
philosopher or a real prophet or by those who follow them and 
have a right comprehension of their ideas. 
The philosopher and the prophet receive their knowledge 
directly from the Active Intelligence which is identified by al-
Farabi with the Ruh ul-Amin, the angel who is the medium of 
reve la t ion , " " 
Al-Farabi believes that man has been created to achieve 
the highest happiness (saadah). He should, therefore, know 
what happiness is and should make it the aim of his life. He, 
then, needs to know those factors and arts through which he 
can achieve happiness. But since human individuals are 
different in nature, it is not in the nature of every man to know 
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happiness or those factors which enable him to reach it by 
himself. So, he needs a teacher, a guide.^^ The guide should 
educates from two ways: 1. Teaching ( ta l im), 2. upbringing 
(tadib). Teaching (talim) is the method of creating speculative 
excellences in nations and cities, while upbringing (tadib) is 
the method of creating and developing moral virtues and 
scientific arts in nations. Teaching is possible only by 
expression; tadib is to make nations and citizens habitusted to 
the deeds done through scientific habits. While al-Farabi 
agrees with Plato in the system of education and in learning 
from childhood, he emphasizes that speculative science are 
learnt either by kings and leaders (imams) or by those who 
preserve these sciences and teach kings and leaders in several 
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ways.^ 
The Chief of Ideal State and His Characteristics: 
According to al-Farabi, since people differ in their 
intellectual capacity, in physical strength, in the exercise of 
virtuous deeds, and in the acquisition of excellent habits of 
thinking, feeling, wil l ing, and doing. For this, it is necessary in 
every department of life and arts the strongest person, of 
excellent manners, who also knows, acts, and directs, as the 
chief of that part, the being the subjects. The chief is either 
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one of the first rank who is not subservient to anyone, or he is 
of the second rank, dominating some, and being dominated by 
some others. 
Such ranks develop in relation to the forms of art, e.g., 
cult ivation, trade, medical profession, or in respect of all kinds 
of human beings. 
The first chief in general is he who needs no help from 
anyone. Sciences and arts are his property in actuality, and he 
needs no guidance from any person in any respect.^^ 
He believes that "the prince or the Imam is prince and 
Imam by virtue of his skill and art, regardless of whether or 
not anyone acknowledges him, whether or not he is obeyed, 
whether or not he is supported in his purpose by any group; 
just as the physician is physician by virtue of his skill and his 
ability to heal the sick, whether or not there are sick men for 
him to heal, whether or not he finds tools to us in his activity, 
whether he is prosperous or poor-not having any of these 
things does not do away with his physicianship. Similarly, 
neither the imamate of the imam, the philosophy of the 
philosopher, nor the princeship of the prince is done away with 
by his not having tools to use in his activities or men to 
employ in reaching his purpose".^^ 
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According to al-Farabi, The Imam or the chief of the ideal 
state is the chief of the ideal nation, and of the whole 
inhabited part of the earth. 
Therefore, he should possess the following 
characteristics: 
1. Sound health, and perfect organs, performing 
their functions with case and facility and in 
harmony with all faculties. 
2. Intelligence and wise, so as to be able to realize 
the intention of a speaker In his particular 
situations and circumstances. 
3. Good memory, so as to retain in his mind all that 
he understands, sees, hearts, and perceives. 
4. Prudence and talent, to understand a problem 
from the perspective in which it has been 
presented to him. 
5. Eloquence, so that his tongue may assist him in 
expressing in a perfect manner all that is in his 
mind. 
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6. Devotion to education and learning, and 
submission to receive l<nowledge witl i ease 
without feeling any annoyance. 
7. No greed for food, drink, and sex; avoidance of 
play; and dislike of pleasures caused by these. 
8. Friendlines towards truth and truthful persons 
and condemnation of falsehood and those who are 
inclined to falsehood. 
9. Bigness of heart, loving nobil i ty, and natural 
magnanimity without any trace of meanness. 
10. Indifference to dirham and dinar and other forms 
of wealth. 
11. Devotion by nature of justice and oppression and 
just people, abhorrence of injustice and 
oppression and unjust and oppressive people; 
offering half of one's possessions and those of 
one's family to help the oppressed, and urging 
others to do the same; helping everything good 
and beautiful; and being easy to bend to justice 
but difficult to oppression and evil. 
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12. Strong resolution, courage and promptitude 
without any sign of fear or psychological 
weakness. 
If a person possessed of these qualities happens to live 
in an ideal state he is the chief. 
I t is, however, impossible to have all these qualities in 
one man. People are scarcely equipped with all of them. If no 
one having these qualities is found in the state, the laws 
promulgated by a former chief or his successors should be kept 
in force. 
If all the conditions mentioned for the chief are not found 
in one man, and are available in two persons, one wise, and 
the other possessing other qualities-then both will be the 
chiefs of the state. If, however, these conditions are scattered 
in a group of people agreeable to work together, then these 
members will be the ideal chiefs. But if wisdom does not form 
a part of the state while other conditions are fulfil led entirely, 
the city will be best without a sovereign, but it will be exposed 
to destruction. The state without a philosopher to whom it may 
be entrusted will perish in no t i m e . " 
"Plato's philosopher king has also been described as 
truth- loving, fond of the knowledge of existents, one who 
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keeps away from vice, is free-thinl<ing, intell igent, sagacious, 
wit ty, and ambitious. But the state of ai-Farabi is international 
in character. While the state of Plato is only a city-state, that 
of al-Farabi can be as vast as a world-state. Plato wants to 
entrust the affairs of the state to a group of philosophers and 
names the organization "aristocracy". Al-Farabi not only calls 
the Head of the state Imam but identifies him with a prophet. 
I t Is in the absence of the Imam or the second chief who has 
the necessary qualities to follow the tradit ion of the Imam that 
he entrusts the affairs of the state to a group of individuals 
who between themselves possess most of the qualities of the 
chief. I t is, therefore, not true to say that al-Farabi has based 
his theory entirely on the Republic of Plato, or that he is 
simply Aristotelian in his thought."^^ 
The Ideal state and its Inhabitants: 
Al-Farabi believes that the sovereigns of an ideal state 
who succeed one another are all like one soul, as if there were 
one king who continued all the t ime. Similar is the case with a 
group of people who administer the state together at a time in 
one or more than one city. The whole group is just like one 
sovereign, their souls being like one soul. Uniformity is found 
in every stage and in every part of the state and people 
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flourishing at different times look as if t l iey were one souls 
working all the time in the same way. If there is continuity and 
harmony at a particular stage, even different groups of people, 
whether of one or more than one state, would appear as one 
soul. 
The people of the Ideal state have something common to 
all of them in their learning and acting. But different groups of 
people belonging to different ranks and stages have some 
sciences and deeds peculiar to them. Through both of these, 
people achieve happiness, and by displaying these they obtain 
an ideal psychical form. This form grows stronger and stronger 
and better and better by constant performance of those 
deeds.^^ 
According to al-Farabi, "the ideal state consists of five 
kinds of people: The excellent, the linguists, the secluded, the 
struggling, and the steady. The excellent people are the 
philosophers, the intellectuals, and the people of opinion in 
great affairs. As for linguists, they are the orators, speakers, 
poets, musicians, writers, and the like. The secluded people 
are the mathematicians, statisticians, physicians, astronomers, 
and the like. The struggling people are the fighters, the 
defenders, and all those who take their place. The steady are 
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those who earn money in the city, for example cultivators, 
traders, and those engaged in other pursuits."^° 
His theory of city state, as we have seen is based on his 
concept of political justice: 
Thus, "general concept of justice concerns the exercise of 
virtue in relation to one's fellow men, whatever this virtue 
might be. This concept is reminiscent of the platonic definition 
of justice as a harmony of functions in the soul and of classes 
in the state. 
The exercise of this virtue presupposes division of labour 
within the state, made necessary by the diversity of natural 
aptitudes in the individuals or classes that make it up. 
This view of justice is naturally at variance with what is 
called natural justice by those who make conquest or 
domination the ultimate goal of the state. Al-Farabi, reporting 
this view anonymously, argues that war might be justif ied if it 
is aimed at warding off invasion or serving some good purpose 
of the state, but not if conducted with a view to conquest or 
gain."^^ 
"States are classified by al-Farabi according to rather 
abstract teleological principles. The virtuous city to which such 
frequent reference has been made is essentially one in which 
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the good or happy life is pursued and in which the virtues 
proliferate. How ever, there might exist a state in which no 
goal beyond obtaining the necessities of life is envisaged. In 
some states the king and his retainers might be ciontent to 
seek honor for themselves, either through virtue (as in 
aristocracy and timocracy, wealth (as in plutocracy), good 
breeding (as in hereditary monarchy), or conquest (as in 
tyranny). Finally, in some states ( i .e., democracy) pleasure 
might be reckoned the ultimate goal of the state, whereas in 
others, with mixed forms of government, the goals of wealth, 
pleasure, and honor might be combined."^^ 
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THE ASHARIYAH: 
Ashariyah is the name of a theological school in Islam, 
the followers of Abu'l-Hasan al-Ash'ari that developed during 
the fourth and f i f th/ tenth and eleventh centuries. Al-Ash'ari 
was born at Basrah in 260/873-4 and died in 324/935-6. "He 
was a descendant of abu Musa al-Ashari, one of the famous 
companions of the Prophet" . " Al-Ashari was one of the best 
pupils of al-Jubbai, head of the Mu'tazila in Basra, and, as a 
disciple of his, became an adherent of the Mu'tazilite school 
and continued to support its doctrines up to the age of forty.^'* 
After that there happened as sudden change in his mind. He 
held an intermediate position between the two schools of 
thought in Islam, that is the rationalist and the extreme 
orthodox.^^ This movement was "an attempt not only to purge 
Islam of all non-Islamic elements which had quietly crept into 
it, but also to harmonize the religious consciousness with the 
religious thought of Islam".^^ Ashari found an orthodox Islamic 
theology or orthodox Kalam, as opposed to the rationalist 
kalam of the Mutazilites; and in opposition to the extreme 
orthodox class. 
In the encyclopedia of Islam is mentioned that towards 
the middle of the S^Vn"" century, the Ashariya were 
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persecuted by the Buwayhid sultans, who favoured a 
combination of the views of the Mutazilah and Shia. But with 
the coming of the saljulcs the tables were turned, and the 
Ashariya received official support, especially from the great 
wazir Nizam al-Mulk. In return they gave intellectual support 
to the caliphate against the Fatimid of Cairo.^^ 
The important members of the Ashariya are: al-Baqillani 
(d. 403/1013). Ibn Furak (Abu Bakr Muhammad b. al-Hasan) 
d. 406/1015-6) , al-Isfaraini (d- 418/1027-8), al-Juwayni Imam 
al-Haramayn (d. 478/1085-6), al-Ghazali (Abu Hamid 
Muhammad) (d.505/1111), al shahrastani (d. 548/1153), 
Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1210), al-JurjanI (d. 816/1413). 
Al-Ashari discussed the main theological problems in his 
Maqalat al-Islamiyyn and al-Ibanah 'an Usui al-Diyanah. In 
these books al-Ashari selects a few principles which distinguish 
the Asharites from the Mutazilite schools of thought. The main 
problems are: (1) The conception of God and the nature of His 
attributes. (2) Freedom of the human wil l . (3) The criterion of 
truth and the standard of good and evil. (4) The vision (ruyah) 
of God. (5) Createdness of the Quran. (6) possibility of 
burdening the creatures with impossible taks. (7) promise of 
reward and threat of punishment. (8) The rational or non-
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rational basis of God's actions. (9) Whether God is bound to do 
what is best for His creatures. 
Free-will: On the question of free-will the Asharites held 
an intermediary position between the libertarian and fatalistic 
views. The orthodox people and the Jabrites held that hunnan 
actions are predetermined and predestined by God. Man has 
no power and wil l , and God is responsible for all actions and 
has absolute power over everything. The Mutazilites and the 
Qadarites, on the other hand, held that. Man is responsible for 
his actions and has freewill and liberty of action, though the 
power was created in him by God.^^ 
In contrast to the emphasis of the Mutazilah on the 
reality of choice in human activity, al-Ashari insisted on God's 
omnipotence; everything, good and evil, is willed by God, They 
confirmed that the power of choice in human being is created 
by God; and that man has been given the power of acquiring 
the actions.^^ Power according to them, is either original 
(qadimah) or derived (hadithah). The original power alone is 
effective. Derived power can create nothing. The power 
possessed by man is given by God and as such it is derived. 
Al-Ashari said, "The true meaning of acquisition is the 
occurrence of a thing or event due to derived power, and it is 
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an acquisition for tl ie person by whose derived power it takes 
place".^° Thus God creates in man the power and the ability to 
do an act. He also creates in him the power to make a free 
choice (ikhtiyar) between two alternative-between right and 
wrong. But this free choice is not effective in producing the 
action. I t is the habit of God to create the action corresponding 
to the action and power created by Himself in man.''^ "God 
creates, in man, the power, ability, choice, and will to perform 
an act, and man, endowed with this derived power, chooses 
freely one of the alternatives and intends or wills to do the 
action, and, corresponding to this intention. God creates and 
completes the action".''^ "Thus, he acquires the merit or 
demerit of the action because of his intending to do a good or 
bad action. Man's free choice is, so to say, an occasion for 
God's causing the action corresponding to that choice. In this 
the Asharites come very close to the occasionalism of 
Malebranche which was expounded in Europe eight centuries 
and a half later."^^ 
According to Ashari, "Man has power over his acts 
because he experiences in himself an obvious distinction 
between movements such as trembling and shaking and those 
which are voluntary. This difference is due to the fact that 
voluntary movements are brought into being through power, 
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and as a result of the choice of the one possessing that power. 
On the basis of this Ashari says that the acquired act is the 
one possible through the power present, and the one that 
occurs under the created power. According to Ashari's 
principle, however, the created power has no effect on the 
bringing into being of an act, because from the point of view of 
coming into being there is no difference between substance 
and accident"'''* 
The Ashariyah adopted a middle position. They made a 
distinction between creation (Khalq) and acquisition (Kasb) of 
an action. God according to the Ashariyah, is the creator 
(Khaliq) of human actions and man is the acquisitor 
(Muktasib). "Actions of human beings are created (makhluq) 
by God, the creatures are not capable of creating any 
action".''^ There is no creator except God and the actions of 
man are, therefore. His creation. 
The Asharites based their theory on some verses of the 
Quran that affirm the absolutism of the Divine will and pre-
arrangement of human actions, such as: 
1. "And God's ordering is in accordance with a fixed 
decree".(38:36). 
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2. "Verily, God accomplishes what He ordains-He has 
established for everything a fixed decree(45:24). 
3. "God creates what He wills". (3 :65) . 
4. "And you do not wish unless God wishes". (85:20) 
5. "Say: All is fronn God". (4:78.) 
6. "And God gives nneans of subsistence to whom He will 
without measure". (2:212) 
7. "And whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in 
the earth is Allah's, He forgives whom He wills and 
chastises whom He wills; and God is forgiving, 
merciful." (3:129) 
8. "No evil befalls on the earth nor in your own souls, but 
it is in a book before we bring it into existence, surely 
that is easy to God". (57:22) 
The Asharites interpret in a different way those verses 
which signify that human actions are free. They say that "the 
Quran ascribes some actions to human energy, not in the 
sense that they really originate from it, but in the sense that 
their completion is partially due to it. I t is owing to the power 
of appropriation which man exercises to complete his work 
that the Quran rhetorically ascribes some actions to human 
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ability. "The true Faith is between predestination and free-
wi l l " , says the tradition".^^ 
The problems of reason and revelation and the 
criterion of Good and Evil. "The Ashariyah differ from the 
Mutazilites on the question whether reason or revelation 
should be basis of the truth and reality. Both the schools 
admit the necessity of reason for the rational understanding of 
fa i th, but they differ with regard to the question whether 
revelation or reason is more fundamenta l . " " In other words, is 
reason able to perceive the goodness or badness of things by 
itself-unaided and "independently"? Or does it have to take 
recourse in revelation and the Divine law? The Mutazilites held 
that reason is more fundamental than revelation and they gave 
prominence to reason. Revelation merely confirms what is 
accepted by reason. 
The Asharites, held that revelation is more fundamental 
than reason. They prefer revelation to reason in case of a 
conflict between the two. The Asharites don't believe in the 
absolutism of reason as the Mutazilites do. In fact, this is one 
of the fundamental principles in which the rational kalam of 
the Mutazilites differs from the orthodox kalam of the 
Asharites. Islam is based on certain fundamental principles, 
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which, being supersensible in nature, are incapable of rational 
proof. These principles, f irst, must be believed in on the basis 
of revelation. This faith, based on revelation, must be 
rationalized.''^ Islam admits the necessity of rationalizing its 
faith. But to admit the necessity of rationalizing faith is not to 
admit pure reason to be the sole source of Islam as a religion. 
Therefore reason must be subordinated to revelation. 
The problem of good and evil is one of the most 
controversial problems of Islamic theology. The Mutazilites 
held that reason is the criterion of good and evil, and reason is 
real standard to determine what is good and what is bad. 
The Asharites, as against the Mutazilites, held that 
revelation is the real criterion of good and evil (husn wa 
qubh). Actions, in themselves are neither good nor bad. Divine 
Law makes them good or bad. 
According to the Asharites, revelation alone decides 
whether an action is good or bad. What is commanded by shar 
is good, and what is prohibited is bad.^^ "They saw good and 
evil as relative realities that adapted themselves to the 
conditions of time and space and that were influenced by 
customs and indoctrinations. Moreover, for the perception of 
good and evil , they saw reason as being not only in need of 
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revelation, but they even saw reason to be a consequence of 
revelation".^° 
For t l i is, the Asharites, denied justice being an essential 
and a priori quality. They said: Justice is not a reality in itself 
that we can describe "before hand" and set as the standard of 
God's acts. In fact, setting such a standard and point of 
reference for Divine acts is to in sonne way impose obligations 
on God and to constrain and limit His wil l. All laws are created 
by Him, and He is the ultimate Authority. Divine justice does 
not mean that there are a set of previously defined " just" laws 
which He must abide by. But Divine justice means that He is 
the source of Justice; whatever He does is just , not that He 
does what is just . Thus, justice and injustice are consequence 
and derivatives of Divine acts. Justice is not the standard of 
God's actions but God's actions is the standard of justice.^^ 
The Asharites referred to themselves as the "people of 
Tradit ion". "They used this name and lable to make a social 
platform and movement for themselves amongst the masses. 
In other words, this dispute between them and the Mutazilah 
which was primarily based upon accepting or rejecting the idea 
of "rationally derived realities" - came to be cast into the 
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acceptance or rejection of tradition (sunnah wa haditli) in the 
popular eye".^^ 
The Purpose and End of Divine Acts: Tlnis theological 
problem is one of the main principles in which the Asharites 
and IMutazilites differed. 
The Asharites held that God is the only real cause of 
everything, and he has effective power. Whatever power 
human beings apparently posses is given by God. Man does 
not possess any real and effective power. 
The Asharites denied rational purpose and end for God's 
actions. They explained the concept of wisdom - which 
appears repeatedly in the Qur'an - in the same way that they 
had dealt with justice. That is to say, it was their belief that 
whatever God does is wise, not that He does what is wise. 
The Mutazilites held that Divine acts are the result of a 
series of expedients. The Asharites held that "as God is the 
creator of creation, He is also the creator of any such things 
that are named "expediencies" - albeit, without that thing 
having an ontological essential, or causal connection with any 
expediency".^"^ He is not bound to do what is best for this 
creatures. He does whatever He wills. But as He is an 
131 
absolutely intelligent and just being, His actions, as a matter 
of fact, are all full of wisdom. 
Promise of Reward and Threat of Punishment By 
God - This problem was one of the five main problems with 
which the l^utazilite movement started. The Mutazilites held 
that "God is bound to fulfil l His promises of reward and 
punishment".^"^ I t is obligatory on God to reward the virtuous 
and punish the vicious. God has made promises in the Quran 
and He, being as just being, cannot do otherwise, i.e.. He 
cannot punish the virtuous and forgive the vicious. 
Contrary to this, the Asharites held that, being all-
powerful and absolutely free in His wil l , He can reward whom 
He will and punish whom He will There is nothing binding on 
God; His will is not subject to teleological considerations. It is 
by the inner necessity of His own nature that he fulfils His 
promise of reward to the virtuous and does not do otherwise. 
And it is in His infinite mercy that He may forgive any wrong 
doer person in spite of the threats of punishment for his 
vicious acts. The Quran says: He forgiveth whom He will and 
punish whom He will.^^ 
In his Tamhid, al-Baqillani, stresses the difference 
between a deliberate movements (ala tarik al- ikhtiyar) of the 
132 
hand and the "movement" which is the trembling of the 
hemiplegia. This is a psychological statement that has to be 
placed within the vaster problem of the "creat ion" and 
"acquisit ion". In fact, generally speaking In the Ashari and 
Hanafi Maturldi schools, I t is not al-ikhtlyar that is the tit le of 
discussions on free human action but rather al-kudra al-
haditha, the "contingent "(commenced") power (of action)". 
With the Asharis, the "acquisit ion" of action, is understood as 
an "at t r ibut ion" carried out directly by God, and with the 
Maturldis as simple "qualif ication" of the action. The problem 
dealt with is that of Istita'a, the "capacity" to act created by 
God in the human subject.^^ 
According to al-Baqillani, "the created power is not 
capable of bestowing existence. However an act in Its 
attributes and aspects is not limited to coming into being 
alone, but it has other aspects also, such as, for example, in 
the case of a substance, occupying a place and receiving an 
accident. Baqillani hold that the aspect of an act's coming into 
being with or 'under' the created power is a special 
relationship, and this is called acquisition. I t is this acquisition 
which is an effect of the created power".^'' 
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Imam Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, discarded the veil of 
acquisition in order to escape the charge of fatalism, and 
advocated naked determinism. "His predecessors had modified 
the idea of human free will into the theory of kasb or 
acquisition, though they asserted that all actions are created 
by God. Razi, however, openly declared that man does not 
possess any free wil l. Likewise, he said that God's action need 
not be according to the human standard of justice and 
wisdom".^^ 
Al-Ghazzali: 
Towards the middle of the 5 ' V l l ' ^ century there was a 
change in method. Ibn Khaldun speaks of al-Ghazzali as the 
first of the "moderns", doubtless because of his enthusiasm for 
the Aristotelian syllogism, but there are already in al-Juwayni 
traces of methodological advance. It was al-Ghazzali, however, 
who steeped himself in the doctrines of Ibn Sina and others of 
the philosophers until he could attack them on their own 
ground with devastating success.^^ 
In his criticism of Ibn Sina, al-Ghazzali focuses on the 
issue of God's will and knowledge. He claims that if Ibn Sina 
remains faithful to his belief that God has no knowledge of the 
other, Al-Ghazzali bases his claim on the argument that 
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knowledge of an action is necessary only in the case of 
voluntary actions. So if one claims that the universe 
necessarily emanates from God without His will or choice, as 
light comes from the sun, then it requires no knowledge on the 
part of God.^° 
He believes that God can choose to impose on his 
creatures what they cannot do. God does nothing in vain. He 
can fail to reward one who obeys him. The obligation of 
knowing God comes from revelation alone.^^ The power of man 
is connected with the power of God. !*»1an is an object in whom 
He created knowledge, will and strength. Everything of man is 
linked with strength and connected with the object of 
strength.^^ 
The Freedom of Wil l : 
The question of the freedom of wil l , because of its great 
ethical significance, received the close attention of al-Ghazzali. 
There are three aspects of this question. Al-Ghazzali believes 
that the efficacy of will in changing and improving character is 
a necessary postulate of ethics. Secondly, he considers that 
will is determined by knowledge. For this he tries to prove bay 
a profound analysis of human actions. Freedom, he thinks, 
consists in the acceptance or rejection by Reason of one or the 
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Other alternatives that are presented to it. But this acceptance 
or rejection is not wholly undetermined. On the contrary it is 
caused by the Divine wil l. Thus man's freedom is determined.^-^ 
A close study of Alam al-Jabrut, the world of mind 
(Reason, Will and Power) which is the bridge between the first 
and the third worlds reveals how far man is free. Al-Ghazzali 
analyses the processes in the human mind leading to action, 
and points out the limits of human freedom and determinism.^"* 
The Khawater (affections of the mind) are all those 
impressions that reach the heart (or soul). They are ideas, 
whether thoughts that come from immediate sensations, or 
recollections that come through memory. It is in these ideas 
that al-Ghazzali sees what he calls the springs of human 
actions. 
These ideas are capable of exciting strong desire or 
inclination (raghba). This inclination must then be followed by 
r t i qad , which is defined as intellectual conviction, i.e., the 
decision or permission of reason. These decision of reason is in 
turn confirmed or accepted by will ( Iradah), and the result is 
directed power, or action (amal). The psychological 
determination of action may be expressed, therefore, as an 
equation: 
136 
Khawatir+raghba + itiqad + iradah = amal. 
In the decision of reason, in acceptance or rejection by 
the wil l , and in the direction of power in action, a man is 
conscious of a sense of freedom, and it is in the exercise of 
this freedom that he becomes a responsible agent. Now this 
will which is produced after deliberation, when translated into 
acceptance or rejection, constitutes ikhtiyar, literally choice, 
i.e., freedom. The word al-ikhtiyar is derived from khair, which 
means good. So al-ikhtiyar means the choice of an idea or an 
object. When the decision of the intellect is accepted as good, 
one is impelled to act accordingly.^^ 
But the first two elements of the equation, ideas 
(khawatir) and inclination (raghba), are recognized as being 
beyond man's own complete control, so that the conclusion 
would be that while the occurrence of a strong desire or 
inclination may come without man's responsibility, yet his 
reason is free to make a decision, and his will is free to accept 
the decision of reason as good and to implement the 
corresponding action. In such a case man would be free to do 
what he desires, but the complete control of his desires would 
lie beyond his power. He then proceeds to take a wider 
outlook, and to consider the whole problem of causation in 
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accord with eternal power (al-qudrat-al-azaliya) and divine 
wisdom (al- l i ikmat ai-azaliya).^^ 
In one of liis best analysis of human action (Ihya ulum 
al-din, ed. Cairo 1352/1933, iv, 219-20), al Ghazzali 
distinguishes three kinks of actions: natural (cleaning one's 
body with water) voluntary (breathing), chosen (ikhtiyar) 
wri t ing). The first is necessary (dharuri) in the strict sense, in 
that it msut take place; it comes about bi- l- idt irar. But all 
three are alike, he says, with respect to the actual nature 
(haqiqa) of the compulsion (idtirar) or the coercion or 
obligation (jabr) that determines them. Al-Ghazzali's 
conclusion, in fact, is in conformity with the Asharite system 
but following a more highly developed psychological analysis, 
is that, even in the case of chosen action, the decision of the 
will necessarily follows the judgement of the intellect, and 
that, accordingly, man is compelled to free choice, majbur 
alal-ikhtiyar. A natural action occurring through idtirar is 
purely determined; divine action is itself purely free; human 
actions are in an intermediate positon, compelled to free 
choice. This is way the people of the t ruth (ahl al-haqq) 
defined free actions of man by means of acquisition (kasb).^^ 
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Al-Ghazzali did not agree that the good or bad of a thing 
cannot be known through reason and argued that in such a 
case, a true religion or a right view cannot be distinguished 
and preferred to one which is considered wrong or inferior, 
because in itself it is neither good nor bad. He held that the 
creation of universe was with a certain object and end.^^ 
In the kitab al-Tawhid (The Book of Unity), Ihya, iv, 220, 
there is a discussion of the relationship between divine 
sovereignty, with its determinism, and man's limited free-wil l . 
The meaning that is most consistent with al-Ghazzali's subject 
matter in this section is that Allah is the only being with real 
or absolute existence. In man's limited individual cosmos there 
is what experience teaches him to recognize as power, but this 
power in him cannot have real or absolute existence, it must 
rather be dependent on the supreme power. 
Thus it was from his belief in God as the sole cause and 
the moving force in the universe that al-Ghazzali derived his 
sequence theory of causation, which provided for a 
consciousness of limited free will in human experience."^^ 
In his theory of ethics, Al-Ghazzali gives an exposition of 
the qualities, i.e, of virtues and vices which make or mar 
character. He believes that man has two forms, Khalq 
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(Physical form) and Khulq (the spiritual form). Khulq 
(character) involves (a) the ability to perform actions both 
good and bad, (b) control over actions, i.e., actions, are 
voluntary, (c) the knowledge of actions, and (d) a state of the 
self which is inclined towards both good and bad.^°° 
The basic elements of the inner constitution of man are 
reason or wisdom, self-assertion, and appetit ion. To form a 
beautiful character these elements must work together In 
harmony, observing the golden mean, each being in the 
correct proportion. Further, justice is the power which directs 
these elements to achieve the golden mean and to preserve 
their harmony. When self-assertion and appetition develop 
excess and get out of control, knowledge is easily exploited by 
them. The best development of self assertion and appetition 
consists in their subservience to wisdom, that is, in their 
activity according to the dictates of reason and the religious 
law. 
According to Al-Ghazzali, when knowledge or reason is 
rightly developed and becomes perfect, it is wisdom (Hikma). 
Knowledge has two aspects: theoretical and practical. 
Theoretical knowledge constitutes real wisdom (Hikma al-
Haqiqiya) because it operates in higher regions. It can 
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distinguish the true from the false in judgments, the right from 
the wrong in beliefs and the good from the evil in actions. 
Practical reason (Hikma al-Amaliya), on the other hand, 
functions in lower regions. It controls appetit ion, self-
assertion, and helps to form all personal and social virtues. If 
it fails to control them, corresponding vices result. I t is not an 
absolutely true wisdom, but a hand-maid to it. He says, if the 
development of knowledge follows the wrong lines, it gives rise 
to cunning (Khubth) ^°^ 
"Knowledge, appetit ion, and self-assertion in right 
proportions produce perfect and complete character. Only the 
prophet had them all in perfect proportions. Others possess 
them in different proportions".^°^ 
For Al-Ghazzali, "justice ";Adl) is the virtue of keeping to 
the golden mean between the extremes of knowledge, 
appetition and self-assertion, and of maintaining a balance 
between them."^°-^ Its opposite is tyranny (zulm), that is, going 
beyond the prescribed limits. Justice requires that one should 
fulfil one's duties. Justice in politics, for instance, means that 
different groups in the city be organized with proper attention 
and with due allowance for the different elements and varying 
sections of the population so that it may begin to function as a 
141 
social unity. Everything should be placed in its proper place, 
i.e., inhabitants divided into grades or classes, each with 
definite duties assigned to it. 
Thus the four cardinal virtues according to al-Ghazzali 
are wisdom, courage, temperance, and just ice, and the rest 
follow from them. They are the fundamentals to good 
character.-^"'* 
Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh (d. 1905), the disciple of 
the reformer Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, against the traditional 
Ashari ideas, would state the existence of human liberty as the 
basis of all actions and responsibility. He did not want to 
concern himself with what he considered metaphysical 
subtleties and turned instead to a somewhat a gnostic 
pragmatism. I t was practice that interested him above all. 
Thus divine law, reason, conscience, and common sense affirm 
human responsibility and human freedom. He said, "God is the 
cause to the extent that people act, and people are the cause 
to the extent that God acts." Here we are far from the Ashari 
Kasb (acquisition) that denies any real power to human beings. 
He added to this clear attitude toward human freedom an 
affirmation of natural law, which once again suggests the 
influence of the Mutazilah. Like the latter he recognized that 
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there are things objectively good or evi l , naturally beautiful or 
ugly, and concludes that a 'natural" law is possible. Religious 
law does not differ essentially from natural morality. The law 
came simply to show what exists. I t is not the law that makes 
it good.^°5 
Muhammad Abduh "did not believe that human society is 
able to work out its own salvation without divine intervention 
through the prophets. In the Risalat, emphasis is placed upon 
love and justice as the bonds which hold human society 
together. But all men are not actuated by these sentiments, 
just as all are not actuated by reason. No state of society, 
therefore, can resist the disintegrating influences of 
selfishness and injustice, only the teaching and supernatural 
personal influence of the prophets can rescue and restore it to 
a salutary state.^°^ 
He believed that the recognized laws of society are laws 
of God, and for sura x i i i . l 2 , "Verily God does not change the 
state of a people until they change their own state," he gave 
this explanation. 
IMations have not fallen from their greatness, nor have 
their names been wiped off the state of existence, except after 
they have departed from those laws which God prescribed with 
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supreme wisdom. God will not change the state of a people 
from might and power and wealth and peace, until that people 
change their own state of intellectual knowledge, and 
correctness of thinking and perception, and consideration of 
the works of God towards previous nations who went astray 
from the path of God and therefore perished. Ruin overtook 
them because they turned aside from the law of justice and 
the path of insight and wisdom.... And chose to live in 
falsehood rather than die in the aid of the t ruth ^°^. 
We can conclude from this mentioned theory as follows: 
1. Justice means that liberty is the basis of all human 
actions and responsibility. 
2. Justice means an identity between religious law and 
natural law and morality. 
3. Justice means freedom of will and responsibility of 
man. 
4. Justice means that things are naturally and 
essentially, good or evil and Divine law only shows 
what exist there in. 
5. And also justice means that the recognized laws of 
society are laws of God. 
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THE SHIAH 
According to the Shiah, justice is one of the Attributes of 
God. In their doctrine, the justice of God constitutes one of the 
five principles of religion (usul al-din). 
The problem of Divine justice and unity were also tabled 
in the shiah school of theology and Philosophy. On the four 
famous questions of justice, reason, free wil l , and wisdom, the 
shiah school supported the Mutazilah view. For this reason 
they are also called adiiyyah (justif iers). But in the shiah 
school, the concept of each one of these four is different from 
that of the Mutazilah. For instance, in the shiah school the 
concept of free will is not posed as absolute delegation of 
authority and freedom, which would amount to a type of 
negation of Divine freedom, and an affirmation of the pure 
independence of human actions. The shiah tried to hold an 
intermediate position between the Mutazilites and the 
Asharites.^°^ 
In the Shiah school, origin of just ice, respect of reason, 
human free will are established without any detriment to the 
principle of Divine unity - in essence or acts. Divine decree 
and destiny are affirmed in the all of beings without any 
determinism in the man's voluntary actions.^°^ In the field of 
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just ice, as said earlier, the Asharites maintained t l iat the 
actions of hunnan beings are created by God. "There is no 
creator except God and Human actions are, therefore, His 
creat ion"."° He does whatever He wants and judges as He 
pleases whatever He does is jus t . " ^ On the contrary, the 
Mutazilites held that Divine justice necessitates that man 
should be the author of his acts. And man has complete 
freedom in his choice, and God has no influence on our 
actions. So this claim warrants the denial of the unity of 
creat ion."^ 
The shiah held a mid way between the two positions, "a l -
amr bayn al-amrayn. I t is said that the person who coined this 
phrase was Imam Jafar ibn l^uhammad al-sadiq (d. 148/765), 
who said, " I t is neither predestination nor delegation but a 
position between the two position".^^^^ 
The following conversation between Imam al-Sadiq and a 
man has been related: "May I be made your ransom! Has Allah 
coerced his bondsmen to sin? Imam al Sadiq replied, Allah is 
more just than to make them commit misdeeds than chastise 
them for what they have done. The man asked, has he 
empowered them with their actions? The Imam said. If He had 
delegated it to them. He would have not confined them to 
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enjoining good and forbidding evil. The man furt l ier asl<ed, Is 
there a station or a position between the two? The Imann said, 
Yes, wider than [the space] between the heaven and the 
earth".^^'^ "What is gleaned fronn the reports related from the 
Imamite Shaih Imams on which the Shiah have a consensus, is 
that our actions are of our own malcing after Allah has infused 
in us the ability to commit or avoid the act. Good and evil are 
done by our free wil l , i.e., we have a choice in doing either of 
them or forsaking the same. God, the Most High, urges His 
servants to do good deeds and to refrain from misdeeds."^^^ 
Imam Ali (A.S.) was asked a bout oneness of Allah and 
justice. He replied: oneness means that you don't subject Him 
to the limitations of your imagination. And justice means that 
you don't lay any blame on Him.^^^ 
In the definition of justice he says: justice means to keep 
every thing in its own place. And it means giving every one his 
due.^^^ 
After resuming the land grants made by Uthman, he said. 
By God, even if I had found that by such many women have 
been married or slavemaids have been purchased I would have 
resumed it because there is wide scope in dispensation of 
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justice and he who finds it hard to act just ly should find it 
harder to deal with injustice/^^ 
Thus, "the question of justice as espoused by Imamites 
has remained untainted, respected, original and without a 
blemish on the doctrine of unity of creation. Our actions have 
two dimensions. The first is commissioning the action of our 
own voli t ion. The second Is the creation of that action by 
Allah's will with which He imbued us, giving us the power to 
commission the action. Imamite Shiah Muslims adhere to all 
these matters. They, therefore, have made Divine Justice one 
of the five principles of religion".^^^ 
Shiah philosophical and theological activity in the matters 
of just ice, predestination, delegation, and free will was so 
prolific that Shiah thinkers wrote hundreds of books and 
treatises on these subjects. Among those who compiled well-
known books dealing with these issues are al-Shaykh al-Mufid, 
Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Allamah al-Hil l i , and Sadr al-Din Shirazi. 
Shaykh al-Mufid, an outstanding Imamite theologian, has 
said: "Allah is Just, gracious. He created men to worship Him 
and forbade them to disobey Him. He did not charge anyone 
with any obligation beyond their ability. His creation is far 
from frivolity and His action is free from impropriety. He has 
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remained above sharing liis servants' actions and rose above 
coercing them to do any deed. He does not chastise anyone 
except when they have sinned and does not chide any 
bondsman or bondswoman except when they do a horrid deed. 
He does not do injustice, not even an atom's weight".^^° 
Rational Good and Evil: 
As said earlier, in the field of good and evil , the Asharites 
held that revelation is the real criterion to determine what is 
good and what is bad. And that goodness and badness of 
actions, in themselves are neither good nor bad. But Divine 
Law makes them good or bad. In general, they emphasized 
that revelation is more fundamental as the source of ultimate 
truth and reality, and reason should merely confirm what is 
given by revelation. 
The Mutazilites, on the other hand, held that reason, and 
not revelation, is the criterion of goodness and badness of an 
action. And that goodness and badness of actions are rational 
and essential qualities. They held that reason is more 
fundamental than revelation and is to be preferred to 
revelation. Revelation merely confirms what is accepted by 
reason. 
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The Imamites also like the Mutazilltes maintained that 
good and evil of actions are rational and essential qualities. 
They said: we clearly perceive that acts are, in their essence, 
different from one another. And we also obviously know The 
human intellect is capable of perceiving the good and evil of a 
few things and no laws are required to express their good and 
evil. For this reason They argued that justice is a reality in 
itself and that since God is bound to be just and wise, carries 
out acts in accordance with this standard of justice. In other 
words, some actions, in their essence, are just , such as 
rewarding the doers of good deeds; while other actions are in 
themselves unjust such as punishing those who do good deeds. 
Now because these acts are different essentially and because 
God is good and absolute in His perfection, wisdom and 
justice, he choses acts that are in accordance with the 
standard of justice.^^^ In this field Mutahhari says: "The 
principle of justice is the criterion of Islam, that is one has to 
evaluate all things in the light of this criterion. Justice belongs 
to the causes (or reasons) of religions laws and not one of the 
effects (or products) of the laws. What the faith prescribes is 
not just , but what justice demands is the faith".^^^ 
Wisdom also is one of the Attributes of God. He has 
described Himself as wise, one of His Names being. The wise 
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which is mentioned in some one hundred verses in the Noble 
Quran. 
Divine wisdom necessarily means that His actions are not 
in vain, and imply the existence of a purpose for the world. 
Whatever exists is either itself good or is a means to 
goodness. Wisdom is an aspect of both knowledge and wil l. I t 
means that God's creation and design is the best possible. 
Wisdom is explanatory of the final cause of the world.^^^ 
The Quran says: 
"And you see the mountains, you 
think them to be solid, yet they pass 
away as the passing away of the cloud, 
the handiwork of Allah who has made 
everything throughly; surely He is Aware 
of what you do" (27:88). 
Allamah al-Hilli argued that the following principles are 
prerequisites to Allah's wisdom and Justice. 
1. He does not commit evil deeds. 
2. He acts with purpose and wisdom and all His actions 
are proper. 
3. He cherishes devotion and hates transgression. 
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4. He does not commission anyone with t l iat which is 
beyond his ability. 
5. He does not judge only that which is just , but all 
actions. Accordingly, His bondsmen should accept 
His judgement, bitter or sweet as the case may 
be.^24 
Promise of Reward and Threat of Punishment: 
As it said before, on the question of promise and threat 
The Mutazilah held that man decides upon and creates his 
acts, both good and evil ; that he deserves reward or 
punishment in the next world for what he does. God is bound 
to fulfil His promises of reward and punishment. Every action, 
good or bad therefore, must be followed by its reward and a 
wrong one by punishment. 
On the other hand, the Ashariyah held that there is 
nothing binding on God, we have no right to maintain that it is 
incumbent on God to reward the Pious and punish the 
transgressor. Because God is all-powerful and absolutely free 
in His wil l . If He so wishes, he will have mercy on them and 
enter them into paradise or condemn them to hell f ire. 
The Shiah tried to take up a position in the middle, 
between the Mutazilah and the Ashariyah, "God ought to carry 
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out His promises, but He is not forced to do so. He sinould 
carry out His promises because this is in accordance with 
justice and fairness, and to go against such principles would be 
repugnant. Yet He does not have to act in accordance with 
those principles, in the sense that he is obliged in more than a 
moral sense to do so."^^^ If God does not reward the virtuous 
and does not punish the vicious He would be unjust, which is 
impossible. According to the Shiah: "Resurrection and the 
judgement of good and evil deeds, and rewarding good-doers 
and punishing evildoers' are in themselves manifestations of 
Divine justice. One of the standard proofs presented for the 
validity of resurrection is that since God is all-wise and all-
just , He does not abandon human deeds without reckoning and 
reward or punishment".^^^ 
The Leader of the Faithful, Ali(a) says; 
" I t is possible God grants respite to the oppressor but He 
never abandons him without punishment; He awaits him on his 
path of crossing, and will block him much like a bone stuck in 
the th roa t . "^ " 
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The Meaning of Decree (Qada) And Destiny (Qadar ) : 
In Arabic the words qada and qadar are used for decree 
and destiny. Tine word, qada means to decide, to settle or 
judge. A qadi (judge) is called so because he judges between 
the two lit igants. In the Quran this word has been used 
frequently with reference to both man and Allah. 
The word, qadar means to measure, and determine. It 
also has been frequently used in the Holy Quran.-^^^ 
"The events of the world are said to be divinely decided 
because they take place within the knowledge of God and are 
subject to His wil l . They are said to the divinely determined 
because their t ime, place and nature are determined in 
accordance with a system fixed by God."^^^ 
In general in the field of the events that arise in the 
world there are three views: 
1. Either is that the events have no relation to the past. 
If this hypothesis is accepted, there is no meaning of 
destiny. According to this theory the destiny of a thing 
is not predetermined at the stage of the existence of 
another thing preceding it, for there is no existential 
link between the two. If we accept this view, we will 
have to deny the principle of causation totally and will 
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have to explain unscientifically all events as mere 
accidents. 
However the principle of causation and the existence 
of an essential link between various events are facts 
which are undeniable. The principle of causation is in a 
way the basis of all hunnan knowledge. 
2. Another view is that we should nnaintain that every 
event has a cause, but deny that every cause 
necessitates a particular effect or that every effet can 
emanate only from a particular cause. According to 
this idea the whole universe has only one cause and 
agent and that is God. All existing things and events 
emanate from Him directly. His will attaches to every 
event separately. Human deeds and actions, also 
emanate direct from the will and knowledge of God. 
The human will and power are not actually effective in 
bringing about any event. 
This is true fatalism, and this view, besides the 
practical and social implications, is logically absurd. 
There is no doubt that it does not stand to reason. The 
system of causation or the connection of causes and 
effects is undeniable. And there are very strong 
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philosophical arguments in support of it. The Holy 
Quran also endorses the doctrine of causation. 
3. The third view is that all the events in the world are 
governed by the system of causation. Every event 
acquires its inevitability and its existential 
characteristics from the causes preceding it. Destiny 
means a link of inevitability between an event and its 
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causes. 
According to Imamite Shiah, a belief in decree and 
destiny and that all events, including human deeds and 
actions, are determined by Divine decrees, does not 
necessarily mean predestination. I t would have certainly 
meant so, had we believed that man and his Will have no role 
in this respect. That is absolutely impossible. If destiny means 
the denial of an inevitable connection between the causes and 
their effects, there will no such things as destiny.-^^^ 
Inevi table And Non-Inevitable: 
In the reports and traditions, and in the hints of Quran, 
fate and destiny have been described as being either revocable 
or irrevocable. I t appears that there are two kinds of fate and 
destiny, on inevitable and unalterable and the other non-
inevitable and alterable. 
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Now the question is: what is the meaning of non-
inevitable fate and destiny? As we l<now, the meaning of 
destiny is the emanation of all the required causes from the 
knowledge and will of God, who is the First Cause. And 
because the decision of decree and destiny that determines the 
occurrence of events through the system of causation must be 
regarded as conclusive. Hence to divide destiny into inevitable 
and non-inevitable appears to be meaningless. 
At this stage a dilemma arises. Either we should, like the 
Ashariyah, believe in destiny in its limited sense only or say 
that it is absolutely unalterable and that man has no power to 
change it ; or like the Mutazilah deny its role at least as far as 
human acts and deeds are concerned. 
I t may consequently be said that " just as the Asharite 
view implies the denial of man's liberty and his control of his 
destiny,the Mutazilite view also besides being contrary to the 
monotheistic principles and the concept of divine knowledge, 
does not serve any useful purpose from the angle of human 
freedom. Even if we do not accept decree and destiny in their 
divine sense, what shall we do about their material concept, 
according to which every event in the world is controlled by 
the system of causation"?"^ 
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Mutahhari in his book, the Human being and his destiny, 
has discussed that a change of destiny in the sense that any 
factor can go against what has been divinely ordained or what 
the law of causation necessitates, is impossible. But a change 
in destiny in the sense that the factor bringing about the 
change should itself be a manifestation of what Allah has 
decreed, is possible. Though It may look rather queer, it is a 
fact that the destiny can be changed by another destiny. We 
admit that this statement is surprising, but it is factual. This is 
that lofty questions of Bada which, for the first t ime in human 
history, was mentioned by the Quran: ^ ^^ 
"Allah creates whatever He wants (out of 
what was recorded previously) and 
records whatever He wants (that was not 
recorded previously) and with Him alone 
is the Motehr Book"."" 
Existing things are of two kinds. Some do not have the 
possibility of having more than one kind of special existence, 
like the heavenly abstracts. Others have such a possibility, like 
non-abstracts. In the heavenly abstracts, their destiny is 
inevitable and cannot undergo a change. Destiny is always 
determined by its causes. As in the case of the abstracts their 
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causes are not alterable, their destiny also does not change. 
But the case of the non-abstracts is different. They are 
subject to the law of motion. They are always at cross roads 
and have several possibilities. Hence their destiny is revocable. 
I t is clear that in many cases a number of destinies are 
operative and they can replace one another.^-^^ 
Human actions are among the events that have no 
inevitable destiny, because they depend to the different 
causes, including man's own will and choice. For example, if a 
man suffering from a disease takes a medicine and recovers, 
he does so in accordance with his fate and destiny. Again if he 
does not take any medicine and continues to suffer, or takes a 
harmful medicine and dies, that is also in accordance with his 
fate and destiny. Similarly if a man moves out of an infected 
area and saves himself from being affected by a disease, that 
is also in accordance with his fate and destiny.^^^ 
The point is that destiny is the source of all factors in the 
world, but in itself it is not a factor that may bring other 
factors into play. Every factor that comes into play is a 
manifestation of destiny and at the same time is subject to the 
general law of causation. 
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For this the theory of predestination is impossible. And 
destiny cannot force man to perform an action. In other words 
destiny is changeable because, it necessitates the existence of 
a thing through its natural causes, which are manifold. 
According to Shiah, "all causes are manifestations of the 
divinely ordained fate and destiny. The number of imaginable 
destines in respect of an event will be corresponding with the 
number of the causes and the alternatives which can be 
imagined. The particular course which an event takes will be in 
accordance with a divinely ordained destiny, and the course 
which it does not take will also be in accordance with a 
divinely ordained destiny,"^-''' 
The Holy Quran is the original source of the doctrine 
which requires man to believe in decree and destiny and at the 
same time it tells him that he is the master of his destiny. 
At the same t ime, the Quran mentions the protected 
tablet, the Eternal Book and the ordained destiny: 
"There is nothing green or withered, but 
is recorded in a clear book,^^^ 
But also says: 
" Every moment He brings about a 
new manifestation of His Power",^-^^ 
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Spiritual Factors: 
From spiritual point of view tl ie world is a living and 
conscious unit. All Human deeds produce reactions. Human 
deeds, whether good or bad, produce certain reaction in the 
world and the individual concerned is himself sometimes 
affected by them during his l ifetime. The consequences and 
effects of human actions are a part of the manifestations of 
fate and destiny. For example Prayer is an effective cause. It 
produces certain occurrences and prevents certain others.^"^^ 
The Holy Quran Says: 
"And when My slaves ask you concerning 
Me, then, I am indeed near. I response 
to the prayer of the supplicant when he 
calls on me. So let them obey Me and 
believe in Me, so that they may be led 
aright."^'^^ 
Charity is also another factor, which is a manifestation of 
decree and destiny and is effective in changing one's fortune. 
In general, vice and virtue, justice and injustice, prayer 
and curse etc. are things that affect human beings in regard to 
their life, health and means of living. 
Imam Sadiq(a) has said: 
161 
"The number of those who die because of 
committing sins is greater than the 
number of those who die their natural 
death, and the number of those who live 
because of doing good deeds is larger 
than the number of those who live up to 
their real age."^^^ 
So "the sequence of causes affecting a destiny are not 
confined to the material causes of this world. The spiritual 
causes are also equally effective. Sometimes it so happens 
that when we look at an event from its material angle only, it 
appears that the sequence of its causes is complete, but if we 
look at it from another angle and observe some hidden aspects 
of it, we realize that some spiritual causes are responsible for 
bringing it into existence. As it said earlier, good deeds 
performed with good intention make an impact on the system 
of causation. If somebody had a sixth sense that would enable 
him to perceive those things that are not normally perceived, 
his judgement in certain cases may be quite different from 
that of ours."^^^ 
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The Famous Problem of Fatalists: 
The most famous argument that they have advanced 
concerns the knowledge of God. They held that God has 
knowledge of all things, and no event is hidden from His 
Eternal knowledge. At the same time His knowledge is neither 
changeable, nor violable. 
I t may be inferred logically, that every event and 
creation must coercively and forcefully take place in 
accordance with Divine knowledge. 
On this basis, if God knew from eternity that such and 
such person at such and such time would commit a certain sin, 
he is bound to commit it accordingly. I t will not be possible for 
him to behave otherwise. Rather, no power can change it, 
otherwise God's knowledge would be ignorance.^'*'^ 
The Imami te Shiah Answer: 
The Shiah scholars have mentioned that this problem 
comes about when both Divine knowledge and the system of 
cause and effect are taken into account separately. In other 
words, it has been presumed that Divine knowledge attaches 
to the occurrence and the non-occurrence of events 
independently of the system of causation, and that it is 
imperative to control this system and, where necessary, to 
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curb the natural laws and the liberty of human will in order to 
ensure that there should be no inconsistency between the 
Divine Eternal knowledge and what happens.•^'^^ 
On the basis of this conception it is necessary to deprive 
man of his Power and volition so that his actions may be 
brught under complete control, and Divine knowledge should 
not result in ignorance. 
According to Imamites, this conception of Divine 
knowledge itself is totally wrong and based on complete 
ignorance. Because the Eternal knowledge of God is not 
separate from the system of causation. His knowledge is 
actually the knowledge of the system. What Divine knowledge 
necessitated and necessitates is the present world with these 
very existing system. It is not attached to the occurrence or 
the non-occurrence of an event directly and irrespective of its 
causes. The Divine knowledge in fact attaches to the 
emanation of an event from its particular cause and agent. 
Their causes and agents are various. Some causes are natural, 
while others conscious. 
Some agents are free and others are not. What the 
knowledge of God necessitates is that the appropriate effect 
should ensue from its particular cause. I t does not necessitate 
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that the effect of a free agent should emanate from an agent 
that is not actually free. 
So ''the meaning of the Eternal knowledge 
comprehending the acts and deeds of the human being is that 
He knows from eternity who would obey Him by having volition 
and l iberty, and who would disobey Him likewise. God's 
knowledge requires that he who obeys Him does so of His own 
will and he who disobeys Him also does so of his own wil l. This 
is the meaning of those who have said: "The human being is 
free by compulsion", i.e. he simply cannot be not-free. The 
Eternal knowledge of God does not force anyone to commit a 
sin nor does it deprive anyone of his liberty as already 
determined by His knowledge." 
However, " i t must be remembered that while all things in 
this world and all system of causation are known to God, they 
at the same time constitute His knowledge also. This world and 
all its systems are Allah's knowledge as well as known to Him. 
This is because God's Essence Embraces the essence of every 
entity eternally, and the essence of everything is present 
before Him. It is impossible for any entity throughout the 
universe to be hidden from Him. He is everywhere and with 
every entity.^"^^ 
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The Holy Quran says: 
"To Allah belong the east and the west, 
so wherever you turn, there is Allah's 
countenance. For Allah is All-Embracing, 
All-knowing."^'^^ 
"He is the First and the last, and the 
Manifest and the unseen; and He knows 
all things."'^^ 
Therefore the entire universe with all its characteristics 
and systems is among the aspects of God's knowledge. At this 
level of comprehension, the known and the knowledge are one, 
and not different. So the question of consistency or 
inconsistency between them does not arise, so that it may be 
said that in certain cases God's knowledge will be right and 
otherwise it will be wrong.^'^^ 
In the field of decree and destiny in a number of 
passages, the Quran stated that God has decreed certain 
things of His servants that are made absolute. The Prophet 
confirmed the problem of decree and destiny in his saying. 
Among his most famous words on decree is: "The pen has 
gone dry as of the creation. Your Lord has finished with men 
as to who will go to paradise and who will go to hell f ire". 
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Since the companions of tl ie Prophet were not at ease in 
understanding the issue of decree, he said: 
"There is not a single soul without it 
being decreed by God for a place in 
either heaven or hell, and decreed to be 
either happy or unhappy. A man then 
retorted, ''O Messenger of God! Are not 
we better off if we were to stick to our 
lot and forsake our work? The messenger 
of God replied. Nay, work. Everything is 
made easy. As for the happy ones, their 
course of action shall be facilitated 
towards the people of happiness. As 
regards the unhappy ones, their actions 
shall be within easy reach in the 
direction of wretchedness."^^° 
Imam AM was the first to prove human choice in actions, 
through the belief in decree and destiny. Historians have 
recorded that when All returned from the Battle of Siffin, an 
elderly man asked him, "Tell us about our expedition in Sham 
was it according to God's decree and destiny? AM said, "We do 
not set a foot nor do we descend on a valley except with God's 
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decree and destiny. The man commented, I trust in God for my 
toi l . I do not contemplate any reward. Ali said, "Woe to you! 
You take it as a final and unavoidable destiny according to 
which we are bound to act. If it were so there would have been 
no question of reward and punishment and there would have 
been no sense in God's promise and warnings. On the other 
hand, God, the Glorified, has ordered His servants to act by 
free will and has cautioned them against evil doing. He has 
placed easy obligations on them, not heavy ones. He gives 
them much reward in return for little action. He is disobeyed 
not because He is overpowered. He is obeyed but not under 
duress. He did not send Prophets just for pleasure."^^^ 
Ibn Abil-Hadid has said: 
"As for theosophy and dealing with 
matters of divinity, it was not an Arab 
art. Nothing of the sort had been 
circulated among their distinguished 
figures or those of lower ranks. This art 
was the exclusive preserve of Greece 
whose sages were its only expounders. 
The first one among Arabs to deal with it 
was Ali. That is why you find exquisite 
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discussion on unity and justice related 
from liim scattered among his sermons 
and axioms. You can not find among the 
words of the companions or the second 
generations of Muslims (tabiun) a single 
word of this kind; they neither thought 
of it, nor did they understand it even if 
they were to be taught".^^^ 
Sadr -a l -D in Shirazi (Nul la Sadra) ( 9 7 9 / 1 5 7 1 ) : 
In his famous work al-Asfar, on the subject of 
predestination in action referred to the station between the 
two stations. He then discussed the views of the Mutazilah and 
the Ashariyah and added: "Their claim that there are partners 
with Allah in the creation of action is unsustainable for there is 
no doubt that it is more preposterous than rendering idols as 
intercessors with Allah. Furthermore, what makes their 
contention untenable is the fact that what the king willed to be 
in His Kingdom is not available in it, but what He is averse to 
can be found in it. This is an absurd shortcoming in rulership 
and sovereignty. He is far above tha t . " ^ " 
In his refutation of the Asharites' theory on this matter, 
he says" "There is no doubt that this contention debars one 
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from practicing wisdom , detaches tine intellect from 
discharging its duties, does not lend credence to the creator, 
and shuts off the gateways of reasoning. Also, in what they 
maintained is the admissibility of the creator being unjust so 
that it is quite rationally permissible that He may chastise the 
Prophets, honour the unbelievers in the Hereafter, take a wife, 
a son, a partner, and so forth of scandalous deeds which stem 
from invalidation of wisdom and reason; and consequent to the 
invalidation of the latter is the incapacitation of the reports or 
tradit ions, for their authentication is done through reason. 
Glory be to the creator and exalted be he in high exaltation 
above what the unjust say. He then discusses his philosophical 
and theological viewpoint in great detail and precision, 
substantiating it with a statement by Imam All, the summary 
of which is: "There is no affair but His. By the same token 
there is no action save His. There is no rule but Allah's. There 
is neither strength nor power except in Allah, the sublime, the 
Great. I t means every power comes from His exaltedness and 
Greatness. He moves between the different stations and acts 
accordingly. Also despite His uniqueness and glorification 
above that of all beings, neither the earth nor the heavens are 
devoid of Him. As the Imam of believers in unity, Ali , said, "He 
is with everything but without drawing a parallel, not like 
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anything without cessation." Since this is the case, it then 
follows that attr ibuting the realization of action to man is 
correct in the same way that existence is attr ibuted to him. I t 
follows that people are the agents of ail actions emanating 
from them in a real sense, not metaphorically. Nevertheless, 
their actions are also actions of God without any deficiency."^^^ 
In the second volume of his book Asfar, during the 
discussion of specific forms, Mula Sadra refers to the concept 
of justice in the meaning and style of the philosophers. He 
says: 
You previously saw that matter and form are the 
proximate co-causes of material things. There is on one hand 
opposition between forms, and the initial states of forms are 
prone to decay, on the other hand, every matter has the 
potential for accepting opposing forms. Hence every existent 
acquires two opposing merits and aptitudes, one due to the 
form and the other due to the matter. The form calls for 
subsistence and maintaining the present state of the existent, 
whereas matter calls for change in state and taking on a form 
other than the first one. Because it is not possible for these 
two opposing "r ights" or precedences to be fulfilled 
simultaneously, as it is not possible for matter to have 
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simultaneous opposing forms Divine benefaction causes 
tl ie completion and perfection of the matter of this world - the 
lowest of all the worlds - by means of forms. I t is for this 
reason that God in His Divine Wisdom ordained perpetual 
motion and unending t ime. He also destined matte to be 
perpetually in flux, constantly changing with different forms 
through t ime, one replacing the other out of necessity and 
every state or form having a specific period so that it can in its 
turn take advantage of existence. Now because matter is 
common to these forms, each form has certain rights over the 
others and demands rights from them. Justice dictates that the 
matter of this form be given to the other and the matter of the 
second one be given to this one. In this way matter is passed 
on hand to hand between the forms. I t is because of this 
justice and the observance of the innate merits and rights of 
things that we see in the world the continuity and subsistence 
of species and not individuals.^^^ 
Nulla Sadra in another place in the field of good and evil 
and benefits of evils says: 
" I f there was not opposition, the eternal 
grace of the Benevolent origin [God] 
would not exist."^^^ 
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The ability of matter to accept various forms, and tl ie 
mutual conflict of forms with one another, is a factor in both 
destruction and creation; destruction of the past and creation 
of the future; removal of the old forms and bringing in new 
ones. Both destruction and abandonment on one hand and 
variety and evolution on the other are an effect of conflict, 
because if a thing were not to be destroyed, their would be no 
meaning for its parts to be composed anew or evolve. Unless 
the parts and elements fight and influence each other, a 
middle composition and new compound will not come into 
being. So it is correct for us to say, conflict is the source of 
good, and the pillar of the world and the order of the universe 
are based on it. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
JUSTICE I N MODERN MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY 
QUTB-SAYYED (1906 -1966 ) 
Sayyed Qutb, an eminent Egyptian scholar, sees the 
universal aspect of Islam. He believes that "Islam has one 
universal theory which covers the universe and life and 
humanity, a theory in which are integrated all the different 
questions; in this Islam sums up all its beliefs, its laws and 
statutes, and its modes of worship and of work. So the best 
method of studying Islam is to start by understanding its 
universal theory before going on to study its views on politics 
or economics or the relationship between communities and 
individuals".^ 
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According to him, all human schools and Christianity and 
Judaism are ignorant of society. Any society that is not IMuslim 
is jahiliyya (ignoring the divine ordained laws). He believed 
that the Quran is the constitution revealed by God to regulate 
all human actions in every conceivable situation. The Quran 
also repeatedly proclaims that accepting Islam means 
submission to the Shariah and the denial of all other laws.^ 
Qutb believes that "the true Muslim Philosophy is not to 
be sought in Ibn Sina or Ibn-Rushd, or such men as these who 
alone are known as the Muslim Philosophers; for the philosophy 
which they teach is no more than a shadow of the Greek 
Philosophy, and has no relation to the true Islamic philosophy. 
The faith of Islam has a native universal philosophy, which 
must be sought only in its own familiar authorities: the Quran 
and the Traditions, the life of its Prophet and his every-day 
customs. These are the authorities in which the student must 
study to find the universal Islamic theory from which come all 
the Muslim teaching and laws, its modes of worship and of 
work".-' 
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The Foundations of Social Justice in Is lam: 
According to Qutb, the nature of Islamic belief about 
human life mal<es social justice essentially an all-embracing 
justice which does not take account merely of material and 
economic factors; for Islam does not divide the individual into 
body and soul, into differing intellectual and spiritual sides."* 
But Islam believes in the unity of body and soul in the 
individual, and in an identity of aim in the individual and in the 
society. 
The following are the foundations on which Islam 
establishes justice: 
1. Absolute freedom of conscience. 
2. The complete equality of all men. 
3. The permanent mutual responsibility of society. 
Freedom of Conscience: 
To Qutb, complete social justice cannot be assured, nor 
can its efficiency and permanence be guaranteed, unless it 
arises from an inner conviction of the sprit; it must be claimed 
by the individual, it must be needed by society; there must be 
a belief that it will serve the highest purposes of mankind. No 
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man will claim justice by law unless he has first claimed it by 
instinct and by the practical methods which accompany 
instinct.^ 
He says, " i t is the Christian view that freedom of 
conscience is one of the luxuries of life; and that to turn 
towards the Lord's kingdom of Heaven and to spurn the life of 
this world is the true way of guaranteeing to man his freedom 
and to do the soul its happiness".^ He believes that this view 
is true; but it is not the whole t ruth. Because they emphasize 
only on the spiritual needs of life. So to ignore the material 
needs of life, or to refuse them, is not always the better way.'' 
On the other hand, the communist view is that economic 
freedom alone satisfies the need for freedom of conscience, 
and that is purely economic pressure on the individual which 
prompts him to overstep his legal rights of justice and equality. 
Qutb says, this view too is true, but it is not the whole truth. 
Because they ignore the spiritual needs of life.® 
But Islam emphasizes all sides of life and all aspects of 
freedom. Islam looks at man as forming a unity whose spiritual 
desires cannot be separated from his bodily appetites, and 
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whose moral needs cannot be divorced from his material 
needs. Qutb says in this field: "When the conscience is freed 
from the instinct of servitude to and worship of any of the 
servants of Allah; When it is filled with the knowledge that it 
can of itself gain complete access to Allah; then it cannot be 
disturbed by any feeling of fear of life, or fear of its livelihood, 
or fear for its station. This fear is an ignoble instinct which 
lowers the individual's estimation of himself, which often 
makes him accept submission. But Islam insists strongly that 
glorly and honor are the rights of man, and insists on the 
guarantee of an absolute social justice, under which man shall 
not suffer from neglect".^ 
Human Equality: 
According to Qutb, one of the foundations of social justice 
in Islam is human equality. Islam follows up any suspicion of 
discrimination between men, or of superiority of one over 
another. I t follows that there can be no race and no class 
which is superior by reason of its origin or its nature. This 
equality extends its compass over all mankind, and transcends 
both patriotism and religion; for, since the Messenger said. All 
Muslims are of one blood, Islam grants to men of other faiths 
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rights of blood equivalent to those enjoyed by believers - so 
long as there is a compact between them and the Muslims.^° 
The Quran says: 
" 0 ye people, reverence your Lord who created you from 
one soul, creating from it its mate; and he spread abroad from 
these two many men and women".(4:1) There was originally 
only one sou}; from it came its mate; and from the two of them 
there spread abroad both men and women. So all are of one 
origin, all are brothers in descent, all are equal in origin and 
nature. "'0 ye people, we created you male and female, and we 
made you races and tribes, that you might know one another. 
Verily the noblest among you is the most pious".(49:13) 
"These races and tribes, were not made for the purpose of 
rivalry or enmity, but for that of mutual knowledge and 
friendliness; all of them in the eyes of Allah are equal, and 
there can be no superiority except in piety. But this is another 
question, unconnected with origin and nature; in these 
respects, "People are all equal as the teeth of a comb," as says 
the noble Prophet of Islam."^^ 
In the spiritual and religious sphere men and women are 
equal. "Whoever does good works, man or woman, and is a 
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Believer - such shall enter into Paradise and shall nto be 
wronged one jot" . (4:122) "Whoever does good works, man or 
woman, and is a Believer - we shall make them live a good 
life, and we shall give them their reward for the best that they 
have done" (16:97) 
"Then their Lord answered them: I shall not waste the 
work of any one of you who works, male or female you belong 
to one another". (3:195) 
"Thus Islam deals with every aspect of human life, 
spiritual and social alike, in order firmly to establish the 
concept of equality. I t has an intense passion for equality; it 
demands that it be universal and complete, not limited to one 
race or one nation, to one house or one city. Similarly it 
demands that equality embrace a wider sphere than merely the 
economic, to which the teaching of the material west have 
confined it".^^ 
Mutual Responsibility in Society: 
The issue of mutual responsibility in society, to Sayyed 
Qutb is the third foundation of social justice in Islam. He holds 
that "Islam lays down the principle of mutual responbility in all 
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its various sliapes and forms. In it we find the responsibilities 
which exist between a man and his soul, between a man and 
his immediate family, between the individual and society, 
between one community and other communities, and between 
one nation and the various other nations".^-^ He has written in 
the definition of Mutual responsibility in society such: 
"Islam grants individual freedom in the 
most perfect form, and human equality in 
the most exacting sense, but it does not 
leave these two things uncontrolled; 
society has its interests, human nature 
has its claims, but a value attaches also 
to the lofty aims of religion.. So Islam 
sets the principle of individual 
responsibility over against that of 
individual freedom; and beside them both 
it sets the principle of social 
responsibility, which makes demands 
alike on the individual and on society. 
This is what we call mutual responsibility 
in society".^"* 
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To Qutb, the responsibility wliich a man lias to liimself is 
tl iat " he must restrain himself from being carried away by his 
appetites, and he must cleanse and purify these appetites; he 
must make them follow the path of righteousness and 
salvation, and must not let them go down in degradation".^^ 
"As for him who has been presumptuous and has sought the 
life of the world, verily Hell will be his place. But as for him 
who has feared the greatness of his Lord and has restrained 
himself from desire, verily Paradise will be his place".(79:37-
41) 
Thus, "individual responsibility is complete; every man 
has his own works, every man is responsible for what he does 
to his soul, good or evil, benefit or harm; and in his place no 
other can ever stand, either In this world or in the next".^^ 
"Each soul is held in pledge by what it has 
gained".(74:38) 
"Whoever is rightly guided, that is of profit to himself; 
and whoever goes astray, he does so to his own loss; you 
are not in charge of them" (39:41). 
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Qutb believed that there is a mutual responsibility 
between the individual and his immediate family, "The value of 
this responsibility within the family circle is that it is the basis 
on which the family stands; and the family is the basic unit on 
which society is built, hence there must be a regard for its 
value. It rests on the permanent characteristics of human 
nature, on the emotions of pity and love, and on the necessity 
of material needs and welfare".^'' 
The Quran says: 
"And use kindness with parents; whether one or both of 
them attain to old age with you, do not say to them. Bah, 
do not rebuke them, but speak them fair. Lower the wing 
of humility to them in mercy, and say: 0 my Lord, have 
mercy upon them, as they brought me up when I was 
litt le". (17:23-24). 
"An we have laid a charge on man concerning his 
parents; his mother bore him In weakness upon 
weakness, and he was weaned in two years. Show 
gratitude to me and to your parents". (31:14) 
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Qutb says, ''We must think also of the responsibility 
which the individual has to society, and of that which society 
has to the individual. On each of these two Islam lays 
responsibilities, and for each of them it defines the limits to 
which he may go. In dealing with these responsibilities Islam 
tries as far as possible to harmonize their interests, and to 
remedy or to punish any loss which either of them may suffer 
in undertaking the duties which attach the various fields of life, 
spiritual and material".^^ 
Every individual is charged in the first place 
conscientiously to perform his own work; for the results of 
individual work are the long run advantageous and beneficial to 
the community.^^ 
"Verily Allah is glad when one of you does work which He 
can be sure of."^° Say: Work and Allah will see your work, as 
will His Messenger and the Believers". (9:105). 
Again every individual is charged with the care of society, 
as if he were a watchman over it, responsible for its safety: 
"Yours is the care of one of the frontiers 
of Islam, so let none overcome you".^^ 
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Every individual, again, is ciiarged witl i the duty of 
putting an end to any evil doing wliich he sees. Every 
individual will be held responsible for every evil doing in the 
community, even if he has had no part in it. For society is a 
unity which is harmed by any evil-doing, and the duty of every 
individual is to guard and to protect it.^^ 
"Whoever among you sees any evil-
doing, let him change it with his hand; if 
he cannot do that, let him change it with 
his tongue; and if he cannot do that, let 
him change it with his heart; and that 
shows the weakest faith".^^ 
Sayyed Qutb held that "the community is also responsible 
for the care of its weak members; it must watch their welfare 
and guard them; it has also the duty of fighting in defense of 
those whom it guards".^'* 
" I t is not for you to refuse to fight in the 
cause of Allah and in defense of the 
weak, men, women, and children."(4:75) 
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Thus, "Islam legislates for mutual responsibility in society 
in all shapes and forms; these forms take their rise from the 
basic principle that there is an all embracing identity of 
purpose between the individual and society. So Islam lays 
down a complete liberty for the individual, within limits which 
will not injure him and will not favour society at his expense. It 
safeguards the rights of society, and at the same time specifies 
its responsibilities on the other side of the balance. 
On these three foundations, then, an absolute freedom of 
conscience, a complete equality of all mankind, and a 
permanent mutual responsibility in society, social justice is 
built up, and human justice is ensured."^^ 
Political Theory in Is lam: 
Qutb says, "The Islamic political system is based on two 
fundamental conceptions, both of which originate in its 
universalist idea of the universe of life, and of man. One is the 
idea of the equality of mankind in class, in nature, and in 
origin; the other is the belief that Islam represents the eternal 
system for the world throughout the future of the human 
race". 26 
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The first of these he has already discussed in the part on 
the foundations of social justice in Islam, "there we indicated 
the rights which Islam extends to protected peoples, and to 
infidel peoples who have a compact with the Muslims. These 
are rights which derive from the permanent and fundamental 
rights of humanity; no difference is made between one religion 
and another. And the same principle is extended to cover 
human relationships in general."^'' 
"As to the second Conceptions, namely 
that Islam represents the eternal system 
for the world throughout the future of the 
human race, this originates in the fact 
that Muhammad was the Messenger of 
God to all men, that he was the seal of 
the Prophets, and that his religion is the 
most permanent of all religions".^® 
The Holy Quran says: 
"And we have not sent you unless 
inclusively to all People".(34:28). 
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"And we have sent you only as a sign of 
mercy to the worlds". (21:107) 
"Today I have perfected your religion for 
you, have completed My favour towards 
you, and have approved Islam as your 
religlon"(5:3) Verily this Quran guides 
you to what is more upright". (17:9). But 
in spite of this Islam does not compel 
others to embrace it: "There is no 
compulsion in religion". (2:256) 
Rather Islam grants to men an extreme 
freedom and protection to continue in their own 
religious beliefs. 
The fact that "the Islamic political system is based on 
these two conceptions has had its effect on the nature and the 
methods of that system. It has made it operate through laws 
and exhortations, through political and economic theory, and 
through all the other systems which it includes. Thus it does 
not legislate for one class or for one nation, but for all classes 
and for all nations".^^ 
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Qutb says, "Political theory in Islam rests on the basis of 
justice on the part of the rulers, obedience on the part of the 
ruled, and collaboration between ruler and ruled. These are the 
great fundannental features from which all the other features 
take their rise."^° 
There must first be justice on the part of the rulers. The 
Quran says: 
"Verily God commands justice". (16:92) 
"And when you judge between the 
people, you must do so with 
justice".(4:58) "And when you speak, act 
just ly, even though the matter concerns 
a relative".(6:152) Verily the Day of 
Resurrection he who is dearest of all men 
to Allah, and he who is nearest to Him 
will be the just leader; but he who is 
most hated by Allah on that Day, and he 
who is most bitterly punished will be the 
tyrannical leader."^^ 
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"This refers to that impartial justice 
which is absolute, and which cannot be 
swayed by affection or by hatred; the 
bases of this justice cannot be affected 
by love or by enmity. Such justice is not 
influenced by any relationship between 
individuals, or by any hatred between 
peoples. It is enjoyed by all the 
individual members of a Muslim 
community, without discrimination 
arising from descent or rank, wealth or 
influence. In the same way, such a 
justice is enjoyed by other peoples, even 
though there my be hatred between them 
and the Muslims. This is a high level or 
equity, to which no international law has 
so far achieved, nor any domestic law 
either".^^ 
And secondly, there must be obedience on the part of 
those who are ruled. The Quran says: 
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" 0 you who have believed, obey God, 
and obey the Messenger of God and 
those who hold authority among you." 
(4:58). The fact that this verse groups 
together means that It clarifies the 
nature and the limits of this obedience. 
Obedience to one who holds authority is 
derived from obedience to God and the 
Messenger. The ruler in Islamic law is not 
to be obeyed because of his own person; 
he is to be obeyed only by virtue of 
holding his position through the law of 
Allah and His Messenger; his right to 
obedience is derived from his observance 
of that law, and from no other thing. If 
he departs from the law, he is no longer 
entitled to obedience, and his orders 
need no longer be obeyed."-^^ Thus one 
authority says that, "There can be no 
obedience to any creature which involves 
disobedience to the creator". Or again; 
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Hear and obey—even if your ruler is an 
Abssianian slave with a head like a 
raisin, so long as he observes the Book 
of Allah the Exalted".^^ 
Thirdly, there must be collaboration between ruler and 
ruled. The Quran says: 
"Take cousel with them in the matter." 
(3:153) 
"And their affair is a matter for collaboration 
between them". (42:36) 
"Collaboration is one of the fundamentals of 
Islamic politics, although no specific method of 
administering it has even been laid down. The 
Messenger used to take the advice of the l^uslim 
community in matters which did not pertain to the 
spiritual; thus he would ask their opinion in worldly 
affairs in which they had some skill, such as 
positions on a field of battle. So he listened to their 
opinion at the battle of Badr, and encamped at the 
well of Badr, though originally he had been some 
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distance away from it ; similarly he listened to them 
in the matter of digging the trench, and also, 
against the advice of Umar, in the matter of 
Prisoners, though in this case there eventually came 
a revelation which supported Umar's point of 
view".'^^ 
A ruler, then, has no rights other than those which belong 
to any individual of the Muslim community - except that he can 
claim obedience to his command, advice, and help in the 
enforcement of the law. 
Although the Prophet was not strictly a ruler, but rather a 
religious lawgiver, he yet established the customary 
limitations, which must be observed by any ruler as governing 
the rights which Islam grants to him.-^^ 
Qutb maintained that no ruler dare oppress the souls or 
the bodies of l^uslims, nor dare he infringe upon their 
sanctities, nor touch their wealth. If he upholds the law and 
sees that religious duties are observed, then he has reached 
the limit of his powers. 
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To him, ''it is the responsibility of the ruler to put an end 
to anything which occasions hardship in the community, no 
matter what it may be; it is similarly his duty to encourage 
anything which is of any kind of profit to the community. But at 
all times he must be careful not to depart from the ordinances 
of Islam."^^ 
Economic Theory in Is lam: 
Qutb believed that "Islam enters the field of economic 
theory under the influence of its universal philosophy, and 
guided by its general ideology. Its interests are the welfare of 
the individual and the ensuring of the welfare of society. In 
these interests it holds a position of doing injury neither to the 
individual nor to society; it does not oppose human nature, nor 
on the other hand does it seek to impede the fundamental 
customs and the high and far-reaching objectives of life".-^® 
Qutb has mentioned that, " In order to implement this 
ideal Islam makes use of its two fundamental methods: 
"Legislation and exhortation. But the 
former it achieves the practical objective 
of being responsible for the maintenance 
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of a healthy community, capable of 
growth and improvement; by the latter it 
aims at raising men above the level of 
instinct to achieve a more developed 
form of life. Its objective is to improve 
life in general to that ideal state which 
admittedly all men cannot achieve under 
all conditions, but to the height and 
perfection of which Islam ever keeps the 
way open".-^^ 
In the matte of property. He said, "Islam has always laid 
one duty upon property, and that is the payment of the holy-
tax (zakat); this is the one ground on which a ruler may use 
force against his subjects, if they withhold this tax, and 
similarly it is the one thing which he can impose on them by 
legal right. Further, Islam has given to a ruler the right of 
exacting in addition to the poor tax as much as will prevent 
hardship and do away with penury and preserve the well being 
of the Muslim community".'^^ 
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So far the law can go; thereafter exhortation has 
commended to the people the practice of getting rid of all 
money' expending it entirely in the way of God. 
Thus to Qutb, legislation and exhortation are the 
groundwork of economic theory, as they are the groundwork of 
all Islamic theory. 
The Methods of Social Justice in Is lam: 
Qutb holds that, Islam sets a complete social justice on a 
higher level than a mere economic justice, and on a more 
elevated plane than can be attained merely by legislative 
measures: "So it establishes a comprehensive human justice, 
established on two strong foundations: first, the human 
conscience, working within the spirit of man; and second, a 
system of religious law, working in the social sphere. These 
two powers it unites by an appeal to the depths of feeling in 
the human consciousness"."*^ 
The Quran says: "Verily in that there is a reminder for 
every one who has a heart, or who will lend an ear; he is a 
witness of it". (50:37) 
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Anyone who bestows even a passing and casual glance on 
this religion must perceive the immense effort which it devotes 
to the reformation of the human spirit in all its aspects and 
from every side. 
Qutb says, "Islam places a great deal of reliance on the 
human conscience when it is educated; it sets it up as the 
guardian of the legal processes, to see that they are observed 
and maintained, and for the observance of the major part of 
the laws conscience alone is accountable. The giving of 
evidence, for example, is s fundamental matter which must be 
governed by laws, yet which, at the same time, must ensure 
the rights of men"."^^ 
Islam does not leave the human conscience to its own 
resources; it allots to its these noble duties, making it the 
guardian of the observance of the law and of the carrying out 
of human responsibilities. It has set the fear of God as a 
sanction on the conscience, and has placed over it the thought 
of Allah's omniscience. The Quran says: "There is no private 
talk between three, but He makes a fourth, nor between five, 
but He makes a sixth; and whether there be less than that or 
more, He is always with them, wherever they are. Then on the 
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Day of resurrection He will tell them what they have done. 
Verily God is aware of all things". (58:7). 
In his Social Justice in Islam, Qutb states that Islam 
makes the holy-tax an obligatory claim on the property of the 
wealthy in favor of the poor. The holy-tax is one of the pillars 
of Islam, one of the essentials of the faith. I t is a due which 
the government can exact by the authority of the law and by 
the power of its administration.'*-^ The Quran says: 
"Successful indeed are the believers who 
are humble in their prayers, who turn 
away from idle talk, and who are active 
in paying the holy-tax."(23:1-4) 
"These are the signs of the Quran, which 
is a Book which makes clear, a guidance 
and a gospel for the Believers, who 
observe the prayers, who pay the holy-
tax(zakat), and who are certain of the 
world to come". (27:1-3) 
This holy-tax (zakat) is a due imposed by the force of the 
law, an amount of money at a specified proportion. But in 
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addition to this there is the institution of almsgiving which is 
imposed on the individual conscience without any fixed rate; it 
is at the discretion of the will and the conscience. It is the 
outward sign of charity and brotherly feeling, to both of which 
Islam attaches a supreme importance. I t serves two purposes: 
first, to establish an inner control of the conscience; and 
second, to foster a belief in the inherent solidarity of mankind. 
Islam makes this charity a pure and human thing, not limited 
by the bounds of a religious fellowship.'*'^ So the Quran says: 
"Allah does not forbid you to act righteously and justly towards 
those who have not fought against you in the matter of 
religion, and who have not expelled you from your 
homes".(60:8) 
" I t is on this basis that Islam establishes 
the custom of almsgiving and charity; it 
makes one fond of spending voluntarily 
and freely, in anticipation to the approval 
of God, of a return from Him in this 
world, and of a reward for Him in the 
world to come"."*^ 
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So there is a good news for the humble, those who are 
obedient to God, and who spend of their wealthy according to 
His will. "And give good news to the humble whose hearts are 
afraid when God is mentioned, who are patient in their 
afflictions, who observe the prayers, and who expend freely of 
what we have given them". (22:34-35). 
So the giving of alms is to make a loan to God, a loan 
which is certain to be repaid: "He who will make a fair loan to 
Allah, He will double it for him. For such a one there is a noble 
reward" . (57 : l l ) . 
So in the next world Paradise is the worthy recompense 
of those who expend freely in alms. "And hasten to forgiveness 
from your Lord, and to a Paradise whose width is as that of the 
heavens and the earth, a Paradise prepared for those who are 
pious; they it is who expend in alms both in prosperity and in 
adversity, who curb their wrath, and who deal leniently with 
others. God loves those who act well".(3:132-133). 
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MUTAHHARI-MURTADA (1919 -1979 ) 
Mutahhari an eminent Iranian scholar lias dealt with the 
concept of justice in his various works from different aspects. 
Mutahhari, concerning justice, believed that one of the 
first matters that must be known is the question: What is 
justice? What is injustice? In his AdI-e-Ilahi Mutahhari, has 
defined the concept of justice in four senses as follows: 
A. Balance: 
The meaning of this word is that in every collection the 
various parts must be to the extent required, but not 
necessarily in equal amounts. I t is only by following the 
various quantities that system can continues to play its role in 
order to reach the purpose.'"*^ 
The Quran says: 
"He raised the sky and set up the balance" (55:7). 
As the commentators have said that the meaning of this 
verse is that a certain balance has been taken into account in 
the structure of the world. Each and every thing has been 
made using just the right amounts of the elements composing 
it and the right distances. 
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In a tradition from the Propliet(s) it is said: 
"The heavens and the earth are maintained with 
justice". 47 
The opposite of "justice" (adi) in this meaning of the word 
is imbalance, not injustice. 
Justice in its meaning of propriety and balance 
corresponds to the divine attributes of wisdom and 
omniscience. 
B. Equality and Non-discrimination: 
This definition needs to be explained. For if what is meant 
is that justice requires all merits to be set aside and that all 
men to be treated equally, then this justice is actually injustice 
and oppression. 
But if what is meant is the application of equality in cases 
of equal merit, then this is correct. And these equalities are the 
corollary of justice.'*^ 
C. Rights-Giving to Each Thing I ts Due: 
The third meaning of justice is related to giving to every 
possessor of rights, his rights. Injustice then means 
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transgressing, withholding, or disposing of the right of others. 
This meaning is the true meaning of social justice. This type of 
justice is based on two things: (1) Rights and Priorities. In 
other words, individuals acquired certain rights with respect to 
one another. (2) The natural character of man is that he makes 
use of conventional concepts are instruments in order to reach 
to his natural aims. The meaning of justice is that the men 
must observe rights and priorities. The opposite of this justice 
is injustice and oppression."^^ 
This meaning of justice and injustice, because, on the one 
hand, it is based on the principle of priority and on other hand, 
it is human character to make conventional concepts for 
abstraction good and evil, it is peculiar to man and does not 
apply to the Divine realm. Because God is the absolute owner 
and sovereign and no existent has precedence over Him.^° 
D. Observance of Merits in Giving Being and Not 
Abstaining from tliis in Respect of that wliich can 
Possibly exist or be further perfected. 
There is difference between the existents because of their 
potentials and abilities in receiving grace and emanations from 
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the source and origin of being. Every existent, in each level, 
from the point of view of its potential for receiving grace, has 
certain merits and rights. "God, who is all-perfect, all-Good, 
and the absolute bestower of grace, gives to each thing its 
possible existence and perfection". According to this idea 
justice means every existent receive each degree of existence 
and perfection that it merits and is possible for it. Injustice 
then means preventing an existent from receiving such grace 
as it merits and is its due.^^ 
According to Islamic philosophers, "the attribute of 
justice that is worthy of God and that is attributed to Him as a 
perfection Is in this very meaning. And the attribute of injustice 
that is an Imperfection and is negated of God is also in the 
meaning mentioned above".^^ 
The Islamic Philosophers believe that there is no creation 
having rights above God, God's justice is His graciousness and 
is identical with His being. That Is to say, God's justice lies in 
not with-holding His grace from any being that has any 
capacity whatsoever for receiving It. This is the meaning of the 
words of Imam "Ali(a) where he says: 
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"A right ... does not accrue to any person unless it counts 
against him also, and it does not count against a person unless 
It also accrues in his favour. If it were to accrue (only) in 
favour of a person without (in turn) counting against him, then 
this (situation) would be solely for Allah, the Glorified, and not 
for His c reat ion" . " 
Objections and Criticisms: 
There are some objections and criticisms on the question 
of Divine justice. Some groups believe that if God is just and 
wise, why are there distinctions and variety in the world? It is 
said that providence dictates that all beings must be good and 
perfect, the existing order and design must be the best 
possible one, hence evil and imperfections, must not exist. The 
objection common to both Divine justice and Divine Wisdom is 
the problem of evil. The issue of evil can be raised as an 
objection under the heading of injustice when it comes to 
justice, and under the subject of purposeless or meaningless 
creations in the case of wisdom.^"* 
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Problem Solved: 
According to Mutahhari, the issue of the best world order, 
as well as the problem of evil, are some of the most important 
philosophical questions. And this issue led to the appearance of 
such ideologies as dualism, materialism, and pessimism in both 
the east and the west. Philosophers of east and west have 
considered the problem of evil but. Western Philosophers have 
not found a conclusive solution to this problem. Islamic 
philosophers, on the other hand, have analyzed this issue in 
detail and have solved i t . " 
Methods and Approaches: 
Mutahhari has mentioned that, "there are various 
methods and approaches to Divine justice. Believers who have 
faith in God and religion usually satisfy their conscience in this 
regard by giving a general answer to the prob lem." " They 
believe that, "God is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-wise-He 
knows the best possible order and design for the world and has 
the ability to create it. So there is no reason for God to make 
the world other than with the best order and design. Even if 
this group sees things which they can not explain it they put it 
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down as some type of wisdom and expediency - seomthing 
which is hidden from them and which only God knows the 
secret of. In other words, they see it as a part of the secret of 
dest iny."" 
Whenever the average believer comes across such Issues, 
he solves them fro himself in the manner suggested above. 
Mutahhari mentions that Traditionalists are exoteric 
pietists who choose to remain silent in the face of such 
questions and refrain from giving their opinions. And in fact 
their way is the way of the average believer. The Asharite 
theologians have taken a route that the question doesn't even 
arise for them. But for the rest of theologians, and also for 
those who favour an empirical approach to theology, the 
resolution to the problems involved in the doctrine of Divine 
justice lies in researching the secrets, uses, and expedients of 
existents.^^ 
But the philosophers approach the problem in a different 
way, and ''they also argue that evil, in its essence, is non-
existing and is accidental."^^ They also affirm necessity of evil 
and the fact that it can never be separated from good or in 
217 
Other words, the fact that creation cannot be divided and 
finally, they discuss the effects and uses of evil. 
Mutahhari's Approaches: 
Mutahhari has tried in his AdI-e-Ilahi, to use philosophical 
methods to solve the problems and questions that surround the 
issue of Divine justice. He first has discussed the issue of 
Discrimination and then has dealt with the subject of Evil in a 
separate section. 
Discrimination: 
The objection of discrimination is that "if created beings 
have an equal relationship to the Divine Essence, why then 
have they been created with differences and distinction? Why is 
one black and another white? One ugly and the other beautiful? 
One perfect and the other defective ?^° 
Differentiation not Discrimination: 
Here Mutahhari makes a distinction between discrimination 
and difference. I^utahhari holds that "what exists in creation is 
'difference' not 'Discrimination'. Discrimination occurs when 
given equal conditions and similar potentials, a distinction is 
made between things. But differentiation is when conditions are 
218 
unequal a distinction is made between things. In other words, 
discrimination is in the province of the agent making it while 
differentiation fundamentally resides within the objects being 
distinguished."^^ For example: if a teacher awards different 
marks to students who are all in the same class, this would be 
discrimination; but if the teacher gives different grades to 
students who are in the different class, here there would not be 
discrimination, rather differentiation. 
"Justice does not mean that the teacher 
should total all marks an divide equally 
among the pupils; justice means that 
every one is given what he deserves. In 
such cases, to differentiate is true justice 
and fairness, and not to differentiate is 
injustice and discr iminat ion"." 
There is a question that we cannot compare God to a 
teacher, because God is the creator of all beings, and every 
distinction is from Him; but a teacher is not the creator of the 
Pupil. So, why He didn't create every one equal from the 
outset? What is the secret of these differences?" 
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According to Mutahhari, "the differences between beings 
are Innate and essential and a necessity of the system of 
causes and effects".^'* According to this view there is a certain 
order, hierarchy and law for creation an that God's will for the 
existence of individual beings is exactly His will for the total 
order. The sequence of causes and effects means that every 
effect has a specific cause and every cause has a specific 
effect. In reality, everything in the sequence of causes and 
effects has a specific station and known position; and this is 
the profound meaning of : 
"Indeed we have created everything in a measure".^^ 
There are four necessary and universal principles between 
all beings and events of world: 
1. The principle of universal causation. 
2. Necessity of cause and effect. 
3. Correspondence between cause and effect (in their 
modalities). 
4. Ultimate termination (of the causal chain) of all 
created beings at the cause of all causes and the Prim 
Mover. 
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The first principle is tiie fundamental law which forms the 
basis of all sciences and its denial entails denial of everything. 
The second law states the necessity of existence of the 
effect from its complete cause. 
The third principle, guarantees the specific relationship 
between the cause effect, and hence no cause can create an 
effect other than its own specific effect; and no effect can 
possibly emanate from a cause other than its own specific 
cause. 
From these three principles we can conclude that the 
universe has a definite and fixed system and in association 
with the fourth principle, i.e., 'Unity of Origination', we can 
conclude the definite and universal connection between all 
events.^^ 
Thus, the level of every existent is inseparable from its 
essence and inexorable. Just like the order of numbers, which 
the position of them cannot be changed above or below. 
Such a necessary and profound system operates between 
created beings. And the law of creation is not unreal. As the 
holy Quran says: 
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"There is not one of us (angels) but has 
his known place".^'^ 
What is known in philosophy as order of universe or 
causation, is termed in religious language as the 'Divine 
precedent'. The holy Quran states: 
"You will not find any change in God's precedent".^^ 
So we can conclude in this discussion that what would be 
contradictory and an invalidation of justice or wisdom is 
discrimination not differentiation and what exists in the 
universe is differentiation not discrimination. And this 
differentiation is not created, rather it is the inherent necessity 
of created beings. 
EVILS 
Evil is Non-Existential: 
Mutahhari holds that "the essence of evils is non-
existence. That is, all evils are of the form of non-existence 
and non-being."^^ The roots of this idea go back to ancient 
Greece, especially to Plato. 
He says that evils are evil because they are themselves 
non-being, deficiency, and emptiness, or are the source, non-
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being, deficiency, and emptiness. This analysis, its effect is 
ti iat it drives from one's mind the question, who created evil? 
Why are some beings good and some evil? I t makes clear that 
what is evil is not of the form of being, but of the form of 
emptiness and non-being, and it eliminates the background for 
dualist thought, which claims that existence has two branches, 
or rather two sources/^ 
Good and evil things in the world are not two separate 
types from one another, but good and evil are mixed together; 
they are inseparable. They are of the type of the compounding 
of being and non-being. In fact, fundamentally good is the 
same as being and evil is the same as non-being. Evil is either 
itself of the form of non-being, or it is a being that necessitates 
a form of non-being; i.e., it is a being that, in as much as it is 
itself, 'is good, and it is evil in as much as it necessitates a 
non-being; and it is only evil because it necessitates a non-
being, not for any other reason. We consider ignorance, 
poverty, and death to be evil. These by their essence are non-
being. We consider poisonous and dangerous animals, and 
bacteria to be evil. These are not non-being by their essence, 
but they are beings that necessitate non-being.''^ 
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Evil is Relative: 
Mutahhari maintains, that every ti l ing possesses an 
innate existence and an existence for some otiier existence. As 
said earlier, evil things are of two types: evils that are non-
being like, ignorance, inability, and poverty, are real 
attributes, though they are non-existential; as for evils that 
are existential like floods, and dangerous animals, without 
doubt their evilness is relative, because they are a source of 
non-being for things. E.g., Snake poison is not bad for the 
snake, it is bad for human beings and other animals.''^ 
Rumi says: 
''Snake-poison is life to the snake, But it 
is death in relation to man. 
Hence there is no absolute evil in the 
world; 
Evil is relative, know this truth also. 
The philosophers have said that evils are not created 
subordinately and figuratively. 
An important issue in philosophical and intellectual 
worldviews is that the universe is an indivisible unit, that is. 
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not only are non-beings inseparable from beings and relative 
beings inseparable from real beings real beings themselves are 
also inseparable from one another. So evils too, in addition to 
the two above mentioned aspects and regardless of those two 
aspects, are inseparable from good things. 
Poet Hafiz says: 
In this garden no body plucked a rose without a thorn. 
So the light of Mustafa is combined with the darkness of 
bolahab. 
"When we look at the universe as a whole, we must 
accept that in the entire system and to maintain its 
balance, the existence of lows and highs, valleys and 
mountains, level and unlevel places, darknesses and 
lights, pains and pleasures, successes and failures, are all 
necessary".''-^ 
The Quran says, 
"He makes the night pass into the day 
and makes the day pass into the night"'''* 
"Indeed ease accompanies hardship. 
Indeed ease accompanies hardship."^^ 
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Mutahhari believes "Uglinesses are necessary not only in 
that they are a part of the complete system of the universe 
and the total order depends on them, rather their existence is 
also needed to manifest and bring to light beautiful things. If 
ugliness were not to exist in the world, neither would beauty. 
If all people were beautiful, no one would be beautiful, just as 
if all were ugly, no one would be ugly. I f all people were as 
beautiful as Yusuf (a) there would be no beauty; and likewise if 
everyone was like Jahiz, there would be no more ugliness. In 
reality, the sensations and perception that man has of beautiful 
things are only possible if ugliness exists in opposition to 
beauty. "^^ 
He says, "the order of universe, horizontally and 
vertically, is a necessary order, God gives every being the very 
existence and perfection and beauty that it is able to accept; 
deficiencies come from the essences of those beings 
themselves, and not from Divine grace"/^ 
Retribution of Deeds: 
One of the issues that should be discussed in the field of 
Divine justice is the issue of the compensation for deeds in the 
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hereafter. Resurrection and the judgement of good and evil 
deeds, rewarding good-doers and punishing evildoers, are the 
themselves manifestations of Divine justice. But there is an 
objection on Divine justice, and it is claimed that the 
punishment in the hereafter is contrary to Divine justice. 
Because in the retribution of the hereafter, there is no 
correspondence between the crime and its punishment, and 
hence the retribution is meted out unjustly.''® 
"In this argument, the matter of retribution which is 
otherwise an evidence for Divine justice, is presented as an 
objection against it, and as being contrary to wisdom".^^ For 
example, sins like backbiting, lying and manslaughter, are 
crimes which demand punishment, but the punishments 
specified for them in the hereafter are excessive. The Quran 
describes the punishment for manslaughter as an eternity in 
hell fire. And for other sins as well have been mentioned 
severe punishments which qualitatively extremely intense and 
quantitatively very long. The objection is how does this 
incongruity be reconciled with Divine justice?®^ 
Mutahhari in the answer to the objection has divided 
punishments into three types:®^ 
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1. conventional Punishments (warning and reprinnand). 
2. Punishments which have an existential and natural 
connection with sin (worldly consequence). 
3. Punishments which are the very embodiment of the 
crime itself and inseparable from its (Punishment of 
the hereafter or retribution). 
Warning and Reprimand: 
The first type of punishment pertains to penalties and 
judicial measures legislated in human societies by either 
secular or religious authorities. The benefit of such 
punishments is two fold. Firstly, to prevent the repetition of 
the crime by the criminal himself or by others. I t is for this 
reason we can call such punishments 'warning'. Secondly, to 
relieve the oppressed, this applying to the criminal cases of 
aggression and oppression against others. So in this matter, 
the correspondence between crime and punishment should be 
observed. 
But such punishments cannot be envisaged in the 
hereafter. Because, in that realm there is neither the question 
of prevention from future crimes, nor of a need for revenge. 
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Furthermore, a large number of punishments are related to 
polytheism, hypocritical display of worship, etc. rights; and in 
such cases none of the two effects and characteristics of 
worldly punishment would apply. 
Worldly Consequence: 
The second type of punishments are those that have a 
causal relationship with the crime. That is to say, they are the 
direct effects and natural consequences of the crime. These 
penalties are called the 'consequence of deeds' or 'natural 
effects of sins'. I^any sins produce undesirable natural 
consequences in this world for the sinner. For example, 
alcoholism, in addition to its social harms, does psychological 
and physical harm to the addict. These punishments are 
natural effects of sin, not legal penalties, the issue of 
proportion between crime and punishment is related to 
conventional punishments. But natural punishments are the 
results and necessary effects of actions. 
Punishments of the Hereafter: 
l^utahhari has mentioned that the retribution of the next 
world has a stronger existential connection with sins. The 
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relationship of deeds to their retribution in the hereafter is 
neither of the first type, conventional, nor is it of the second 
type, natural; rather, it is higher than these two. There is the 
relationship of unity and identity in the retribution of the next 
world; i.e. what is given as reward or punishment to good 
doers or evildoers in the hereafter will be an embodiment of 
the act itself. 
The Holy Quran states: 
(a) "The Day when every person will find present whatever 
good he has done, and whatever evil he has done, he will 
wish that there were a great distance between him and 
his evil".^2 
(b) "They will find all that they had done, present, and your 
Lord threats no one with in just ice" ." 
(c) "And be afraid of the Day when you will be brought back 
to God. Then every person shall be paid what has earned, 
and they will not be dealt with unjustly."®'* 
Thus, "the response to the objection of correspondence 
between crime and punishment can be summarized in that the 
necessity of proportion applies to social and conventional 
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punishments. Of course in such penalties, the legislator has to 
keep in nnind the correspondence between crime and 
punishment. But in punishments which have an existential and 
ontological relationship with the act, that is, they are the 
actual effects and real consequences of the act, or in 
retributions which have a unitive and identical relationship with 
the crime, meaning that they are in reality the act itself, there 
remain no grounds to even speak of the presence or absence of 
correspondence".^^ 
Social Justice in Is lam: 
The nucleus of Mutahhari's political thought is the concept 
of natural rights. He beleivs that "this due is from the law of 
creation, which is prior to the religious law".^^ He says: the 
system of creation leads the existents to the ideal perfections 
and purpose on the basis of their talents. Every natural talent 
is the basis of a natural right.^^ 
In general the perception of Mutahhari from he concept of 
natural rights is Aristotelian and ancient political thought. And 
he has used the principle of end that is the same nature in 
Aristotle's definition of nature.^^ 
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Mutahhari like the philosophers such as Plato and 
Aristotle advocated the establishment of the best government 
in the political philosophy, and in the following of IMam AM (a), 
believed that justice is basis of social philosophy and politics in 
Islam.«^ 
Mutahhari in his definition of justice agrees with Imam 
Ali(a) and says : Justice means to place every thing in its own 
place, and also says, Justice means giving every possessor of 
right his due. So every one should get all of his due. Such as, 
equality before law, economic equality, racial equality, liberty, 
and due of property.^° 
Mutahhari has divided justice into Divine justice and 
human justice. Divine justice into natural justice and legislative 
justice, and also human justice into individual justice and 
social justice. According to him, individual justice is basis of 
social justice and Divine justice and faith are basis of individual 
justice. He believes that social justice cannot be contrary to 
individual justice.^^ 
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To him justice in tlie society is as foundations of a 
building. Tliat is tine society is based on justice and witliout 
justice there is no society.^^ 
Mutahhari has emphasized on the equality before law in 
Islam and he believes that law should consider all individuals 
equally, without any discrimination. In other words, legal 
justice means treating equals equally and unequal unequally 
but in proportion to their relevant differences.^-^ His idea of 
legal equality is based on Aristotle's theory who considers that 
there cannot be law for the slave and the master. The slave 
and the master should be treated separately. All slaves are 
equal before law and all masters are equal before law but the 
legislation is different. In the case of Islam the Muslim and 
infidels are not equal. All infidels are equal before their law and 
Muslims are equal before their law. 
Mutahhari in the confirmation on the economic justice has 
criticized socialism and capitalism. And has denied socialists 
theory of justice in which all people should live similar. 
According to this idea, every one should work to the extent to 
his ability but every one should spend to the extent to his 
needs. This idea leads to the exploitation. This treatment of 
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justice is pure socialistic. And there is no liberty for 
individual.^'* 
He has also criticized Liberals for their theory of justice. 
Because this view emphasizes only the individual property, And 
there is no social justice.^^ To him, these two theories prevent 
progress of society and promote coercion therein.^^ 
According to him, one of the important rights of man is 
liberty, that within it the freedom of speech and thought is 
more important than the other types of liberty.^^ In his book, 
Barrasi-ye, ijmaliye mabani-ye Iqtisade islami. He has 
emphasized that "Islam has granted equal rights of property, 
liberty, and self judgement, for all without any 
discrimination".^® 
He holds racial equality for men in the society, because 
he believes in natural rights regardless of sex, race, and 
colour.^^ He draws support for his belief in racial equality from 
the Quran and tradition. The Quran says, "O Ye People, we 
created you male and female, and we made you races and 
tribes, that you might know one another. Verily the noblest 
among you is the most pious".^°° 
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The noble Prophet of Islam says: 
"People are all equal like the teeth of comb".^ °^  
Mutahharl finally has suggested the faith as supporter of 
law and justice. All men in the society have equal opportunity 
but they have to struggle to get it.^ °^ 
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SHARIATI-ALI ( 1933 -1977 ) 
Shariati an eminent Iranian scholar, believed that Islam 
has a unique culture which is neither totally spiritual, nor 
totally mystical, nor completely Philosophical, and nor entirely 
materialistic and technological. But it is a mixture of faith, 
idealism and spirituality and yet full of life and energy with a 
dominant spirit of equality and justice. 
The nucleus of shariati's thought is the problem of 
justice. In fact, justice, politics, and true government are his 
basic concerns.^°-^ 
The idea of justice in shariati is not marginal problem 
rather it is a basic problem and the kernel of his social 
thoughts. And the whole of his thought is full of repetitions.^^'^ 
Shariati believed that justice is one of the fundamental 
characters of Islam and shiism.^°^ 
He makes a universal appeal to the people to imbibe 
justice in Islam. He criticizes the method of philosophers and 
theologians. He believes that justice in Islam is not an abstract 
metaphysical concept but a concrete social problem. He says: 
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"In Islam particularly shiism I see the root of justice deep in 
society". ^°^ 
Siiariatl considers the Islam of Ali (Al-Islam al-Alawi) to 
be the quintessential expression of a polarized view of society 
based on the struggling classes, the correct outcome of which 
struggle should lead to the transformation of present class and 
power structures and the imposition of the economic political 
and social power of the oppressed and dispossessed 
(Mustadhafin) over the proprietors and oppressors 
(Mustakbirin). 
Shariati believes "Shiism is based on two principles: (1) 
Justice (2) Imamate, but he is depressed to say that the shiah 
have not realized the spirit. They only follow them as faith".^°'' 
He holds that justice cannot be explained only with logical 
and intellectual arguments or social expediency but on the 
contrary it can be understood by the creation of the order in 
the universes. If we say that the order in the universe is 
established on the basis of justice, it follows that the social 
system, which it is the part of the universe is also rooted in 
justice. ^°^ 
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To him, "justice means social equality and equality of 
human rights, and economic equality. The system is based on 
the unity of God and universal justice".^°^ 
Regarding the unity of God (tawhid), he criticizes the 
others views and says: "My world-view consists of tawhid. 
Tawhid in the sense of oneness of God is of course accepted by 
all monotheists."^^° But tawhid as world-view in the sense I 
intend in my theory means regarding the whole universe as a 
unity, instead of dividing it into this world and the hereafter, 
the natural and the supernatural, substance and meaning, 
spirit and body. I t means regarding the whole of existence as a 
single form, a single living and conscious organism, possessing 
will, intelligence, feeling and purpose. There are many people 
who believe in tawhid, but only as a religious-philosophical 
theory, meaning nothing but "God is one, not more than one". 
But I take tawhid in the sense of a world-view, and I am 
convinced that Islam also intends it in this sense. I regard 
polytheism (Shirk) in a similar fashion; it is a world-view that 
regards the universe as a discordant assemblage full of 
disunity, contradiction, and heterogeneity, possessing a variety 
of independent and clashing poles, conflicting tendencies. 
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variegated and unconnected desires, reckonings, customs, 
purposes and wills. Tawhid sees the world as an empire; shirk 
as a feudal system".^^^ 
Shariati after explanation of the concept of tawhid, says, 
" I have said that very structure of tawhid cannot accept 
contradiction or disharmony in the world. According to the 
world-view of tawhid, therefore, there is no contradiction in all 
of existence, no contradiction between man and nature, spirit 
and body, this world and the hereafter,matter and meaning nor 
can tawhid accept legal, class, social, political, racial, natlnal, 
territorial, genetic or even economic contradictions, for it 
implies a mode of looking upon all being as a unity".^^^ 
Shariati criticized Marx who considers economic factor to 
be the basis of society. For him morality, politics, and rights 
are secondary. In this way justice also becomes secondary. 
Shariati divided Marx's thought into three stages: the young 
Marx, the mature Marx and the old Marx. The mature Marx was 
for him more consistent theoretically, more forceful morally 
and more palatable religiously. 
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Shariati also thinks that the basis of society is the unity 
of God and justice is its product.^^^ 
Under the influence of Marx and George Gurwich Shariati 
defines class. In his book, Umma and Imannat, he defines class 
in which the individuals live together. The individuals have the 
same style of life and the same profession with equal wages 
form a class. ^^ "^  
The Ideal Society - The Umma 
According to shariati, "The ideal society of Islam is called 
the nation (Umma). Taking the place of all the similar concepts 
which in different languages and cultures designate a human 
agglomeration or society, such as society, nation, race, people, 
tribe, clan, etc., is the single word nation (Umma), a word 
imbued with progressive spirit and implying dynamic, 
committed and ideological social vision."^^^ 
"The word Umma derives from the root amm, which has 
the sense of path and intention. The nation (umma) is, 
therefore, a society in which a number of individuals, 
possessing a common faith and goal, come together in 
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harmony with the intention of advancing and moving toward 
their common goal."^^^ 
While other expressions denoting human agglomerations 
have taken unity of blood or soil and the sharing of material 
benefit as the criterion of society, Islam, by choosing the word 
umma, has made intellectual responsibility and shared 
movement toward a common goal the basis of its social 
philosophy.^^^ "The infrastructure of the nation (umma) is the 
economy, because "whoever has no worldly life has no spiritual 
life". Its social system is based on equity and justice and 
ownership by the people, on the revival of the system of Abel, 
the society of human equality and thus also of brotherhood-
the classless society. This is a fundamental principle, but it is 
not the aim, as in western socialism, which has retained the 
world-view of the western bourgeoisie. The political philosophy 
and the form of regime of the nation (umma) is not the 
democracy of heads, not irresponsible and directionless 
liberalism which is a plaything of contesting social forces, not 
putrid aristocracy, not anti, popular dictatorship, not a self-
imposing oligarchy. I t consists rather of purity of leadership 
(not the Idader, for that would be fascism), committed and 
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revolutionary leadership, responsible for the movement and 
growth of society on the basis of its world-view and ideology, 
and for the realization of the divine destiny of man in the plane 
of creation. This is the true meaning of Imamate".^^^ 
Equality before law, Economic Equality, Racial Equality, 
and Liberty: 
Like socialists shariati includes equality before law, 
economic equality, racial equality, and liberty in the concept of 
justice. 
In general, in the history of political thought, justice is 
defined as equality and one of the ingredients of justice. It has 
two meanings; one is that every one has equal before law.^^^ 
Accepting this meaning shariati brings in Imamate under 
this provision. He defines Imamate to give a guidance to every 
one in the society. The basis of this Ideology is that Imam 
performs a very task of guidance. 
He is more responsible to law than subjects. His guidance 
has to be in the legal framework of religion. Not in accordance 
with his personal whims.^^° 
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The other meaning of the legal equality is that all those 
having equal rights enjoy legal justice. Explaining it he points 
out that Aristotle in the ancient times and liberalism in the 
modern times support this meaning of legal justice.^^^ 
Shariati disapproves the second meaning of the legal 
justice. He criticizes Aristotle same that the other meaning of 
the legal justice. Aristotle supports only higher classes. He 
excludes slaves from his concept of justice. Shariati agrees 
with the Marxist concept of radical justice, wiges, available to 
a l l . i " 
Liberty and equality are closely related. There is 
difference of opinion. Some scholars believe that liberty can 
exist without equality. Others hold that liberty and equality are 
inevitable for each other. Those who support radical justice are 
of the view that political equality and economic equality are 
based on the concept of liberty. They argue that justice without 
liberty is empty. Shariati also defends radical justice. He holds, 
economic equality and the idea of collective property are based 
on liberty.^^-^ 
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Shariati opposes capitalist system. Because in this system 
tliere is a difference of class, in which we have the haves and 
have nots. The capitalist system promotes class division and 
economic, social, and legal discrimination. Shariati therefore 
condemns capitalism and advocates socialism in which there is 
no discrimination of either type. 
In the capitalist system individual property is basic 
element but shariati opposes it and like Rousseau and Marx 
bleives that appearance of individual property is the cause of 
human conflict.^^'* 
He holds under influence of Max Weber that man 
possessed right to property as a natural right but with the 
quarrel of Abel and Cain innate right to property was 
challenged. 
The Philosophy of History: Cain and Abel: 
Shariati has mentioned that "according to the Islamic 
school of thought, the philosophy of history is based on a 
certain kind of historical determinism".^^^ 
He says: "History is without doubt a reality, just like the 
other realities in the world. I t began at a certain point, and 
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must inevitably and at a certain point. I t must have an aim and 
a direction. Wliere did it begin? Lil<e man himself, with the 
beginning of the contradiction!"^^^ 
He has also mentioned that "the sons of Adam were both 
men, human and natural, but they were at war with each 
other. One killed the other, and the history of humanity began. 
The story of Cain and Abel is the source for our philosophy of 
history, just as that of Adam is the source for our philosophy of 
man."^^^ The war between Cain and Abel is the war between 
two opposing fronts that has existed throughout history, in the 
form of historical dialectic. The contradiction begins with the 
killing of Abel by Cain. Now Abel, in my opinion, represents the 
age of a pasture-based economy, of the primitive socialism 
that preceded ownership, and Cain represents the system of 
agriculture, and individual or monopoly ownership. Thereafter a 
permanent war began so that the whole of history became the 
stage for a struggle between the ruler and the ruled. Abel the 
pastoralist was killed by Cain the landowner; the period of 
common ownership of the sources of production - the age of 
pastoralism, hunting and fishing- the spirit of brotherhood and 
true faith, came to an end and was replaced by the age of 
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agriculture and the establishment of the system of private 
ownership, together with religious trickery and transgression 
against the rights of others, Abel disappeared, and Cain came 
to the forefront of history, and there he still lives."^^® 
The agricultural system resulted in a restricting of the 
sources of production present in nature. Before, this, the 
individual had not existed in human society; the tribe itself was 
the individual. But, with the coming of agriculture, that unitary 
society, where all men were like the brothers in a single 
household, was divided. The human family that had been 
overflowing with freedom, peace, tranquility and warring and 
contradictory camps.^^^ 
Shariati says, "we can thus attain a profound 
understanding of the contradiction between the two types, 
Abel, the man of faith, peaceable and self-sacrificing, and Cain, 
the worshipper of passions, the transgressor, the fratricide, by 
means of psychological analysis and on the basis of a scientific 
and sociological examination of their environment, their 
occupations and their class".^^° 
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He believes that "it is for tliis reason that the war of 
religion against religion has also been a constant of human 
history. On the one hand the religion of shirk, of assigning 
partners to God, a religion that furnishes the justification for 
shirk in society and class discrimination. On the other hand is 
the religion of tawhid, of the oneness of God, which furnishes 
the justification for the unity of all classes and races. The 
transhistorical struggle between Abel and Cain is also the 
struggle between tawhid and shirk, between justice and human 
unity on the one hand, and social and raical discrimination on 
the other".^^^ 
"Shariati emphasizes the concepts like 
holy-tax; charity, and spending money 
and he especially emphasized the verse, 
Kanz. Abu Dharr in opposition to Uthman 
and Muawiya was favoured by him for his 
emphasis on justice. He held that spend 
thrift would be tortured in hell".^^^ 
He concerning equity (qist) says, " In the Quran and 
Traditions there are two word, one is equity (qist) and the 
other, is justice. Opposite of equity (qist) is injustice and 
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opposite of justice is oppression. Tliey are used as synonyms. 
But shariati disagrees witli it. In liis opinion, equity is the basis 
of every thing, and therefore is more important."^-^^ 
He says, "Justice (adi) refers mostly to the legal relations 
between individuals and groups, on the basis of the laws laid 
down in society. Equity (qist) refers to the equal enjoyment by 
all men of the fruits of their labor and of their rights, whether 
or not this is recognized by law. Justice implies the existence 
of a judicial system, and equity relates to the structure of 
society. In order to have justice, the judiciary must be 
reformed; in order to have equity, the social system must be 
changed-not superficially, but in its fundamental structure".^•''^ 
"Justice means giving every one his due before 
law. Equity (qist) means giving every one 
according to his actual contribution, to the 
society. The concept of justice does not 
include the concept of equity (qist) but the 
concept of equity includes it therein".^-^^ 
Shariti holds that the Quran has emphasized to establish 
the award of equity (qist) as a duty of the community (umma). 
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the Prophet and the Imam. He says for the establishment of 
the award of equity, we need an economic revolution in the 
distribution of property. 
One of the forms of justice in shariati's idea is racial 
equality, that it has discussed from the ancient time. 
Totalitarianism is the newest type of racial discrimination in the 
form of Nazism that held superior to the blacks and the yellows 
and the reds.^^^ 
Without doubt shariati argues this form of justice 
substantiating it from the Quran that states: 
" 0 Ye people, we created you male and 
female, and we made you races and 
tribes, that you might know one another. 
Verily the noblest among you is the most 
pious".^^^ 
The black Africans embrace Islam due to its racial 
equality. After being convinced with its principle of justice they 
accepted its other articles of faith like unity of God, 
Prophethood and the Quran.^^^ 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Justice in Islam is not only an ethical value but also 
included in its fai th. The larger community, albeit, does not 
regard it as one of the articles of faith yet it believes in its 
being one of the attributes of God. Being an attr ibute it is 
envisaged as important ingredient of Islamic Faith. Justice in 
Islam is thus not ethical but metaphysical and ontological. 
God inheares it in his essence. I t is evidently included in his 
being. 
I t should not however be understood that there is no 
ethical significance of justice in Islam. I t is not only an 
intrinsic value but also an end. In case of its being a means 
it insures some higher end. Unlike Judaism and Christianity, 
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Islam recognizes the theory of balance (mizan) between 
retribution and reformation. Although, Islam favours 
retr ibution, it nevertheless encourages forgiveness. I t is 
against coercion by way of retribution unless it is 
indispensable. Islam does not advocate passive resistance to 
worlds any atrocious attempt. In such a case one may 
properly retaliate to the extent that the person is aptly paid. 
In Christianity the case is otherwise. I t propagates complete 
submission to the will of the adversary. By doing so, it aims 
to reform him so that he may become a true Christian. Islam 
discourages such treatment and considers it to be injustice. 
In fact it teaches to stand against any coercion inflicted 
upon either on your own self or anybody else. Justice in 
Islam is a practical necessity which safeguards its followers 
from cruelty. 
In order to avert coercion and to dispense with justice, 
Islam has recommended a well knit system of punishment, 
their actions are broadly classified as sins virtues. As sin is 
pragmatically an impermissible action. I t is cruel by nature 
and is, thus, harmful either to yiour ownself or to the 
society. The Quran has given a long list of dos and don'ts 
(awamir-v-nahi). Justice in Islam means, particularly in 
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ethical context, to abstain from the interdicted and to 
practice the permitted. The traditions (hadith) of the prophet 
and the juridical schools have explained in details the 
expediencies inherent in the actions termed as the sin and 
the virtue. There is of course a disagreement in the schools 
of i^uslim Philosophy regarding the criterion of declaring 
action either as sin or otherwise. The Mutazllah hold the 
reason to be a sufficient criterion to discern good and evil, 
but the rival school defies it and considers the Quran to be 
the only guide of its judgement, Islam has successfully 
attempted to establish the rule of justice by delivering an 
appropriate system of reward and punishment. They are not 
merely legal and moral sanctions but also reformative acts. 
In the ethical system of Islam the reward aims at setting up 
a healthy social system. The punishment is conducive to the 
provision of such society, which is based on justice and 
benevolence. 
Justice in Islam is reflected in action. I t is embodied in 
the nature of things. The Quran has shown the right path 
(siraat-e-mustaqim). Man must peruse it for his 
emancipation from same. Justice is revealed in: action, 
things, and events. God through His message has classified 
the actions as right and wrong. The right one's are justice 
261 
and the wrong one's are tyrannical. In addition God has also 
declared things as permissible and impermissible (halal and 
harma). The followers are required to act accordingly. To 
obey the command is justice, the otherwise is atrocious. The 
events should be classified as social and natural. They occur 
in t ime and in space. God alone has the knowledge of their 
occurrence. I t is more true in the case of natural events. 
Some of the social events, however may be predicted. They 
are also, as believed, the consequence of God's wil l . 
Whatever takes place by the will of God is just ice. Even the 
natual events in particular, which bring out atrocities to 
man, are just because they maintaine balance in nature, and 
balance is justice. 
The justice in Islam includes in its connotation all the 
acts of God reflected to the actions, things, and events. The 
Quran categorically asserts, whatever God does, is justice. 
There is a tradit ion (hadith) of the prophet, " i f God sends me 
and my brother Moses into the hell, it will be just ice". The 
tradit ion suggests that no cruelty can be attached to God. 
We are not aware of the expediencies of God. Our knowledge 
of things is l imited. We know them only as the appearance. 
On the contrary God's knowledge of things is unlimited. He 
knows the internalities of things decides upon them 
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accordingly. There is a story of tl ie looses and Ichidr in 
Quran, defining justice in its own way. It says: The Moses 
once saw the Ichidr and requested him to conne with him for 
the journey around the world and said to Khidhr, you teach 
me something of that knowledge which you have been 
taught (by God). The khidr agreed on the condition that the 
Moses would not ask him any question. The prophet 
assented they went on. The Moses against the agreement 
asked him several questions. His companion abandoned him 
after explaining the expediencies, of the events. Akin to 
killing a boy, the sinking of a ferry with many passengers, 
and the repairing a wall about to collapse. The story 
contains apparently three different events, but based on 
justice as the expediencies suggest. I t is obvious then that 
all actions of God, every event that takes place, all things 
that follow from Him is justice. 
Islam speaks of and also aims at establishing social 
just ice, economic justice, and legal justice. I t is the first 
religion which tries to fill in the gap between the rich and 
the poor. The other Semitic and non Semitic religions 
augment the cleavage between the two classes. Islam 
teaches that all its followers in particular and all the human 
beings in general are the servants of God. The Almighty 
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distinguishes them on the basis of their piety. The Quran 
very frequently describes Him as the harbinger of many 
world (rabb-ul-Alamin). He is the creator of every thing, 
every being. He is omnipotent and omniscient. He deals with 
his servants most mercifully and kindly. He is cruel to none. 
He has created man with myriad potentialities and 
capacities. Man can develop them and avail the opportunity 
on equal footing. 
Islam for the first time recognized the rights of the 
poor. I t has very unequivocally ascertained the rights of the 
different classes of society. I t classifies the rights into two 
broad categories namely the rights of man and the rights of 
God. Along with it Islam has also assigned duties to man. 
Every one must finished the task before he claims for his 
rights. Islam aims at establishing a balance between the 
rights and the duties. In addition to this Islam is the first 
religion to have encouraged the abolition of slavery in a 
phase manner, of course. There are verses of the Quran and 
the traditions of the prophet which speak of the award after 
emancipation of slave. Freeing slave is deemed to be the 
right atonement of a particular sin. By doing so Islam 
establishes a kingdom of ends instead of the world of 
means. 
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Islam confirms to the social justice based on economic 
equality. I ts taxation also aims at achieving the goal by 
reducing the gap between the poor and the rich. The Quran 
emphatically asserts on the dispensation of economic justice 
by introducing free flow of wealth through the system of 
Zakat. I t may be rightly pointed out that Islam has done 
little to bridge the chism. I t has nevertheless made an 
honest effort to achieve the goal more than any other 
religion in the world. 
Besides Islam also emphasizes the equality before law. 
I t has provided a code of life applicable to all its followers. 
There is no discrimination of the master and slave, the rich 
and the poor. The actions of every individual will be judged 
in accordance with the provisions of the law in this world 
and the next as well. The quantum of punishment will be 
decided on the nature of action. The Islamic law recognizes 
the bulk of the crime and the punishment there of. I t deals 
with the individuals on the basis of justice by maintaining 
the balance between the crime and the punishment, unlike 
other religions it does not agree with the principle one crime 
one punishment. The nature the mode of punishment is to 
be and determined in accordance with the tenacity of the 
crime. The Islamic law aims at removing the evil from 
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society instead of prosecuting tlie human beings. Tlie 
Islannic law also intends to reform the people by regulating 
the actions of the individuals. I t recognizes the human 
weakness and wins over them by imposing legal sanctions. 
Justice demands that the human weakness should be taken 
into account. They cannot be separated altogether but 
controlled to the process of legalization. Islam advocates to 
transform the nature of action as it has done in the case of 
biological desires by institutionalizing the social acts of 
marriage and family formation. Islam desires to transform 
the community as law abiding citizens without any 
unnecessary afflictions. Islam does not discriminate in the 
execution of law. I t maintains a balance between various 
sections of society. Justice in Islam also means liberty and 
brotherhood. Islam guarantees full liberty to its followers in 
all walks of life, but within its fold. A Muslim enjoys 
economic and political liberty. He is also free to follow his 
conscience. He can choose any profession allowed by the 
religion, Islam also encourages free trade but it should be 
based on just relations. It allows no deception or dishonesty 
in the business offers. Another to check operation of the 
poor by the rich, it declares the usury as forbidden (haram). 
I t also does not permit the l^uslims to indulge in the trade of 
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intoxicants so t l iat the otiier fellow brothers nnay not face 
the danger of getting into the bad habits. Besides providing 
the liberty Islam checks, the intrusion of evil in the society. 
Islam maintains a balance between the liberty and the perils 
there of. 
Islam propagates the concept of human brotherhood. 
All are the creation of God and also His servants. No one has 
the right to despise the other. God is the creator. No man 
has therefore any right to kill any one except in the case, he 
becomes his enemy. The servants of God may wage ware 
against each other only for the sake of God. 
Islam emphasizes Jehad the (holy war) but imposes 
some requisite conditions. The Islamic formulation of society 
is based on justice. I t discourages the causes of personal 
antagonism. The system of its vice and virtue sets up a 
moral society based on high ideals. 
The concept of justice has also ethical connotation. I t 
is a virtue in itself and is closely related to the concept of 
sin, reward, and punishment. Unlike Christianity Islam 
classifies actions into good and evil. The good is virtue and 
the evil is sin. Justice demands that the virtue should be 
recompensed with reward and the sin be repaid with 
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punishment. The Quran categorically asserts to enjoin good 
and eschew evil. Islam further categorizes the sins into the 
major and minor. The Quran promises to punish the sinner 
in accordance with the magnitude of the sin. God however 
may forgive the sinner or otherwise may transform the bulk 
of punishment. 
Justice anticipates the will of God. The Quran affirms 
that God is the Master of the day of judgement. He is the 
best judge. He can forgive the sinner and punish the pious. 
Justice also anticipates the knowledge of God. He Knows, 
what we are not aware of. The sin and the piety are better 
known to him. Thus, justice in Islam in ethical, context 
depends on the knowledge and the will of god. Many verses 
of the Quran support the contention. 
Justice means to evaluate and judge the nature of 
action and the consequence, it follows. The action depends 
on the capacity ( istetaat), the doer possesses. There has 
been a controversy as to who has created the capacities in 
man. The Mutazilah believe that the capacities are inborn. 
They are divulgated as and when necessary. 
The occasion helps them out to express themselves. 
They are the traits of man's disposition. For this reason the 
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individual behaviour towards different stimulus Is 
distinguished. The reward and punishment is to be decided 
accordingly. The Ashariyah on the contrary are convinced 
that God creates man with different capacities it means that 
God is the creator of the capacities as well. Man has been 
given the choice of the use and abuse. The Quran has clearly 
asserted the use. I t the capacities are so expressed they 
become the cause of reward. If is, however, contented that 
God my judge the actions as to His wil l . I t is in refutation to 
the Mutazilah doctrine of promises and threats (vad v-vaid). 
The capacities have been interpreted as destiny by the later 
Ashariya thinkers like Ghazzali and shah wall ullah. Justice 
means to appropriate the capacities in the manner Islam 
permitted. 
All the terms like adl, mizan, and qist that Quran uses 
are the shades of justice. They have different connotation 
but guxtapositly related to each other. 
God, being all powerful, is the source of every thing so 
also the justice. He is the dispenser. Man implements, what 
is bestowed. In justice being a negative concept cannot be 
attr ibuted to God, all his actions are just. I t is, similarly, 
expected from man that he would dispense with justice in 
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the ethical sense and the social plane. Islam through its 
concept of justice promotes individual and social welfare. In 
addition to this it looks after the development of the 
individual and the society. The social just ice, as stated, can 
be dispensed with by maintaining the balance between the 
individual's rights and the social obligations. Besides it can 
be obtained by allowing the individual to have his share in 
all the socio-economic realms not only in the course of rights 
but also responsibilities. The terms mizan and qist, as 
pointed out earlier, have a social reference. I t is also 
important to note that Islam does not only rectify the 
individual morality but also presents moral norms for the 
society. Justice in Islam is not merely normative concept but 
also a positive one. I t has practical implications affecting the 
social and individual life. I t is a virtue as well as a concept 
having metaphysical bearing. Justice means nothing but 
power it is shared by individuals. Those, who possess it, are 
strong and can affect, sometimes dictate the other 
individuals. I t is a power to judge individual actions as right 
or wrong. The power is sometimes institutionalized: in the 
case of a monarch, a dictator, a head of the family or a 
judge of a court. His decision, as the case, may be, is f inal. 
He is given the power to judge. I t is sometimes delegated. 
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sometimes assumed. In the case of religions including Islam 
the power of justice rests with the necessary, being God. He 
is the source from where it originates and terminates. The 
people in the world exercise it accordance with the law 
promulgated by God. Justice in Islam is dispensed with the 
guiding principles laid down in the Sharia. The power of 
justice is exercised by the individual in a hierarchical manner 
where as in religions there is only one authority of justice, 
absolute in nature, form and content. 
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